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The basis for an arbitral proceeding is usually an arbitration agreement. In most situations, the arbitration agreement is included as 
an arbitration clause in the main agreement. Even if the arbitration clause seems to be a part of the main agreement, it has in 
accordance with the doctrine of separability to be regarded as a separate agreement from the main agreement. Without the doctrine 
of separability, the arbitral tribunal would lose its competence by ruling the main agreement, of which the arbitration clause would be 
a part invalid, terminated or non-existent. Consequently, the alleged invalidity of the main agreement does not automatically affect 
the arbitration clause and a separate assessment of the validity of the arbitration clause has to be done.  
 
The doctrine of separability has been justified with both the intent of the parties to solve all disputes regarding the main agreement 
by arbitration and with efficiency arguments, as for instance protection of the competence of the arbitral tribunal. In most jurisdictions, 
the doctrine of separability is accepted, but the exact scope and applicability of the doctrine varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
 
This thesis aims to determine the scope of the doctrine of separability and in addition, to create general rules for assessing the scope 
of the doctrine. The thesis aspires to clarify the legal state regarding the scope and applicability of the doctrine of separability in 
Finland. However, there is not much case law and legal doctrine concerning the doctrine of separability in Finland. Therefore, in 
addition to the legal dogmatic method, also a comparative method is used. The comparison is done with both international arbitration 
practice and as a Nordic comparison, focusing mainly on Sweden. The doctrine has been more thoroughly studied in both Sweden 
and internationally than in Finland. By clarifying the scope of the doctrine of separability, many conflicts regarding the competence 
of the arbitral tribunal could be avoided. 
 
The thesis is structured to first assess specific situations of applicability of the doctrine of separability and then assess if any general 
rules for the scope and applicability of the doctrine can be made. Regarding the specific situations of applicability, the doctrine is in 
Finland applied for at least separating the arbitration clause from a main agreement that is allegedly invalid or terminated. When it 
comes to a main agreement alleged to be non-existent, there is no consensus regarding if the doctrine should be applied. In the 
thesis, I have argued that the doctrine of separability should be applied even if the main agreement is allegedly non-existent. Other-
wise, for instance a concluded arbitration clause in a draft agreement would be regarded as non-existent, if the main agreement is 
not concluded. 
 
When it comes to the applicability of the doctrine of separability to choice of law clauses in the main agreement, Finnish doctrine 
seems to have taken the standpoint that a separate assessment of the law applicable to the arbitration clause has to be done. 
Consequently, a choice of law clause in the main agreement does not automatically reach to the arbitration clause. However accord-
ing to Finnish case law and literature, the doctrine of separability cannot reach to the interpretation and adjustment of arbitration 
clauses. In accordance with general contract law principles, arbitration clauses have to be interpreted and adjusted in the light of the 
main agreement.  
 
The second part of the research regards if any general rules can be applied to determine the scope and applicability of the doctrine 
of separability. I suggest that the doctrine of separability should be applied to all situations where the main agreement and the 
arbitration clause interconnects. The arbitration clause is a procedural agreement that is auxiliary to the substantive main agreement 
and thus has certain tasks and features that have to be protected by evaluating the arbitration clause separately. The doctrine of 
separability is a tool for contractual construction, which enables the courts and tribunals to give proper effect to the arbitration clause 
and the will of the parties. It does in no other way prevent the interaction between the agreements. When separately assessing and 
interpreting the arbitration clause, the general contract law rules determine the outcome of the assessment.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Because of its benefits, today many commercial disputes are resolved by arbitration instead 
of litigation. Particularly in cross-border matters, arbitration has gained ground from the tra-
ditional court proceedings.1 There are several reasons for commercial parties to choose ar-
bitration instead of general courts, for instance the flexibility of the proceeding, the finality 
of the award, its speed and the confidentiality of the proceeding and the award.2  
Arbitration is an old method of solving disputes that has been used for centuries.3 Arbitration 
clauses are probably the oldest dispute resolution clauses used, at least in the Western 
World.4 Even if arbitration has long been used, at least courts in common law countries were 
reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements for many centuries.5 During the 20th century ar-
bitration has gradually been made more attractive, for instance by the introduction of the 
doctrine of separability. 
To gain all benefits connected with arbitration, the careful drafting of the arbitration clause 
is vital. Especially the finality, the speed and the flexibility of the proceeding depends on the 
arbitration clause.6 A conflict regarding the validity of the clause or regarding the content of 
the clause can lead to challenges in general courts, which affects the finality of the award, 
delays the proceeding and rises the costs. A poorly drafted arbitration clause also decreases 
the possibility for a tailor-made and flexible proceeding.  
It is more common that the parties use an arbitration clause in the main agreement, than that 
they conclude a separate arbitration agreement.7 However, an arbitration agreement separate 
                                                          
1 Möller 1997, p. 8. 
2 Möller 1997, p. 7-8; Hemmo has highlighted the following factors as the benefits of arbitration; 1. The speed 
of the proceeding; 2. The flexibility of the proceeding; 3. The expertise of the tribunal; 4. The possibility to 
affect the formation of the tribunal; and 5. The confidentiality of the proceeding and the award, Hemmo 
2005, p. 371-373.  
3 For instance in the US, arbitration was already used during the colonialization, Poser 1993, p. 1095.  
4 Koulu 2009, p. 72; In the Western World, arbitration has been used at least since medieval times, Cohen & 
Dayton 1926, p. 266; In Finland and Sweden, arbitration has been used at least since the 17th century, Möller 
1996, p. 441. 
5 Van Wezel Stone 1999, p. 973; In England, the scepticism subsided in the end of the 18th and in the begin-
ning of the 19th centuries and in the US and internationally in the beginning of the 20th century, Van Wezel 
Stone 1999, p. 974-976. 
6 According to Savola, a poorly drafted arbitration clause can lead to the invalidity of the clause or to the 
arbitral award being null and void or set aside. Even if the consequences are not always that serious, a poorly 
drafted clause can at least lead to conflicts that slows down the proceeding and raises the costs for the par-
ties, Savola 2008, p. 15. 
7 Koulu 2009, p. 17. 
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from the main agreement does not raise as many concerns regarding the interpretation and 
validity of the agreement than the clause does.8 Arbitration clauses are usually only short 
standard clauses. This raises questions regarding the interpretation of the clause, since it is 
less detailed than an arbitration agreement. Often the clause is formulated as a boilerplate 
clause, which means that it is formulated identically regardless of the type or content of the 
main agreement.9 According to a study by the Queen Mary University of London, 48 % of 
all used arbitration clauses are standard clauses.10 This is problematic, since in a conflict 
situation the clause can turn out to be ill-fitted for the conflict at hand. Out of context, the 
clause is not very informative and needs other interpretative sources to fulfil its function 
properly. 
The most logical approach would be that the arbitration clause would be considered as a part 
of the main agreement and interpreted in the light of the main agreement. This is the starting 
point for interpretation of contract clauses in general contract law.11 However, the well ac-
cepted doctrine of separability restricts the interaction between the main agreement and the 
arbitration clause, since according to the doctrine the main agreement and the arbitration 
clause are two separate agreements.12 Originally, the aim with the doctrine has been to pro-
tect the arbitration clause from the invalidity of the main agreement, but in many legal sys-
tems the scope of the doctrine is broader and covers also other aspects of the interaction 
between the arbitration clause and the main agreement. 
The doctrine of separability is much younger than arbitration as a manner of dispute resolu-
tion and it needed time to break through in the Western world.13 During the first part of the 
18th century, it was in many countries normal to regard the arbitration clause as a part of the 
                                                          
8 A separate arbitration agreement is usually more detailed than an arbitration clause since it is less depend-
ent of the main agreement. Also, an arbitration agreement is usually more carefully considered compared to 
an arbitration clause. The arbitration clause is usually only included in the main agreement at a late stage of 
the drafting of a contract, without any comprehensive negotiations. The arbitration agreement is often con-
cluded after the conflict already has escalated and consequently the parties are well aware of the needs and 
demands of the upcoming conflict. 
9 Koulu 2009, p. 48. 
10 Queen Mary University of London: International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2006, p. 11. 
11 Regarding the interpretation of contract clauses, see chapter 4.1. 
12 Regarding the definition of the doctrine of separability, see chapter 2.1. 
13 Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 168; In the United States, the doctrine of separability was first introduced by 
the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. 
Co., 388 US 395 (1967), p. 403-404; In France, the doctrine was introduced by the Cour de Cassation in 1963, 
Raymond Gosset v. Carapelli, JCP, Ed. G., Pt. II, No. 13,405 (1963); In the United Kingdom, the doctrine was 
quite lately accepted by the Court of Appeal in Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International 
Insurance Co Ltd, 1 Q.B. 701 (1993)  and a couple of years later added to the Arbitration Act in 1996. 
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main agreement.14 Today, the doctrine has become one of the most fundamental cornerstones 
of international arbitration.15 As evidence of this evolution, in addition to the acceptance of 
the doctrine of separability in most countries, the doctrine is also codified in many interna-
tional conventions.16  
In some countries, the doctrine of separability is included in the legislation and in others it 
has evolved by case law.17 There are also examples of countries where the doctrine has first 
been accepted in case law and later explicitly codified in national legislation.18 Even if the 
doctrine in its modern form is quite recently accepted, the benefits of the doctrine have been 
recognised long before. Historically in some countries, the arbitration clauses had to be made 
in a separate physical agreement to avoid the problems related to pleas of the non-binding 
or invalid nature of the main agreement.19 
The doctrine of separability was introduced in the Nordics quite early compared to many 
other Western countries.20 In Finland, the first writings regarding the doctrine date back to 
the 1940s. Already in 1943, Tirkkonen summarized the international discussions concerning 
the separability doctrine and concluded that the legal state was unclear.21 He stated that in 
his opinion the arbitration clause should be regarded as a separate agreement, which can be 
considered as the first reference to the existence of the doctrine in Finland.22 As sources for 
                                                          
14 Born 2014A, p. 354. 
15 See e.g. Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 75; Madsen 2016B, p. 654; Born 2014A, p. 350; Hobér 2011, p. 107; Susler 
2009, p. 119; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 202; Svernlöv 1992, p. 115; It is difficult to find national decisions, 
national legislation or international awards rejecting the doctrine, Born 2014A, p. 395; Despite this, there are 
also scholars supporting the abolishment of the doctrine, Ware 2007, p. 119; The scholars not accepting the 
doctrine have been called the “non-separability doctrine scholars”, Möller 1981, p. 57. 
16 According to Born, the doctrine was first developed in the national legal systems before being codified in 
international conventions, Born 2014A, p. 358; In addition to the codification of the doctrine in many arbitra-
tion related conventions and treaties, a form of the doctrine is also included in the CISG, article 81(1). 
17 Craig et al. 2000, p. 515. 
18 Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 203-204; For instance in all Nordic countries, except for Finland, see e.g. Sweden 
where the doctrine was first accepted in the Supreme Court decision AB Norrköpings Trikåfabrik v. AB Per 
Persson (NJA 1936, p. 521) and later codified in the Swedish Arbitration Act, section 3 in 1999; In Norway, the 
doctrine had long been accepted before being added to the Arbitration Act in 2004, Berg 2006, p. 200; In 
Denmark, the doctrine was first accepted in the decision, Maritime and Commercial Court, Ugeskrift for 
Retsvaesen 1987.945 SH (27.8.1987) (referred to in Lookofsky & Kristoffersen 2006, p. 55) before being added 
to the new Danish Arbitration Act in 2005, Lookofsky & Kristoffersen 2006, p. 55. 
19 Schwebel 1987, p. 5. 
20 For instance, the doctrine of separability was accepted in Sweden by the Supreme Court in 1936 in AB 
Norrköpings Trikåfabrik v. AB Per Persson (NJA 1936, p. 521). 
21 Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124. 
22 Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124-125; Tirkkonen also wrote about the competence of the tribunal to solve disputes 
regarding the validity and termination of the main agreement, Tirkkonen 1943, p. 104; Today that compe-
tence is called as competence-competence or kompetenz-kompetenz, of which the latter term is derived 
from the German origins of the doctrine. 
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his thoughts, he quoted mostly German and Swedish sources, which means that the doctrine 
of separability was brought to Finland from the civil law tradition.23  
In case law, the doctrine has been recognized at least in connection to terminated agreements 
as early as in 1954 in KKO 1954 II 11. There is not much case law regarding the matter in 
Finland, but the doctrine was finally generally established in the decisions KKO 1988:55 
and KKO 1996:61. Today, the doctrine is generally accepted as a part of the Finnish proce-
dural law.24 The subject has not been much researched in Finland, which makes the legal 
state regarding the scope of the doctrine of separability unsettled. This thesis aims to clarify 
the unsettled legal state in this respect. 
1.2 The Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to clarify the scope of the doctrine of separability and its effects on 
the interaction between the main agreement and the arbitration clause. The main question is, 
how broad is the scope of the doctrine of separability and can any general rules regarding 
the applicability of the doctrine be made? Since the legal state is unclear in Finland, the aim 
is to clarify the legal state and present options for solving these ambiguities in Finnish arbi-
tration law. The circumstances in which the doctrine applies have been discussed on a case-
by-case basis, which has led to a situation where no general rules regarding the applicability 
of the doctrine has been developed. Thus, I will also try to find general rules regarding the 
scope of the doctrine of separability that could be applied generally to all situations where 
the applicability of the doctrine is ambiguous. 
There are many ways to solve the ambiguities. Without any legislative measures, the courts 
will get the task on their table sooner or later. By producing case law, the courts can solve 
the problems covered in the thesis, but it can take years for the right case to come up. The 
problems with waiting are significant, since the legal uncertainty can lead to costly proce-
                                                          
23 Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124-125; Generally, it seems that the civil law tradition adopted the doctrine of separa-
bility earlier than many common law countries. For instance, Switzerland adopted the doctrine already in 
1931, Leboulanger 2007, p. 6; In Sweden, the doctrine was already adapted by the Supreme Court in the 
decision AB Norrköpings Trikåfabrik v. AB Per Persson (NJA 1936, p. 521). When it comes to the common law 
countries, at least in the United States, the doctrine was accepted in the 1960s (Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 US 395) and in the United Kingdom as 
late as in the 1990s (Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd, 1 Q.B. 
701). 
24 Frände et al. 2017, p. 1307. 
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dural conflicts because there is not much material for the tribunals to consider in their deci-
sion making. This can lead to erroneous decisions and inconsistent case law by arbitral tri-
bunals. 
Another way of solving the ambiguity, is to use legislative measures. The benefits with leg-
islative measures are their accurateness and their authority. The measures are aimed to result 
in a clear rule solving the question or at least in guidelines on how the courts shall assess the 
matter. The Arbitration Act will be amended in the upcoming years, but it is unclear if there 
is a will to consider the interaction between the arbitration clause and the main agreement 
when updating the Act.25 Certainly this is a possibility, since there have been discussions 
about using the UNCITRAL Model Law as a base for the amendments and the doctrine of 
separability is included in the Model Law.26 
The way this pro gradu will assess the problem, is by letting the legal doctrine take part in 
the discussion and give well-grounded solutions and arguments aimed for solving the prob-
lem. Even if the courts does not always quote the legal doctrine, it is well-known that they 
use the literature as a source when making decisions and that lawyers use the literature in 
their argumentation. Compared to other countries, there is not much legal doctrine regarding 
the research question in Finland. Hopefully, prominent legal academics will take part in the 
discussion in the coming years.  
By better understanding how the interaction between the main agreement and the arbitration 
clause works, the drafting of arbitration clauses would be easier and many conflicts could 
certainly be avoided. Eventually, a more careful drafting will lead to economic gain and 
would avoid wasting the benefits of arbitration by arguing about procedural matters. The 
wideness of the problem is not known due to the confidential nature of the awards, but since 
most arbitration clauses are only standard clauses without for instance choice of law provi-
sions, they pose a great risk for procedural conflicts. 
                                                          
25 The Minister of Justice, Antti Häkkänen begun the evaluation of the need for reformation of the Act in the 
autumn 2018 and in late January 2019 he promised to begin the modernisation of the Act during this spring. 
Oikeusministeri Häkkänen: Välimiesmenettelylainsäädännön uudistaminen käynnistetään (25.1.2019) 
https://oikeusministerio.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/oikeusministeri-hakkanen-valimiesmenettelylainsaa-
dannon-uudistaminen-kaynnistetaan; Ministeri Häkkänen: Tehokas riidanratkaisu on yritysten kilpailukyky-
tekijä – Välimiesmenettelyn uudistamistarpeet arviointiin (11.8.2018) https://valtioneuvosto.fi/artikkeli/-
/asset_publisher/1410853/ministeri-hakkanen-tehokas-riidanratkaisu-on-yritysten-kilpailukykytekija-vali-
miesmenettelyn-uudistamistarpeet-arviointiin.  
26 Both the doctrine of competence-competence and the doctrine of separability are included in the UN-
CITRAL Model Law, article 16(1). 
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1.3 Research Questions and the Structure of the Thesis 
The research will be divided into four different research questions, every question dealt 
within a separate chapter. The research questions will assess the problem from a Finnish 
perspective. 
The first question regards the core of the doctrine of separability. How is the core of the 
doctrine of separability defined in Finland and how broad is the scope of the core? The core 
refers to the part of the doctrine that protects the arbitration clause from the alleged invalid-
ity, expiration and non-existence of the main agreement. This function of the doctrine of 
separability is widely accepted in most legal systems, but there are differences of opinion as 
to which situations should be included in the scope of the core. The core is closely connected 
with the aim of the doctrine, which consequently has to be studied thoroughly. Of interest is 
also how strong the core of the doctrine is. Is the invalidity of the arbitration clause deter-
mined by general contract law rules or is the protection of the validity of the arbitration 
clause evaluated differently from the evaluation of the validity of the main agreement? 
The second question regards choice of law clauses in the main agreement. Does the doctrine 
of separability prevent a choice of law clause in the main agreement from being applied to 
the arbitration clause? I will also assess other aspects affecting the choice of law and how 
they interact with the doctrine of separability.27 Since the applicability of the doctrine to the 
choice of law is not necessary for the fulfilment of the aim of the doctrine, it is important to 
also ask if the doctrine can be used as an argument at all, when deciding the law applicable 
to the arbitration clause. 
The third question regards interpretation and adjustment of arbitration clauses. How does 
the doctrine of separability affect the interpretation and adjustment of the arbitration 
clause? This question is interesting from a Finnish perspective. Some legal systems, espe-
cially those governed by common law adopts a more textual interpretation of clauses, while 
the Finnish system focuses primarily on a contextual interpretation.28 Even if Finland gets a 
lot of influences from other jurisdictions regarding arbitration, national principles regarding 
the manner of interpreting agreements is strong. In a contextual interpretation, it would be 
                                                          
27 I will however only briefly assess the other aspects of the choice of law question since it is a complex ques-
tion more appropriately answered in a separate thesis.  
28 The Finnish way of interpreting contracts is similar to the way used in the other Nordic countries and the 
Continental Europe, Lando 2016, p. 28; However, the aim of the interpretation is regardless of jurisdiction to 
find the common intent of the parties, Annola 2016, p. 51; Especially the English way of interpreting agree-
ments seems to be textual, even if it is evolving into a more contextual direction, Annola 2015, p. 53. 
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logical to take the main agreement into consideration when interpreting the arbitration 
clause. Thus, the question regarding the applicability of the doctrine of separability is vital 
for the interpretation of arbitration clauses.29  
Regarding adjustment, section 36 of the Contracts Act allows taking into consideration all 
circumstances, for instance the entire agreement when adjusting contract clauses. This makes 
the question interesting from the perspective of the doctrine of separability. If there are two 
separate agreements it would not be possible to consider the main agreement when adjusting 
the arbitration clause. 
Finally, the fourth research question aims to find general rules for assessing the scope and 
applicability of the doctrine of separability. The problem is that the application of the doc-
trine to invalidity, termination and non-existence of the main agreement and to choice of law 
clauses in the main agreement have been thoroughly researched abroad, but no general rules 
for the applicability and scope of the doctrine of separability have been made.30 To decide 
the scope and the borders of the doctrine of separability, it is necessary to find general rules 
that could be applied to ambiguous situations to which the applicability of the doctrine is 
unsure. 
1.4 Methodology and Branch of Law 
As methods, I have used a comparative method and a legal dogmatic method. As the research 
regards arbitration, the comparative method is necessary. Arbitration is an important way of 
solving cross-border disputes and this in itself makes it necessary to consider also interna-
tional sources. Also, arbitration is partly based on transnational principles and practice, 
which makes it inevitable to compare how these questions are solved in other countries and 
internationally.  
Since many aspects of the research questions are unresolved in Finland, this thesis will make 
a comparison with other Nordic countries and international arbitration practice and princi-
                                                          
29 Also, it has to be decided if the general contract law rules are applied to the interpretation or if there are 
special principles for the interpretation of arbitration clauses. 
30 A good example of the problems occurred are boilerplate clauses, for instance waiver and change of control 
clauses that are commonly used in the main agreements. Which makes them problematic, is that they are 
often used clauses which usually are included in the agreement “to be on the safe side” and without any 
further negotiations. There are often no hints about whether the parties intended the clauses to also be a 
part of the arbitration clause. This leaves the doctrine of separability as an important rule governing them, if 
applicable. 
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ples. The Nordic comparison will mostly be made with Sweden where the doctrine of sepa-
rability and also arbitration have been studied more extensively than in Finland and the other 
Nordic countries.31 The comparative method does not give directly applicable and compel-
ling results for the Finnish Courts but the method helps to deepen and improve the national 
legal argumentation.32 
With the legal dogmatic method is meant, research about the valid and binding law, espe-
cially the interpretation and the systematisation of the law.33 The aim of the method is to 
give practitioners (e.g. judges, lawyers) practical information and advice aimed to help them 
solve legal problems. The legal dogmatic method is inevitable for understanding the content 
of the law, interpreting the law and eventually for resolving legal problems and offering 
interpretational solutions regarding the current legislation. The method is used in this re-
search for interpreting and determining the content of the doctrine of separability in Finland.  
The methods used supplement each other. As the aim of the thesis is to fill gaps in Finnish 
arbitration law, interpretation of the existing law and a comparative study of other legal sys-
tems gives the tools to successfully fulfil this aim. As the question regards a specific field of 
contract law, the general principles of contract law is the main source for gap-filling and 
interpretation. Arbitration is a cross-border matter, which is partly governed by international 
law and principles and also gets a lot of influences from other legal systems. For a compre-
hensive study, which leads to a proper solution of the problem, the results from the both 
methods have to be compared and used in a way acceptable both from the viewpoint of the 
Finnish legal system and internationally. 
The thesis will focus on both procedural and contract law. Questions regarding arbitration 
clauses get influences from both branches of law and work in the contact surface of the two 
branches.34 The connection also leads to frictions between the principles of both branches of 
law. The general principles governing arbitration clauses are taken from the general contract 
law, but as a dispute resolution clause it also has features specific to procedural law.  
                                                          
31 For more regarding the sources, see chapter 1.5. 
32 Husa 2013, p. 33-34; Especially when solving ”hard cases”, the comparative method can give advice on how 
to fill gaps and implement the legislation, Husa 2013, p. 92. 
33 Hirvonen 2011, p. 22. 
34 Koulu 2009, p. 228. 
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Also, as arbitration clauses have special features there can be a tension between general 
procedural law and the needs of arbitration. For instance, it is not yet clear how intercon-
nected arbitration clauses and other dispute resolution clauses are which asks for caution 
when using analogy between different kinds of dispute resolution clauses.35 
1.5 Sources 
The research questions will be covered from a Finnish perspective, but a Swedish, Nordic 
and international comparison is necessary since there is not much material regarding the 
matter in Finland.36 In Finnish legal doctrine, the question regarding the doctrine of separa-
bility has often been avoided which makes the legal position uncertain.37 I have strongly 
relied on Risto Koulu´s books, since there are no other comprehensive works about arbitra-
tion clauses than Koulu´s works.38 Koulu´s findings are mostly based on a Nordic perspec-
tive and he also partly relies on international sources.39 
In addition to the foreign materials, I have used general principles and rules of Finnish con-
tract law. In the Nordic countries, there is a consensus that general contract law principles 
are applied to arbitration clauses.40 Even if the doctrine of separability is only applicable to 
dispute resolution clauses, it has some connections to general contract law which has to be 
remembered and taken into consideration when committing research regarding arbitration 
clauses. The problem connected to the effects of the alleged invalidity of the main agreement 
on the arbitration clause is also present in contract law, when only a part of a contract is 
invalid and it has to be decided what effect the invalidity has on the rest of the agreement.41  
                                                          
35 About the connection between different dispute resolution clauses, see chapter 1.5. 
36 For instance, Möller has only superficially written about the subject, see e.g. Möller 1981, p. 57-62; Möller 
1984, p. 370-372; Also, Kurkela has only shortly written about the doctrine of separability during the 1990s, 
see e.g. Kurkela 1996A, p. 351-352. 
37 As a reason for this, it has been claimed that the usage of the doctrine is often avoided as it is ambiguous, 
Koulu 2008, p. 76-77. 
38 Generally about dispute resolution agreements, Koulu has written “Sopimukset oikeudenkäynnin varalta” 
(Koulu 2009) and about arbitration clauses “Välityssopimus välimiesmenettelyn perustana” (Koulu 2008).  
39 In Swedish literature, the doctrine of separability has been discussed in-depth by at least Lindskog, Hobér 
and Heuman. Internationally, there are also comprehensive works about the doctrine, for instance Born has 
written a lot about the subject, see e.g. Born 2014A, p. 401-471. 
40 Koulu 2008, p. 32; In Sweden, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 47; Runesson 2006, p. 5; In Norway, Ot.prp. nr. 27 (2003-
2004), p. 11; In Denmark, Forslag L 127 (2004/2), p. 11-12; However, in Denmark at least before the enact-
ment of the new arbitration act it was uncertain if the arbitration clause was governed by private law or 
procedural law principles. It was also suggested that an in casu evaluation of the problem had to be done and 
based on the characteristics of the specific arbitration clause, the applicable principles should be chosen, 
Hjelje 1987, p. 22-23; Internationally, it seems that the general contract law has not given much influences 
to at least the interpretation of the doctrine of separability, Born 2014A, p. 359. 
41 Koulu 2008, p. 74. 
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The main rule in general contract law is that the invalidity of a part of an agreement makes 
the whole agreement invalid.42 The situation concerning arbitration clauses is the opposite 
because of the doctrine of separability. When using general contract law one therefore has 
to be careful since the doctrine can also be considered as an exception to general contract 
law or the differences as specific features for dispute resolution clauses.  
Another important question regards whether there are specific interpretative rules for dispute 
resolution or arbitration clauses.43 In general, Koulu is of the opinion that there are general 
principles for the interpretation of dispute resolution agreements and so analogy could in 
theory be used between the different types of dispute resolution agreements.44 However, 
more value should be given to the type of the dispute resolution agreement, since there are 
significant differences between the different agreement types.45 
The agreement type closest connected to arbitration agreements are prorogation agree-
ments.46 Both agreement types change the competence from one court to another court/tri-
bunal. The only difference is that when it comes to arbitration agreements, the competence 
is moved outside the state´s court system. This makes it possible to use analogy between the 
two types as long as care is taken to acknowledge the specific features of each agreement 
type.47  
Koulu argues that the doctrine of separability was developed with arbitration clauses in 
mind.48 What makes the applicability of the doctrine of separability to prorogation clauses 
                                                          
42 Koulu 2008, p. 78. 
43 Systematically, Koulu has divided the dispute resolution agreements into competence agreements and pro-
cedure agreements. The competence agreements decide the forum for the proceeding while procedure 
agreements shape the procedure of the court. The competence agreements can further be divided into three 
subgroups; 1. prorogation agreements; 2. instance agreements; and 3. form of procedure agreements. Koulu 
does not systemize arbitration agreements as competence agreements in its narrow meaning. In its narrow 
meaning, the subgroup only includes agreements changing the competence inside the state´s court system 
and does not include alternative dispute resolution occurring outside the court system. Nevertheless, Koulu 
seems to include arbitration agreements in the broad meaning of the subgroup, Koulu 2009, p. 21-22. 
44 Koulu 2009, p. 53. 
45 Koulu 2009, p. 74; Prorogation agreements are considered as the oldest and most developed dispute res-
olution agreement type among the agreement types keeping the competence within the jurisdiction of the 
state courts. Because of this, prorogation agreements can be used as a basis for comparison and analogy with 
other types of dispute resolution agreements when the similarities between the agreement types allow for 
comparison, Koulu 2009, p. 22. 
46 For analogy to be possible, there has to be enough similarities between the different contract types, Halila 
& Hemmo 2008, p. 27. 
47 Both prorogation and arbitration clauses are quite new types of agreements and thus do not have long 
interpretational backgrounds. However, Koulu states that it seems that the arbitration clauses are older than 
the prorogation clauses. Therefore, it is probable that originally the rules regarding arbitration clauses ana-
logically have been used for interpreting and developing the prorogation clauses, Koulu 2009, p. 156. 
48 Koulu 2009, p. 204. 
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problematic, is that there is no institutional support for the standpoint.49 There can only be 
found older Finnish legal doctrine that accepts the applicability of the doctrine of separability 
to prorogation clauses.50 Since there are no further explanations for the applicability of the 
doctrine of separability in the legal literature, the applicability seems to be an analogy from 
arbitration law.51 Despite this, Koulu criticizes the usage of analogy since he is of the opinion 
that prorogation clauses and arbitration clauses are so different that the doctrine of separa-
bility cannot directly be applied by analogy.52 He states that it seems that the principles and 
rules applied to arbitration clauses have been moved to competence clauses without any 
critical review.53  
However, the ECJ decision C-269/95 Benincasa rules that the doctrine of separability is also 
applied to jurisdiction clauses.54 Today, also the Brussels I Regulation accepts the applica-
bility of the doctrine of separability, which means that the doctrine has institutional support 
at least in cross border matters. According to article 25(5) of the Regulation, the prorogation 
clause shall be treated as an independent agreement and it is also clarified that the validity 
of the prorogation clause cannot be contested on the grounds that the main agreement is 
invalid.55 In addition, the doctrine is also institutionalized in the Hague Convention, article 
                                                          
49 Koulu 2009, p. 110, 204-205. 
50 At least by Lager, Lappalainen and Walamies; According to Lager, the parties intend to solve all disputes, 
also regarding the invalidity of the main agreement in the court chosen in the prorogation clause. As a con-
sequence, she states that the invalidity of the main agreement does not mean that the prorogation clause 
would be invalid, Lager 1974, p. 138-139; Lappalainen does not use the term “erillisyysoppi”, but from his 
book can clearly be seen the same definition and characteristics described as the doctrine has. According to 
him, general rules of contract law have to be applied to determine the validity of the prorogation clause and 
that the invalidity of the main agreement does not necessarily make the prorogation clause invalid. The stand-
point is justified by him, because one of the aims with the prorogation clauses is to enable the determination 
of the validity of the main agreement, Lappalainen 1995, p. 232; Walamies explains that the usage of analogy 
can be justified if the doctrine of separability is considered as a consequence of the will of the parties. He 
alleges that the will of the parties is regarding both prorogation and arbitration clauses to solve disputes 
regarding the invalidity and termination of the main agreement in the chosen forum, Walamies 1988, p. 104. 
51 Koulu 2009, p. 208; The situation seems to be similar in at least the United Kingdom, Briggs 2008, p. 72. 
52 Koulu 2009, p. 205. 
53 Koulu 2009, p. 230, 235. 
54 C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl (3.7.1997), pp. 21-32; Another interesting decision is the 
Norwegian Court of Appeal decision LB-2008-117512. The decision concerned a settlement agreement in-
cluding a prorogation clause. According to the Court of Appeal, even if the claimant submitted that the set-
tlement was null and void, the proceeding covering the validity of the prorogation clause should be held in 
the Court referred to in the prorogation clause. This is a clear indication of the applicability of the doctrine of 
separability in Norway, Borgarting lagmannsrett 24.10.2008 LB-2008-117512 (summarized in Koulu 2009, p. 
205). 
55 The explicit rule in Brussels I can be seen as only a codification of the doctrine already introduced in the 
law of the European Union with the Benincasa case, Lindell 2017, p. 265. 
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3(d), according to which choice of court agreements shall be treated independently from the 
main agreement they are included in.56 
Finally, it appears that the doctrine of separability can be applied to all dispute resolution 
clauses, but that the strength of the doctrine seems to depend on the type of the dispute 
resolution clause.57 As a conclusion, referring to the above mentioned arguments, it seems 
justifiable to use analogy from prorogation clauses and of course use the general interpreta-
tive principles for dispute resolution agreements when assessing and interpreting arbitration 
clauses and the doctrine of separability.58  
There is also a tension between the national and international sources. The international ma-
terials often give a more accurate and applicable answer to the problem than the Finnish 
contract law, but the general contract law is much stronger as a source of law.59 Many arbi-
tration law matters have just not been assessed in Finland and neither is the general contract 
law well suited for the assessment of arbitration clauses.  
Even if the Finnish contract law is strong as a source of law, there are many arguments that 
supports an interpretation of the national arbitration law in a way that is in line with interna-
tional arbitration law. Firstly, even if there is yet no harmonisation of the arbitration law in 
the European Union, it is highly possible that EU will later regulate and harmonise also the 
arbitration law since the Union has already taken alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a 
                                                          
56 The Convention is signed by EU, Council Decision of 26 February 2009 on the signing on behalf of the Euro-
pean Community of the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2009/397/EC); It is claimed by Koulu 
that the doctrine of separability applied to prorogation clauses also covers all competence and choice of law 
matters, Koulu 2009, p. 206. 
57 Koulu 2008, p. 35-36; Koulu 2009, p. 75, 110; As a reason, Koulu considers the doctrine as necessary for all 
dispute resolution clauses, Koulu 2008, p. 71-72; However, Koulu further argues that the scope of the doctrine 
of separability should be equally broad for all dispute resolution clauses as opposed to the legal state he 
thinks is prevailing. As main arguments for this interpretation, Koulu highlights the importance of uniform 
rules for all dispute resolution clauses and the need to avoid conflicts regarding procedural matters, Koulu 
2009, p. 209-210, 235; See also, Frände et al. 2017, p. 1307. 
58 However, one has to be careful and take into consideration the special features of the type of the dispute 
resolution clause to find the differences between the clause types which in some aspects can restrain from 
the usage of analogy. 
59 The contract law can be divided into a general and specific part. The general part of the contract law, 
includes all norms applicable to all types of contracts. The specific part includes norms applicable to only 
specific contract types, Taxell 1987, p. 25-29; Comparative perspectives are only regarded as allowed sources 
of law, Aarnio 2006; However, Husa alleges that the comparative perspective could either be regarded as an 
allowed source or as a weakly binding source of law, Husa 1998, p. 35. 
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focus area.60 As the odds are on harmonisation, it seems to me that it is in Finland´s interest 
to already begin the conformation with the rest of Europe.  
Secondly, arbitration law is one of the aspects of law where uniformity with international 
law is especially important. Arbitration is economically beneficial for the country chosen to 
be the seat for a cross-border arbitration. One of the most important factors for parties when 
choosing the seat, is that the national arbitration law does not include any surprising ele-
ments, in other words it should be in accordance with international practice and standards.61 
Among the most important factors considered when choosing an arbitral seat are the local 
arbitration law and the easiness to enforce arbitral awards.62 Concludently, it is in Finland´s 
interest to conform both the arbitration law and the enforcement of arbitral awards to inter-
national practice.63 
Thirdly, there are international standards that are accepted across jurisdictional borders and 
can thus be considered as reliable by the parties of the proceeding.64 The importance of the 
international unity regarding arbitration laws can be illustrated by the fact that 16 of 28 EU 
countries have implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law.65 Consequently, it is beneficial 
for Finland to interpret and develop the Finnish arbitration legislation in accordance with 
international standards, especially with the Model Law which is widely accepted.  
Already, the present Finnish Arbitration Act has been influenced by the Model Law.66 Nev-
ertheless, it has to be kept in mind that some parts of the Model Law differs from the Arbi-
tration Act, some parts of the Act are more detailed than the Model Law and that there are 
parts of the Model Law that are not included in the Act. Even if the UNCITRAL Model Law 
                                                          
60 Koulu 2007B, p. 66; There is however still some debate concerning if the Commission has the competence 
to make legislative measures regarding ADR, Ervasti 2006, p. 327. 
61 Savola 2017A, p. 503-504. 
62 2018 International Arbitration Survey, p. 10. 
63 As a good example of the importance of uniformity, Madsen suggest that the since the Swedish Arbitration 
Act is often applied by foreign practitioners, it should be interpreted in line with international practice. As 
examples of principles that should be uniformly interpreted, he mentions the doctrine of competence-com-
petence and the doctrine of separability, Madsen 2007, p. 53. 
64 In addition to the New York Convention, which is signed by 159 countries, http://www.newyorkconven-
tion.org/countries (16.3.2019); Finland has both ratified the Convention and incorporated the Convention 
into Finnish law. 
65 A total of 80 countries have implemented the Model Law, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un-
citral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (13.3.2019); In addition, many countries have 
also used the Model Law as a model and inspiration for their national arbitration laws, for instance Sweden, 
Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 37-38, 43-46. 
66 Koulu 2007B, p. 67; Many of the sections in the Arbitration Act are meant to be equivalent to and have 
been justified with the Model Law. This can be seen by reading the detailed explanations in the Government 
Proposal for the Arbitration Act (HE 202/1991), see for instance HE 202/1991, p. 11, 15, 19, 22, 24. 
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is not applicable law in Finland and cannot overrule the national law, the national law is in 
parts quite ambiguous, which enables the usage of the Model Law as a tool for the interpre-
tation of the national law as soft law.67 
In addition, also Nordic sources are useful. Sweden has had the UNCITRAL Model Law as 
a model for their Arbitration Act,68 and both Norway and Denmark have implemented the 
Model Law.69 Mostly, I have used Swedish sources but I have also when needed considered 
Norwegian and Danish legal solutions.70 The legal tradition, particularly regarding civil law 
is quite similar in the Nordic countries which raises the value of Nordic sources, especially 
contract law sources.71 
Finally, there is not much case law concerning the doctrine of separability in Finland. Re-
garding the matter, there is only a couple of cases and they are not very informative.72 As 
arbitration is confidential, also generally the amount of case law is small. Therefore, I have 
used mostly legal doctrine for the research. In Finland, the cases usually become available 
only if the decisions are challenged to the state courts and published on internet if they are 
challenged as far as to the Supreme Court.73 However, there are also some cases from other 
jurisdictions and I have tried to use the few Finnish cases found as effectively as possible. 
                                                          
67 The same can be said for all widely accepted international materials. Since the legislator or Supreme Court 
have not taken a stand in the research question, there is much space for using soft law in the interpretation 
and reasoning of the doctrine of separability. 
68 Even if the Swedish Arbitration Act is based on the Model Law, there are some differences. When drafting 
the Act, the legislator has in connection with every section explained if the Model Law is followed or not, 
Madsen 2006, p. 48.  
69 For Denmark, see Forslag L 127 (2004/2), p. 10; For Norway, see Ot.prp. nr. 27 (2003-2004), p. 25; However, 
even if the Model Law is the basis for the Norwegian Arbitration Act, there are some differences and the 
Norwegian Act is at some points more detailed than the Model Law. The differing provisions are non-manda-
tory and therefore the parties can agree to apply the Model Law provisions instead of the differing provisions 
included in the Act, Ot.prp. nr. 27 (2003-2004), p. 25; Berg 2006, p. 36. 
70 This is mostly because Sweden is regarded as a popular arbitral seat and there is far more legal doctrine 
and case law about arbitration than in the other Nordic countries. 
71 Nordic or Scandinavian law is usually regarded as an own family of law because of the similarities in the 
laws of the Nordic countries. The Nordic law is a part of the civil law tradition and highly influenced by conti-
nental law, especially German law, Lando 2016, p. 14; However, also some influences have been taken from 
the common law countries, Mannheimer Swartlinger 2014, p. 124; In addition, there is a strong Nordic tradi-
tion of exploiting the legal doctrine of other Nordic countries. The importance of the Nordic doctrine depends 
on the similarities between the Nordic countries for each contract type, Hemmo 2003A, p. 43-44.  
72 See e.g. KKO 1954 II 11; KKO 1988:55; KKO 1996:61.  
73 Nevertheless, Koulu thinks that there are a good amount of Nordic arbitration cases available, but that the 
procedural matters are not well covered in the summaries released, Koulu 2008, p. 16-17. 
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1.6 Terminology 
There is no consensus on what would be the most appropriate term to describe the character 
of the arbitration clause as a separate agreement.74 The doctrine has many names, for instance 
the “principle of severability”, “doctrine of independence” and the “autonomy principle”.75 
I will use the term “doctrine of separability”, also used by e.g. Born.76 Generally, common 
law jurisdictions have used the terms “severability” and “separability” and civil law coun-
tries the terms “autonomy” and “independence”.77 In Finland, the doctrine has been named 
“erillisyysoppi”78, but from the English term also “separabiliteettiperiaate/oppi”79, “erotet-
tavuusteoria/oppi”80, “itsenäisyysoppi”81 and “autonomiadoktriini”82 have been used.  
However, as Koulu mentions there is a slight difference between the terms “separability” 
and “autonomy”. “Autonomy” is broader as a term, and includes also the choice of law and 
competence-competence.83 Similarly, Born has considered the terms “independence” and 
“autonomy” as meaning a stronger doctrine than the term “separability”.84 Also, there is a 
difference in describing the separability of the arbitration clause as a “doctrine” or as a 
“principle”. Consequently, the terminological choice can also be seen as an opinion on the 
scope of the doctrine. Nevertheless, my choice of terminology for the doctrine of separability 
shall not be considered as a take regarding the scope and applicability of the doctrine. 
In addition to the traditional meaning of the term, the doctrine of separability can also mean 
that the arbitration agreement is separable from all national laws.85 This concept of separa-
bility which is connected with the traditional doctrine of separability, but much broader and 
                                                          
74 Born 2014A, p. 351. 
75 Landolt 2013, p. 513; Kurkela 2005, p. 65; Craig et al. 2000, 48-49; Schwebel 1987, p. 3; van den Berg 1981, 
p. 145. 
76 For a discussion on the appropriateness of the usage of the different terms, see Born 2014A, p. 351-353. 
77 Born 2014A, p. 351-352; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 198; The terms “autonomy” and “severability” are often 
used in the United States instead of the term “separability”, Susler 2009, p. 122; The Swedish legal academics 
have in addition to “separabilitetsprincipen” also at least used the terms “separationsprincipen” and “prin-
cipen om särskiljbarhet”, Lindskog 2012, p. 290; Öhrström 2009, p. 36.  
78 See e.g. Koulu 2008, p. 71. 
79 See e.g. Lindfelt 2011, p. 208. 
80 See e.g. Walamies 1988, p. 103-104. 
81 See e.g. Kurkela 1996A, p. 351. 
82 See e.g. Koulu 2009, p. 204.  
83 Koulu 2009, p. 204. 
84 Born 2014A, p. 352. 
85 Dimolitsa 1999, p. 224; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 197, 218.   
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seldom accepted is not to be confounded with the traditional doctrine and will neither be 
assessed in this pro gradu.86  
To avoid confusion, I will use the term “arbitration clause”, instead of “arbitration agree-
ment”. Some academics and even the Swedish Supreme Court87 uses the term arbitration 
agreement for both individual arbitration agreements and arbitration clauses included in the 
main agreement. Since I will only focus on arbitration clauses included in main agreements, 
I will use the term arbitration clause to limit the scope of the thesis and to avoid confusion.88 
The usage of the term “arbitration agreement” can be regarded as a stronger statement on 
that the arbitration clause shall be considered as a separate agreement than the term “arbi-
tration clause”. However, my choice of terminology shall not be seen as a take on the ques-
tions covered in this pro gradu. 
Finally, it is necessary and desirable to define the terms lex fori and lex arbitri. Lex arbitri 
is defined as the law of the country where the arbitration is carried out.89 More problematic 
is the term lex fori. The term has been used in the legal doctrine as both the law of the country 
where the arbitration is carried out as a synonym to lex arbitri, but also as the law of the 
country of the court where a challenge regarding the arbitral proceeding is tried.90 To avoid 
confusion with the term lex arbitri, I will use the term lex fori as meaning the law of the 
country of the court where a challenge regarding the arbitral proceeding is tried. 
  
                                                          
86 This application of the doctrine has also been named the “doctrine of autonomy” in its broad meaning, 
since it is much broader than the original doctrine, Dimolitsa 1999, p. 255; This application of the doctrine is 
at its strongest in France, where it has also been accepted in the case law, Dimolitsa 1999, p. 224; Also in 
general, the doctrine of separability has been regarded as strongest in France, Leboulanger 2007, p. 3. 
87 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin.,Inc (2001), Högsta Domstolen 27.10.2000, T 1881-99; 
The terms have been used interchangeably in the Finnish Supreme Court decision KKO 2007:39. 
88 Apparently, I will use the term “arbitration agreement” when explicitly assessing those. 
89 Koulu 2009, p. 78. 
90 Koulu 2009, p. 78; Bühring-Uhle 2006, p. 33.  
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2. The Core of the Doctrine of Separability 
This chapter assesses the core of the doctrine of separability. First, I will determine the def-
inition and aim of the doctrine of separability. The reason for this, is that these are important 
factors when determining the applicability and scope of the doctrine. They affect both the 
core of the doctrine of separability assessed in this chapter and the situations assessed in 
chapters 3-5. 
As the core of the doctrine, I count situations where the alleged invalidity, termination or 
non-existence of the main agreement could result in the arbitral tribunal losing its compe-
tence. In addition to assessing if the doctrine of separability applies to these three aforemen-
tioned situations, I will also assess if the doctrine affects the assessment of the invalidity of 
the arbitration clause. 
2.1 Definition of the Doctrine of Separability 
The precise definition of the doctrine of separability varies between different jurisdictions 
and depending on which legal academic you ask.91 The differences between the definitions 
are mostly small and the basis for the doctrine is similar in most jurisdictions.92 In Finland, 
the doctrine of separability has been defined in two different ways. The first definition is an 
open definition and according to the definition the doctrine stipulates that the arbitration 
clause and the main agreement are two separate agreements.93 According to the other defi-
nition, the arbitration clause and the main agreement are two different agreements when 
determining the validity of the arbitration clause.94 Consequently, the two definitions of the 
doctrine differs since the scope of the latter definition is narrower.  
The doctrine of separability has internationally been explained as separating the arbitration 
clause from the main agreement, which means that there are two different agreements, the 
main agreement and the independent arbitration agreement.95 The doctrine of separability is 
                                                          
91 Also, the precise “content, basis and effects” of the doctrine is ambiguous in most legal systems, Born 
2014A, p. 350-351; See also, Siig 2003, p. 253. 
92 However, the scope and applicability of the doctrine can differ significantly between some jurisdictions, 
Leboulanger 2007, p. 4.  
93 Frände et al. 2017, p. 1307; Tamminen 2017, p. 30; Koulu 2008, p. 72; Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124-125. 
94 Möller 2004, p. 13; Möller 1997, p. 28; Kurkela 1994, p. 7.  
95 See e.g. Madsen 2016A, p. 92-93; Born 2015, p. 54; Redfern et al. 2015, p. 104; Hobér 2011, p. 106; Jarvin 
2008, p. 99; Lew et al. 2003, p. 102; From an international perspective Switzerland and United Kingdom are 
interesting as both are often used seats for cross-border arbitration. Both countries have incorporated the 
doctrine in their respective legislation. Section 7 of the British Arbitration Act stipulates that an arbitration 
clause shall be treated as a separate agreement; “Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration 
agreement which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement (whether or not in writing) shall 
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also included in the UNCITRAL Model Law, article 16(1) and in the ICC Rules, article 6(9). 
The Model Law defines that because of the doctrine, the arbitration clause is an independent 
agreement and that the invalidity or non-existence of the main agreement does not directly 
make the arbitration clause null and void.96 Similarly, the ICC Rules states that the tribunal 
has jurisdiction regardless of the validity or existence of the main agreement as long as the 
arbitration clause is valid.97  
The doctrine of separability is not included in the Finnish Arbitration Act, but as mentioned 
earlier the doctrine has long been well established in Finland.98 In general, many countries 
do not have any legislative support for the applicability of the doctrine, as is the situation in 
Finland.99 However in the other Nordic countries, the doctrine of separability is raised to the 
level of law, which helps defining the content of the doctrine.100  
In Sweden, the doctrine is included in Lag om Skiljeförfarande, section 3.101 According to 
the section, an arbitration clause shall be regarded as a separate agreement when deciding 
the validity of the main agreement.102 The Norwegian Lov om voldgift, section 18 almost 
                                                          
not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did not come 
into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a distinct agreement”. 
Section 178(3) of the Swiss Federal Statute on Private International Law is not that informative but still clearly 
states that the doctrine is a part of Swiss arbitration law; “The arbitration agreement cannot be contested on 
the grounds that the main contract is not valid or that the arbitration agreement concerns a dispute which 
had not as yet arisen”. 
96 “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence 
or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract 
shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral 
tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.” , 
UNCITRAL Model Law, article 16(1). 
97 “Unless otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal shall not cease to have jurisdiction by reason of any allega-
tion that the contract is non-existent or null and void, provided that the arbitral tribunal upholds the validity 
of the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal shall continue to have jurisdiction to determine the parties’ 
respective rights and to decide their claims and pleas even though the contract itself may be non-existent or 
null and void.”, ICC Rules, article 6(9). 
98 See e.g. Möller 1997, p. 28; Even if there is no reference to the doctrine of separability in the Finnish Arbi-
tration Act, the doctrine is so well established that there seems to be no other reason for adding it into the 
Act later than to clarify the scope of the doctrine. However, since the Ministry of Justice has promised to 
begin the modernisation of the Act during this spring, there could be possible amendments to the Act in the 
coming years. 
99 Koulu 2009, p. 204-205. 
100 For a comparison of the Nordic solutions, see Lindskog 2012, p. 289.  
101 Originally in Swedish: ”När giltigheten av ett skiljeavtal som utgör en del av ett annat avtal skall bedömas 
vid prövningen av skiljemännens behörighet, skall skiljeavtalet anses som ett särskilt avtal.”, Lag om skiljeför-
farande, section 3. 
102 The Swedish Arbitration Act from 1999 was amended in 2018 and the amendments came into force by Lag 
(2018:1954) om ändring i lagen (1999:116) om skiljeförfarande on 1 March 2019. Section 3 regarding the 
doctrine of separability was not amended, but for instance section 2 regarding the doctrine of competence-
competence was slightly amended. 
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similarly states that the arbitration clause shall be considered as a separate agreement when 
deciding the validity of the main agreement.103 The doctrine is also similarly included in the 
Danish Arbitration Act, chapter 4, section 16.104 
2.2 Aim and Justification of the Doctrine of Separability 
The function of dispute resolution clauses has by Koulu been defined as getting a satisfactory 
and final decision to the dispute.105 The exact function of a dispute resolution clause can 
vary depending on the aim of the parties. In this chapter, I will assess the aim and justification 
of the doctrine of separability. 
Internationally, Schwebel who is one of the leading academics who has researched about the 
doctrine of separability finds four aims behind the doctrine; 1. The aim of the parties to get 
all the disputes regarding their agreement solved by arbitration. If the parties would have 
wanted to exclude some conflicts regarding the agreement from the scope of the clause, they 
would have explicitly agreed on it; 2. Without the doctrine it would be easy for a party who 
wants to abuse the proceeding to claim that the agreement is invalid to avoid arbitration. The 
speediness of the proceeding would suffer and the process would be costly if the parties 
would have to first argue on the validity of the arbitration clause in a general court; 3. His-
torically, as a matter of legal presumption the parties make two different agreements; and 4. 
If there would not be two separate agreements, the tribunals/courts would have to investigate 
also the substantial matter to solve the procedural question regarding their competence.106 
                                                          
103 Originally in Norwegian: ”Ved avgjørelser etter første ledd skal en voldgiftsavtale som utgjør en del av en 
kontrakt, anses som en selvstendig avtale uavhengig av de andre deler av kontrakten. En avgjørelse av vold-
giftsretten om at kontrakten er ugyldig, medfører ikke i seg selv at voldgiftsavtalen er ugyldig.”, Lov om vold-
gift, section 18; However, according to Koulu, the doctrine is regarded weaker in Norway than in the other 
Nordic countries, Koulu 2008, p. 246. Nevertheless, Koulu does not rely on any Norwegian or Nordic sources 
to support his argument.  
104 Originally in Danish: “Voldgiftsretten afgør spørgsmål om sin egen kompetence, herunder indsigelser mod 
voldgiftsaftalens eksistens eller gyldighed. En voldgiftsklausul, der udgør en del af en kontrakt, anses i denne 
sammenhæng for en selvstændig aftale uafhængig af kontraktens øvrige dele. En afgørelse fra voldgiftsretten 
om, at kontrakten er ugyldig, medfører ikke i sig selv, at voldgiftsklausulen er ugyldig.”, Voldgiftsloven, chap-
ter 4, section 16. 
105 Koulu 2009, p. 136. 
106 Schwebel 1987, p. 3-6; Samuel has also made an own list of the four aims behind the doctrine of which 
numbers 1-2 are similar to those listed by Schwebel. According to Samuel, the doctrine can be justified with; 
1. The intention of the parties; 2. The reduction of the risk that a party abuses the proceeding by claiming 
that the main agreement invalid; 3. The removal of the distinction between arbitration clauses and arbitration 
agreements; and 4. The doctrine reflects the function of the arbitration clause as a measure to solve disputes 
regarding the main agreement, Samuel 1989, p. 156-157.    
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According to Heuman, the justification of the doctrine has two dimensions; 1. The general 
aim to make arbitration more effective by giving the arbitrators competence to rule on ques-
tion regarding the validity and expiration of the main agreement; and 2.  The aim of the 
parties to get conflicts regarding the validity and expiration of the main agreement solved by 
the tribunal.107 With effectivity is above all meant the speed and flexibility of the proceed-
ing.108 Important is also the costliness of the proceeding.109 As Heuman, also other academ-
ics have split up the justification of the doctrine in two parts. Schöldström calls the efficiency 
argument the practical reasoning of the doctrine and the intention of the parties as the theo-
retical justification of the doctrine of separability.110 In the following when assessing the 
subject, I will also use the same distinction as Heuman and Schöldström. Firstly, I will assess 
the practical justification and secondly, the theoretical justification of the doctrine. 
2.2.1 The Practical Justification of the Doctrine of Separability 
Traditionally, the task of the doctrine of separability has been to protect the arbitration clause 
from invalidity of the main agreement.111 Without the doctrine, the tribunal could not rule 
the main agreement invalid without losing its own competence and integrity.112 It could eas-
ily be claimed in a general court that the tribunal lacked competence, since the arbitration 
clause becomes invalid as an effect of the invalidity of the main agreement. 
In the Nordics, the doctrine of separability has also been reasoned with the restricted com-
petence of the courts and tribunals. It is well-established that the courts cannot refuse to 
enforce an arbitral award on material grounds.113 Without the doctrine of separability, the 
arbitral tribunal would have to make a material investigation into the main agreement to 
solve the procedural question about their competence.114 As a consequence, also the court 
would have to make a material assessment of the matter to decide if the tribunal has exceeded 
                                                          
107 Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; Heuman 1997, p. 536; The division is also accepted by Hobér, Hobér 1983, p. 263-
264. 
108 The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1984, p. 27. 
109 Born 2014A, p. 399. 
110 Schöldström 1998, p. 264-265. 
111 Koulu 2008, p. 74; This is also accepted internationally, Craig et al. 2000, p. 49; For instance according to 
the Swedish Government Proposal, the reason behind the doctrine is to avoid the invalidity of the main agree-
ment to undermine the competence of the arbitrators, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 74. 
112 Koulu 2009, p. 204; Koulu 2008, p. 77-78; For Sweden, see Öhrström 2009, p. 36; If the tribunal rules the 
main agreement unenforceable, it would have no competence to make its ruling if the arbitration clause also 
automatically would be unenforceable as a consequence of the finding. 
113 See Finnish Arbitration Act, sections 40-41; Swedish Arbitration Act, sections 33-34; Norwegian Arbitration 
Act, sections 43 and 46; Danish Arbitration Act, sections 37 and 39.  
114 Koulu 2008, p. 72. 
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its competence.115 Möller also highlights the practical effects of the doctrine of separability. 
It is not practical to let the general courts solve questions regarding the validity of the main 
agreement and the tribunals to interpret the main agreement.116 Usually the same facts and 
circumstances have to be considered in both situations.117 
A common reason for justifying the doctrine of separability is that it makes arbitration more 
effective.118 It has been stated that the speed and flexibility of the proceeding would suffer 
without the doctrine, especially if one of the parties tries to undermine the proceeding.119  
The doctrine is regarded as an effective way to prevent abuses and bad-faith attempts by a 
party claiming that the tribunal lacks competence.120 It can also be argued that the doctrine 
aims to make the whole arbitration institute more efficient.121 As a part of the effectivity 
argument can also be claimed that the doctrine of separability enhances procedural economy 
since prolonged procedural conflicts regarding the competence of the tribunal are costly.  
It has also been argued that the nature of the agreements is a reason for keeping them sepa-
rate. Since the main agreement determines the substantial content in the parties´ relationship 
and the arbitration clause determines the procedural issues, they are different kinds of agree-
ments.122 Consequently, it has been argued that they are two different agreements, one ma-
terial and one procedural.123  
The aim of the doctrine of separability has also been described as to make arbitration more 
attractive compared to traditional court litigation.124 The doctrine makes arbitration more 
independent from the state and the more independent arbitration is from the court system, 
                                                          
115 Heuman 2003, p. 44-45; Regarding jurisdiction clauses, also the ECJ highlighted the importance of that the 
Court only assesses the procedural side of the conflict when deciding on its competence, C-269/95, pp. 27. 
116 Möller 1984, p. 371; Möller 1981, p. 59; This possible benefit with the doctrine of separability has also 
been acknowledged internationally, Siig 2003, p. 256.  
117 Möller 1984, p. 371. 
118 Jarvin 2008, p. 99; For instance, Born pictures the aim of the doctrine of separability as to protect the 
effectivity of the proceeding, Born 2014A, p. 391; The problem with the doctrine is that since its scope and 
existence is not totally settled, the doctrine itself can lead to costly conflicts within a present conflict, Koulu 
2009, p. 236; This aim is also accepted in Sweden, Madsen 2016A, p. 80; Heuman 1997, p. 536; There seems 
to be a Nordic consensus regarding the question, since in addition to Finland and Sweden also Norway accepts 
the aforementioned aim, Ot.prp. nr. 27 (2003-2004), p. 45; Woxholth 2013, p. 484; Berg 2006, p. 199. 
119 Woxholth 2013, p. 484; Hobér 2011, p. 107; Park 2006, p. 96-97; Hobér 1983, p. 263-264. 
120 Várady 2015, p. 179; Hjelje 1987, p. 22; Wetter 1987, p. 334; Möller 1981, p. 59.  
121 NOU 2001:33, p. 72. 
122 Leboulanger 2007, p. 14. 
123 However, this justification has also got a lot of criticism, Leboulanger 2007, p. 14. 
124 Landolt 2013, p. 512. 
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the faster and more reliable is arbitration for the parties.125 Consequently, the parties can 
then better trust the finality of the award and the enforceability of the arbitration clause.  
In connection with the theoretical justification of the doctrine, it is in place to briefly assess 
the close connection between the doctrine of separability and doctrine of competence-com-
petence (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).126 The doctrine of competence-competence gives the ar-
bitral tribunal the right to rule on its own jurisdiction instead of letting a general court decide 
on its competence.127 The aim with the competence-competence is as the aim with the doc-
trine of separability to enhance efficiency and to prevent abuse of the proceeding occurring 
from a lack of competence of the arbitral tribunal.128 As is the doctrine of separability, also 
the doctrine of competence-competence is included in the UNCITRAL Model Law, article 
16(1). 
While the doctrine of competence-competence gives the tribunal the right to decide the com-
petence of the tribunal, the doctrine of separability protects the competence of the tribunal 
by keeping the arbitration clause valid even when ruling the main agreement invalid or ter-
minated. It can be said that the doctrine of separability gives a material base for the tribunal´s 
competence and the doctrine of competence-competence gives a procedural base for the tri-
bunal to decide on its competence.129  
                                                          
125 Landolt 2013, p. 512. 
126 As with the doctrine of separability, also the doctrine of competence-competence is widely accepted in-
ternationally, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 75; Madsen 2016B, p. 654; Hobér 2011, p. 106; Susler 2009, p. 119. 
127 Landolt 2013, p. 511; Svernlöv & Carroll 1991, p. 37; It is a well-known expression that “every tribunal is 
the judge of its own competence”, Schwebel 1987, p. 9; In Finland, the competence-competence of the tribu-
nal includes at least the evaluation of the validity of the arbitration clause, Möller 1997, p. 66. 
128 Madsen 2016A, p. 80; Svernlöv & Carroll 1991, p. 37; Without the doctrine of separability, the tribunal 
would have to wait for a court decision determining their competence before proceeding to the substantial 
part of the proceeding, Landolt 2013, p. 514; The procedural assessment completed in a general court instead 
of in the tribunal would add an extra procedural step to the process and make the process longer and more 
expensive, Ware 2007, p. 132; However, in many countries (for instance Finland) the general courts have the 
final jurisdiction to decide if the arbitral tribunal had competence or not. For instance, according to section 
41, subsection 1, paragraph 1 of the Finnish Arbitration Act, an award can be set aside by a general court if 
the tribunal has exceeded its competence. 
129 The connection and interaction between these doctrines is probably best explained by an example from 
the Swedish Arbitration Act. According to section 2 of the Act, the arbitrators have the competence to rule 
on their own competence. In the following section, section 3 is laid out that when deciding on the compe-
tence, the doctrine of separability protects the arbitration clause from invalidity. 
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2.2.2 The Theoretical Justification of the Doctrine of Separability 
In Finland, it has also be argued that the doctrine of separability can been justified with the 
will of the parties.130 This opinion suggests that the parties´ intention is to determine issues 
regarding the validity of the main agreement in an arbitral tribunal.131 It has been alleged by 
some academics that this is a presumed and hypothetical will of the parties.132 As the intent 
of the parties is the starting point in contractual interpretation, the mere inclusion of an arbi-
tration clause in the main agreement does not as such set aside the common will of the parties 
and make the clause a part of the main agreement.133 There are also scholars suggesting that 
the intent of the parties is to apply the doctrine of separability.134 It is indeed difficult to 
explain that the parties have intended to make two contracts, not only one contract.135 The 
intent is consequently more appropriately formulated as the intent to solve all disputes re-
garding the agreement by arbitration,136 than to intend to apply the doctrine of separability. 
To properly fulfil the intention of the parties, it is necessary to apply the doctrine of separa-
bility. Nevertheless, there are also opinions that suggest that the parties’ intent is only to 
make a binding agreement.137 
Consequently, the intent of the parties can also counteract the doctrine of separability since 
it is allowed to depart from the doctrine.138 However, the presumption is that the parties have 
                                                          
130 Koulu 2008, p. 72; Koulu 2007A, p. 388; Walamies 1988, p. 104; Already Tirkkonen justified the doctrine 
of separability with the will of the parties. If the parties would have wanted to have the disputes regarding 
the validity and termination of the main agreement outside the scope of the clause, they would have explicitly 
mentioned it, Tirkkonen 1943, p. 123-124; Also in Sweden, the doctrine has been justified with the intention 
of the parties, Madsen 2016A, p. 93; Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; Hobér 1983, p. 263; This standpoint is also 
accepted internationally, Born 2014A, p. 353, 390-391; Lew et al. 2003, p. 102; Siig 2003, p. 256. 
131 Koulu 2008, p. 72; Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124-125; In Sweden, the intent has been constructed as an intent to 
solve all disputes regarding the agreement by arbitration, Madsen 2016A, p. 93; Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; 
Hobér 1983, p. 263; Also internationally, the intention has often been regarded as the will to solve all disputes 
regarding the main agreement by arbitration, see e.g. Craig et al. 2001, p. 49-50; Mayer 1999, p. 263. 
132 Koulu 2008, p. 72; In Sweden, Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; In Norway, Woxholth 2013, p. 484; This view has 
also been criticized, see Lindskog 2012, p. 290, 294.  
133 Hobér 1983, p. 263. 
134 See e.g. Born 2014A, p. 353. 
135 Schwebel 1987, p. 9. 
136 As have been done in Sweden and internationally, for Sweden see Madsen 2016A, p. 93; Heuman 1999, 
p. 62-63; Hobér 1983, p. 263; For the international standpoint, see e.g. Craig et al. 2001, p. 49-50; Mayer 
1999, p. 263. 
137 Craig et al. 2000, p. 50; For instance, Samuel is of the opinion that it is only a speculative possibility that 
the parties when concluding the agreement have taught about the fate of the arbitration clause if the main 
contract is not functioning properly, Samuel 1989, p. 157; According to Samuel, the justification is better 
constructed as a presumption of what could be in the parties´ best interests, Samuel 1989, p. 161-162. 
138 Lindskog 2012, p. 291; Heuman 1999, p. 69; Samuel 1989, p. 176; This has been reasoned by the fact that 
the doctrine of separability does not protect a public interest, only the parties´ desire for an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism, Siig 2003, p. 254; The possibility for the parties to agree otherwise is for instance 
explicitly included in the British Arbitration Act, section 7 and the ICC Rules, article 6(9). 
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intended to get all their disputes solved by arbitration, but the presumption can be proved 
wrong by a party.139 The presumption is according to Born derived from the “expectations 
of reasonable commercial parties” and the parties are thus also free to agree differently.140 
As Craig has stated, the doctrine of separability cannot be justified with pure logic but it is 
still necessary to apply for the arbitration clause to be effective.141 Neither can the doctrine 
convincingly be justified by theoretical arguments.142 It is better understood as a construction 
of legal fiction.143 The arguments favouring the doctrine are mostly practical.144 Since from 
a perspective of the parties the clause is an important part of their agreement and in general 
contract law it would be both part of and interpreted in the light of the main agreement, a 
somewhat artificial doctrine is necessary to break the connection between the main agree-
ment and the arbitration clause. The doctrine of separability gives the tribunal the right to 
decide the state of the substantive contract, regardless of if the substantive contract is null 
and void or terminated. 
2.3 Invalidity of the Main Agreement 
As have been shown before in chapters 2.1-2.2, the doctrine of separability is defined and 
aimed to protect the arbitration clause from the invalidity of the main agreement and thus 
this part of the doctrine is accepted both in Finland and internationally.145 
In Finland, the alleged invalidity of the main agreement does not affect the arbitration clause 
according to Supreme Court praxis in the decisions KKO 1988:55 and KKO 1996:61.146 In 
                                                          
139 Woxholth 2013, p. 487; Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133; However, Mayer is of the opinion that the pre-
sumption should be the opposite if the arbitration clause is narrowly drafted, Mayer 1999, p. 263. 
140 Born conceive the doctrine of separability as not a mandatory rule nor a rule dictated by legal sources and 
not even necessarily derived from legal sources, Born 2014A, p. 396; Born has also nicknamed the doctrine 
as the “separability presumption” since the parties can depart from the doctrine, Born 2014A, p. 353. 
141 Craig et al. 2000, p. 49; At first sight, it seems apparent to accept that an agreement including an arbitration 
clause shall be regarded as a single agreement when the parties have added the arbitration clause to the 
agreement on purpose before concluding it.  
142 Craig et al. 2000, p. 50. 
143 Schwebel 1987, p. 9; It has even been said that the doctrine of separability is only a technique for protect-
ing the arbitration clause from the invalidity of the main agreement, Briggs 2008, p. 12. 
144 Heuman 1983, p. 259-260. 
145 For a Finnish viewpoint, see e.g. Möller 1997, p. 28; For an international viewpoint, see Born 2014A, p. 
351; Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133; Lew et al. 2003, p. 103; Craig et al. 2000, p. 515-516; It is good to keep 
in mind that the doctrine also applies to enable the validity of the main agreement even if the arbitration 
clause is invalid, Tamminen 2017, p. 30; Born 2014A, p. 466-467; The invalidity of the arbitration clause which 
does not automatically affect the main agreement is also called “reverse separability”, Paulsson 2014, p. 62. 
146 In Sweden, the first decision regarding the invalidity of the main agreement was resolved in 1936. In the 
decision AB Norrköpings Trikåfabrik v. AB Per Persson (NJA 1936, p. 521), the Supreme Court stated that the 
alleged invalidity of the main agreement does not necessary mean that the arbitration clause is invalid. The 
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KKO 1988:55 the issue was whether the arbitration clause was valid even if it was alleged 
that the CEO of a limited liability company had had no right to sign and accept the main 
agreement, which consequently would have made the main agreement null and void. The 
Court applied the doctrine of separability to assess the validity of the arbitration clause. Ac-
cording to the Court, even if the CEO probably had no right to accept the main agreement, 
the acceptance of the arbitration clause was not a measure unusual or extensive proportioned 
to the scope and nature of the activities of the company. In other words, the court assessed 
the validity of the arbitration clause separately. As a conclusion, the Court stated that since 
the arbitration clause was valid, the Court had no competence to solve the substantial ques-
tion regarding the validity of the main agreement. 
In KKO 1996:61, KKO stated that the alleged invalidity of the main agreement does not 
affect the evaluation of the validity of the arbitration clause. The District Court had, based 
on case law and legal doctrine, concluded that if the plaintiff claims that the same ground of 
invalidity affects both the main agreement and the arbitration clause, the arbitral tribunal 
lacks competence. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision regarding the jurisdictional 
plea.147 The Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the lower courts. According to the 
Supreme Court, the alleged invalidity of the main agreement does not affect the validity of 
the arbitration clause. The statement of reason of the Court was quite short but the Court 
clearly accepted that the doctrine of separability is applicable in Finland. 
There is also a public decision made by an arbitral tribunal upholding the doctrine of sepa-
rability, since the award was challenged to the Court of Appeal.148 In the decision COMI 
30:2007, the main agreement was alleged (and ruled) invalid because of a contravention of 
the formal requirements set down in the Code of Real Estate. Referring to Tirkkonen, Möller 
and the existing case law, the tribunal stated that when deciding on the validity of the arbi-
tration clause, the clause shall be regarded as an independent agreement.149 As different for-
mal requirements are applied to the arbitration clause than the requirements included in the 
                                                          
applicability of the doctrine to the alleged invalidity of the main agreement was later upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Hermansson v. AB Asfaltbeläggningar (NJA 1976, p. 125).  
147 The interpretation made by the District Court and the Court of Appeal is difficult to understand. There was 
already a decision, KKO 1988:55 accepting the doctrine of separability and legal doctrine from the forties and 
eighties accepting the separability doctrine (Tirkkonen 1943, p. 124-125, Möller 1981, p. 57-62. Möller 1984, 
p. 370-372).  
148 COMI 30:2007, referred to in Turunen 2007, p. 371-376. 
149 COMI 30:2007, referred to in Turunen 2007, p. 373. Furthermore, the Court stated that some of the inva-
lidity grounds alleged to hit the main agreement can also reach to the arbitration clause, as an example of 
such a ground was mentioned coercion.  
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Code of Real Estate, the arbitration clause was ruled valid even if the main agreement was 
later ruled invalid by the tribunal after an assessment of the substantive dispute.150 The chal-
lenge did not concern the validity of the arbitration clause. 
As an analogy from case law assessing other dispute resolution clauses it is in place to shortly 
cover the Benincasa case, which regarded whether the alleged invalidity of a franchising 
agreement affects a jurisdiction clause included in the franchising agreement.151 The court 
highlighted that the aim of the doctrine of separability is that the court easily could assess its 
competence without investigating the substantial matter.152 Also, the court mentioned that if 
a party by claiming that the main agreement is invalid could frustrate the jurisdiction clause, 
the legal protection of the other party could be endangered.153 The court ruled that even if a 
party claims that the franchising agreement is invalid, the court designated in the jurisdiction 
clause has jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the franchising agreement if the jurisdic-
tion clause is validly concluded.154 
2.4 Invalidity of the Arbitration Clause 
How strong is the doctrine of separability and when will the arbitral tribunal lose its compe-
tence? One of the main arguments put against the doctrine of separability is that the doctrine 
makes the standard of consent to arbitrate lower than when forming normal contractual re-
lationships.155 The academics opposing the doctrine are of the opinion that a party cannot be 
forced to arbitrate if the arbitration clause is a part of a contract that is unenforceable.156 In 
the following, I will assess if the invalidity of the arbitration clause is decided by general 
contract law rules or if the doctrine of separability raises the threshold for finding the arbi-
tration clause invalid. 
                                                          
150 COMI 30:2007, referred to in Turunen 2007, p. 373-374. 
151 C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl (3.7.1997); The case regarded the interpretation of the Brus-
sels Convention. It is still good to keep in mind that according to the Brussels Convention, article 1(2)(4) the 
Convention does not apply to arbitration. The same also applies for the Brussels I Regulation, according to 
article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation. 
152 C-269/95, pp. 27. 
153 C-269/95, pp. 29; Based on the case, it seems that the same justifications for the applicability of the doc-
trine of separability to arbitration clauses also applies to other dispute resolution clauses, at least jurisdiction 
clauses. 
154 C-269/95, pp. 32. 
155 Ware 2007, p. 120. 
156 Ware 2007, p. 121; Also, a strong doctrine of separability leads to a strong onus of proof for a party to 
prove that the doctrine should not be applied in the case at hand or that the arbitration clause is valid re-
gardless of the alleged invalidity of the main agreement. This can lead to the same result as a higher threshold 
for invalidity, Koulu 2008, p. 78.  
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It seems that those criticizing the doctrine of separability do not criticize the doctrine itself, 
but that it has been applied in a way that infringes the individual´s right to a fair trial.157 The 
doctrine only states that the arbitration clause is a separate contract and thus has to be eval-
uated separately.158 Problems occur from a human rights perspective if when evaluating the 
arbitration clause separately, the tribunal gives the clause effect even if it is encumbered with 
an invalidity ground.159 It is easy to agree with the criticism since as misinterpreted the doc-
trine can cause harm to the due process, but it has still to be remembered that properly used 
the doctrine is inevitable for an effective and fair procedure.  
By keeping the procedural and the material questions separate, the tribunal can assess its 
own competence first and avoid to assess the material question without competence. If the 
arbitration clause is invalid, the general courts have the competence to assess the substantial 
matter even if the same invalidity ground often also hits the main agreement. Since the main 
agreement usually also is invalid, this change of forum leads to a procedural economic prob-
lem.160 The matter has to be moved to the general courts even if the same invalidity ground 
found by the tribunal probably hits both the main agreement and the arbitration clause.161  
2.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights and the Invalidity of the Arbitration 
Clause 
As shown above, the applicability of the doctrine of separability can lead to a collision be-
tween procedural economy and the right to a fair trial even if the aim of the doctrine is to 
enhance efficiency. Finland is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights after 
ratifying the Convention in 1990. Finland is also a part of the European Union since 1995 
                                                          
157 The aim of the criticism seems to be to harmonize the invalidity grounds applied to the arbitration clause 
to those of general contract law and not to necessarily abolish the whole doctrine of separability, Ware 2007, 
p. 127-128.  
158 See e.g. Born 2014A, p. 458-459; Park 2006, p. 294-295; Craig et al. 2000, p. 515-516 and chapter 2.1 of 
the thesis; By primarily assessing the validity of the arbitration clause, the tribunal can dismiss the claim on 
procedural grounds before assessing the material part of the matter. Thus, if assessing the matters in the 
right order, the tribunal could not infringe the rights of the parties by assessing the material question without 
having competence or by giving the alleged invalidity of the main agreement value in the evaluation of the 
arbitration clause; In Norway, the situation is clarified by explicitly mentioning that the doctrine of separabil-
ity does not prevent the tribunal from by a separate evaluation find that the same invalidity ground allegedly 
encumbering the main agreement encumbers the arbitration clause, NOU 2001:33, p. 77. 
159 Problematic is also that there is a conflict of interest when the tribunal is deciding about its competence. 
The arbitral tribunal has an interest to get competence, since otherwise they have no right to an award, Koulu 
2008, p. 73; Ovaska 2007, p. 249. 
160 Also Ware recognizes the problem. According to him, the economic efficiency is important too, but has to 
surrender to the benefit of the right to litigate and consequently also the right to a fair trial, Ware 2007, p. 
132-134. 
161 This situation is probable at least if the invalidity ground regards the formation of intent. 
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and therefore bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 6 
of the ECHR, article 47 of the Human Rights Charter and section 21 of the Constitution of 
Finland guarantee the right to a fair trial. Of the aforementioned fundamental legal frame-
works, the ECHR should be considered as the leading legal framework which sets the mini-
mum level of protection of the human rights.162 The ECHR sets the minimum level of pro-
tection that the national law has to afford to the human rights.163 Furthermore, the national 
courts shall apply a human rights-favourable interpretation of the national legislation.164 
Article 6 of the ECHR, which sets out the principle of the right to a fair trial, has a wide 
scope of application but the wording of the article does not give detailed information on how 
and to which extent it is applied. The extent and applicability of the article has been shaped 
and become concrete by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court 
has accepted the benefits received from arbitration and thus also accepts waiving the right 
to a fair trial by the usage of arbitration agreements/clauses.165 However, the waiver has to 
be made freely, lawfully and unequivocally.166 Most problematic from the point of view of 
the doctrine of separability is that the waiver has to be made freely. In the light of the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights, the arbitral tribunals have no right to solve the 
substantial dispute regardless of the doctrine of separability, if the parties have not accepted 
the arbitration clause freely, lawfully and unequivocally.167  
2.4.2 From the European Convention on Human Rights to the Applicability in Practice 
Since Finland is bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to a fair 
trial has to be given more value than the procedural economic aspects. What is alarming is 
that it has been alleged that the doctrine of separability in practice has been applied so that 
well-grounded claims that the arbitration clause is invalid have been rejected based on the 
doctrine. The rejections have allegedly been made without separately assessing the validity 
                                                          
162 For instance, article 52(3) of the Human Rights Charter states that the protection given by the Charter shall 
at least be the same as the protection given by the ECHR.  
163 Hallberg et al. 2011, p. 192. 
164 PeVL 25/1994, p. 4; PeVL 2/1990, p. 3. 
165 See e.g. Pastore v. Italy 46483/99 (25.5.1999) (dec.); Deweer v. Belgium, 6903/75 (27.2.1980), pp. 49.  
166 See e.g. Tabbane v. Switzerland 41069/12 (1.3.2016), pp. 27; Suda v. Czech Republic 1643/06 (28.10.2010), 
pp 48; The decisions are made in French, using the wording “libre, licite et sans equivoque” as the criterion 
for the waiver. 
167 Even if the guidelines and case law of the Court seems clear and sound, the Court has been criticized for 
not having used these guidelines in practice which has led to a situation where the protection of the human 
rights in arbitration solely relies on the national courts, Koulu 2008, p. 208-209. 
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of the arbitration clause before assessing the material question.168 After studying case law 
from the other Nordic countries, Koulu is of the opinion that this problem also could occur 
in the other Nordic countries.169  
Despite the criticism, Finnish arbitration law should in theory be in accordance with the 
Convention. An arbitral award can be set aside by a court upon request of a party in accord-
ance with the Arbitration Act, section 41, subsection 1, paragraph 1, if “the arbitrators have 
exceeded their authority”. This is for example possible if there is no valid arbitration clause 
concluded between the parties.170 According to Möller, this also includes situations where 
there is no arbitration clause entered into.171 Chapter 3 (sections 28-38) of the Finnish Con-
tracts Act covers the invalidity of contracts. At least sections 28-31 of the chapter are enacted 
to make agreements that are entered into without free will null and void.172 The general in-
validity grounds in Finnish contract law are applied to arbitration clauses.173 If the arbitral 
award contravenes an invalidity ground in the Contracts Act, the Court can upon request of 
a party set aside the award.174 Consequently, the Finnish arbitration law and the applicability 
of the doctrine of separability do not seem to breach the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
The standpoint also seems to be settled in the legal doctrine. The legal academics are of the 
opinion that an invalidity ground could possibly only hit the arbitration clause or the main 
agreement, or could be found to hit both the main agreement and the arbitration clause after 
a separate assessment.175 Both Kurkela and Möller seems to be of the opinion that some 
                                                          
168 Koulu 2008, p. 208. 
169 Koulu 2008, p. 208; Koulu does however not mention any Nordic cases supporting his standpoint. 
170 HE 202/1991, p. 26. 
171 Möller 1997, p. 85. 
172 Sections 28 and 29 cover coercion, section 30 covers fraud and section 31 covers the taking advantage of 
another’s distress, lack of understanding, imprudence or position of dependence.  
173 Koulu 2008, p. 32; Also according to Tirkkonen, the arbitration agreement is invalid if it is encumbered 
with a civil law ground of invalidity, Tirkkonen 1943, p. 123. 
174 The parties cannot strengthen the doctrine of separability to raise the threshold for invoking the invalidity 
of the arbitration clause, Lindskog 2012, p. 291; Koulu 2008, p. 74; Koulu justifies the standpoint with the 
general contract law principle that one cannot agree on restricting the applicability of grounds of invalidity in 
advance, Koulu 2008, p. 74. 
175 Möller 1997, p. 28; Kurkela 1996A, p. 351; As examples of invalidity grounds, Kurkela mentions coercion 
and fraud which are also included in the Finnish Contracts Act, Kurkela 1996A, p. 351; But observe that Lager 
states that the invalidity grounds included in the Contracts Act are not as such applicable to at least proroga-
tion clauses and that a breach of an invalidity ground has to be especially serious to make the prorogation 
clause invalid, Lager 1974, p. 139. 
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invalidity grounds encumbering the main agreements also automatically could cover the ar-
bitration clause.176 This standpoint can however be criticized. Even if there are invalidity 
grounds that most likely also make the arbitration clause invalid, a separate assessment 
should always be done to assess the invalidity of the arbitration clause in accordance with 
the doctrine.177  
There is not much case law regarding the issue, but in the aforementioned decision COMI 
30:2007 the matter was assessed. The Tribunal stated that some of the invalidity grounds 
alleged to encumber the main agreement could also reach to the arbitration clause.178 All in 
all, for instance a violation of one of the invalidity grounds in the Finnish Contracts Act 
regarding formation of will usually covers both the main agreement and the arbitration 
clause, because the formation of intent has been formed similarly and usually also timely at 
the same moment for both the main agreement and the arbitration clause.179 However, a 
separate assessment of the invalidity of the arbitration clause should be preferred in order 
not to infringe the doctrine of separability and since it is possible that the alleged invalidity 
ground does not affect the validity of the arbitration clause.  
In Sweden, the invalidity grounds in the Swedish Contracts Act also apply to arbitration 
clauses.180 Nevertheless in practice, at least before 2011, there were no cases where the in-
validity grounds in the Swedish Contracts Act had been relied on.181 According to Lindskog, 
it would be absurd to apply the doctrine of separability as to always give the tribunal com-
petence when the main agreement is alleged invalid, without assessing the validity of the 
arbitration clause separately.182 There also appears to be a Nordic consensus on this, since 
                                                          
176 Möller 1997, p. 28; Kurkela 1996B, p. 18; Kurkela 1994, p. 7; Möller 1981, p. 60.  
177 For instance, invalidity grounds connected to the formation of will usually, but not always make the arbi-
tration clause invalid. As an example, coercion could be used for only getting one or a couple of contract 
clauses included into the agreement and consequently the coercion does not necessary also cover the arbi-
tration clause. 
178 As an example was mentioned coercion to sign the agreement, COMI 30:2007, referred to in Turunen 
2007, p. 373. 
179 In practice, the invalidity of the arbitration clause is often caused by the same invalidity ground alleged to 
emcumber the main agreement. Seldom the alleged ground for invalidity of the main agreement cannot also 
be applied on the arbitration clause, Frände et al. 2017, p. 1307; Tirkkonen 1977, p. 536. 
180 Prop 1998/99:35, p. 47; Madsen 2016A, p. 352; Mannheimer Swartling 2014, p. 28. 
181 Hobér 2011, p. 114. 
182 Lindskog 2012, p. 293; Of course, regardless of the doctrine of separability, there are situations where 
both the main agreement and the arbitration clause are invalid. It seems that if there is an invalidity ground 
connected to the concluding of the main agreement, it also makes the arbitration clause invalid. However, if 
the invalidity ground is explicitly connected to the performance of the main agreement, it is more probable 
that the arbitration clause could still be valid, Lindskog 2012, p. 300, 302-303; However as an exception, Heu-
man is of the opinion that even if a party claims that the main agreement is made by a person without legal 
capacity and the alleged invalidity ground also hits the arbitration clause, the tribunal has competence to try 
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also the Danish and Norwegian view seems to be that the same invalidity ground hitting the 
main agreement could also make the arbitration clause invalid.183  
Also, internationally there seems to be scholars accepting that there are invalidity grounds 
that could affect both the arbitration clause and the main agreement after a separate assess-
ment.184 Internationally, the importance of only assessing the arbitration clause when decid-
ing on the competence of the tribunal before assessing the alleged invalidity of the main 
agreement has been stressed.185   
The UNCITRAL Model Law, article 16(1) also seems to accept the invalidity of the arbitra-
tion clause in at least some circumstances. It is suggested that the wording “A decision by 
the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity 
of the arbitration clause” means that even if the agreements are separate, this does not mean 
that the invalidity ground applied to the main agreement cannot also be applied to the arbi-
tration clause.186 Born has interpreted the Model Law as to mean that both the intention of 
the parties and specific invalidity grounds can lead to the invalidity or non-applicability of 
the arbitration clause.187  
As a solution to the problem, Koulu suggests that the scope of the doctrine of separability 
should be narrowed.188 In my opinion, the viewpoint of Koulu can be criticized. Firstly, I 
                                                          
the validity of the main agreement, Heuman 1999, p. 67; Hobér and Magnusson have clarified the meaning 
of the doctrine by stating that the invalidity of the main agreement does not “automatically” make the arbi-
tration clause invalid. This emphases that the arbitration clause can only be found invalid by a separate as-
sessment, Hobér & Magnusson 2008, p. 61. 
183 For Denmark, see Siig 2003, p. 247; Hjelje 1987, p. 21; According to the Norwegian Arbitration Act, section 
18, subsection 2, the invalidity of the main agreement does “ikke i seg selv” (not as such) make the arbitration 
clause invalid; The invalidity grounds in the Finnish Contracts Act are also similar to those in the other Nordic 
countries, since the Finnish Contracts Act is based on the contract laws of the other Scandinavian countries, 
HE 66/1927, p. 1; Even if the Finnish Contracts Act was enacted about 10 years later than the other Nordic 
contract laws, all the acts are based on a common Nordic law-drafting, Hemmo 2003A, p. 43. 
184 Born 2014A, p. 393; Paulsson 2014, p. 61; Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133; Park 2006, p. 295; Usually the 
alleged invalidity grounds affecting also the arbitration clause are caused by the lack of consent when con-
cluding the main agreement, Born 2014A, p. 457. 
185 Park highlights the importance of only assessing the arbitration clause when deciding on the competence 
of the tribunal, Park 2006, p. 294-295; According to Lew et al., the invalidity of the main agreement does not 
“automatically” affect the arbitration clause, Lew et al. 2003, p. 104; Lew et al. also make a clear distinction 
between solving the procedural and substantial issues, Law et al. 2003, p. 130; Born highlights that to be 
correct, the invalidity of the arbitration clause shall be assessed separately, Born 2014A, p. 460.  
186 Born 2014A, p. 407; The article is poorly formulated since based on its wording, it could be interpreted to 
suggest that the validity of the main agreement shall be assessed before assessing the validity of the arbitra-
tion clause. 
187 Born 2014A, p. 378. 
188 Koulu 2008, p. 209; Ware is a bit more drastic and suggests that to solve the problem, the whole doctrine 
of separability should be abolished, Ware 2007, p. 121. 
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suggest that the scope of the doctrine is not too broad, the doctrine is only interpreted 
wrongly.189 According to the earlier mentioned definition of the doctrine, it only separates 
the arbitration clause from the main agreement so that the invalidity of the clause is assessed 
separately. From the wording used to define the doctrine, it cannot be concluded that the 
threshold to rule the arbitration clause invalid should be higher than the threshold under 
general contract law, especially under the invalidity grounds in the Contracts Act. Secondly, 
it seems that Koulu first determines the validity of the main agreement before assessing the 
arbitration clause, since he states that the invalidity of the main agreement too seldom re-
flects to the arbitration clause.190 This is not justifiable in terms of procedural efficiency or 
in accordance with the division of competence between the court and the tribunal. The court 
or tribunal has to determine its competence first before assessing the material part of the 
case.  
Consequently, two separate assessments have to be done, first one to determine the validity 
of the arbitration clause and then secondly to determine the validity of the main agreement. 
The same threshold for the invalidity shall be applied in the both assessments. In this way 
the right to a fair trial is properly protected. 
2.5 Expiration of the Main Agreement 
In general contract law, the main rule is that the expiration of an agreement affects all con-
tract clauses and obligations under the contract.191 With expiration, I mean different ways 
the binding character of the agreement ends, for instance by becoming invalid, terminated, 
the end of the agreement period and other reasons forcing the valid contractual relationship 
between the parties to end. There are some exceptions to the main rule. As examples of these 
exceptions, Hemmo explicitly mentions prorogation and arbitration clauses.192 As a main 
rule, he states that the expiration of the main agreement does not affect clauses that have 
been included in the contract to be applied at the time of the expiration of the agreement.193 
                                                          
189 Also Park criticizes the extension of the competence of the tribunal by the doctrine of separability with 
the misunderstanding of the operation of the doctrine, Park 2006, p. 295. 
190 Koulu 2008, p. 209. 
191 Hemmo 2003B, p. 369; See also, Lindfelt 2011, p. 208. 
192 Hemmo 2003B, p. 369; See also, Lindfelt 2011, p. 208. 
193 Hemmo 2005, p. 304; Hemmo 2003B, p. 369; According to Hemmo, there are seldom disputes about the 
validity of these clauses since the continued validity of these clauses is usually self-evident, Hemmo 2005, p. 
304; In the United Kingdom, the legal state seems to be similar regarding at least jurisdiction clauses, see 
Briggs 2008, p. 67.  
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The general opinion in the Finnish legal doctrine seems to be that the doctrine of separability 
is also applied to a terminated main agreement.194 The standpoint seems to be correct both 
from the perspective of the parties´ intention and in accordance with the aim of the doctrine. 
As earlier discovered, by adding an arbitration clause to the agreement, the parties seem to 
intend to solve all disputes regarding the main agreement by arbitration.195 It also seems to 
be against the aim of the doctrine to make the proceeding more efficient not to apply the 
doctrine of separability to disputes regarding expired main agreements.196 There are two Su-
preme Court decision covering the effect of the termination of the main agreement to the 
arbitration clause, KKO 1954 II 11 and KKO 1980 II 103. In its both decisions, the Supreme 
Court ruled that even if the parties had terminated the main agreement, the arbitration clause 
was still valid and the conflicts could be decided by an arbitral tribunal. 
The European Court of Human Rights has also assessed the applicability of the doctrine of 
separability to a terminated main agreement in Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis 
v. Greece.197 The Court stated that even if the Greek authorities had the right to terminate 
the main agreement with the refinery, the termination could not affect the arbitration 
clause.198 The standpoint was justified with both the doctrine of separability and the fact that 
the rejection of the doctrine would have deprived the other party the right to a fair trial.199 
2.6 Allegations that the Main Agreement is Non-existent 
Even if the legal state is unclear in Finland, it seems that based on the legal doctrine, the 
leading opinion is that the doctrine of separability cannot be applied if the main agreement 
is alleged non-existent.200 It is difficult to claim that the parties have agreed to use arbitration 
                                                          
194 Möller 1997, p. 28-29; Kurkela 1994, p. 7; The same seems to follow from Savola´s definition of the doctrine 
of separability, Savola 2015, p. 137; However, Koulu alleges that the legal state is still unclear, Koulu 2008, p. 
79; Also in Sweden, the applicability of the doctrine of separability to a terminated main agreement is ac-
cepted, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 75; The legal state is similar in Denmark, Forslag L 127 (2004/2), p. 13; Also 
internationally, it seems that the termination of the main agreement does not affect the arbitration clause, 
Born 2014A, p. 351; Moses 2008, p. 18; Grant 2007, p. 873; Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133; Lew et al. 2003, 
p. 103; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 437. 
195 See chapter 2.2; It has also been argued that the competence to arbitrate a dispute regarding a terminated 
contract could also solely be based on the parties´ will. Consequently, the result could also be justified with 
general contract law rules instead of with the doctrine of separability, Frände et al. 2017, p. 1307. 
196 See chapter 2.2. 
197 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece 13427/87 (9.12.1994). 
198 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece 13427/87 (9.12.1994), pp. 72. 
199 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece 13427/87 (9.12.1994), pp. 72-73. 
200 Kurkela 1996A, p. 352; However according to Möller, the applicability of the doctrine of separability to 
non-existent main agreements should in principle also be accepted. Nevertheless, he states that in most cases 
the non-existence of the main agreement also extends to the arbitration clause, Möller 2004, p. 13. 
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in the situation of a conflict regarding an agreement, if they have not even concluded the 
agreement. There is neither any theoretical basis for the doctrine to rely on, since there is no 
agreement from which the clause could be separated.201 However, the standpoint taken in 
the Finnish legal doctrine can be criticized. 
An interesting situation where the doctrine of separability gets a practical role even if an 
agreement is never entered into are draft agreements. As I see it, the doctrine of separability 
has to be applied to draft agreements to enable the tribunal to rule an arbitration clause in-
cluded in a draft agreement valid. Without the doctrine of separability, the arbitration clause 
cannot be entered into, if the main agreement is not entered into. Consequently, the tribunal 
would lose its own competence by ruling the main agreement non-existent. There is one case 
assessing the problem decided by the Arbitration Institute of the Finnish Chamber of Com-
merce. The case is summarized by Mika Savola.202  
In the case, the parties had exchanged drafts to an agreement including an arbitration clause. 
One of the parties had taken the dispute regarding the agreement to arbitration, but the other 
party objected the arbitration by claiming that the agreement was never signed and accepted. 
As a basis for its evaluation, the Tribunal stated that the doctrine of separability applies and 
that the existence of the arbitration clause has to be evaluated separately. Consequently, the 
tribunal did a separate evaluation of the validity of the arbitration clause and came to the 
conclusion that even if the main agreement was alleged non-existent, the arbitration clause 
was valid. Without the doctrine of separability such a ruling would not have been possible. 
Similar opinions can also be found in the international arbitral doctrine.203 
The ruling is also supported by article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law that states that 
the arbitral tribunal shall have the competence to rule on its own jurisdiction at least “with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement”.204 The article continues 
with explaining that the doctrine of separability shall be applied to the aforementioned situ-
ations regarding the tribunal´s competence-competence.205 The interpretation of the article 
is not clarified further in the explanatory note, but it seems that based on its wording, the 
                                                          
201 Koulu 2008, p. 75, 78-79. 
202 Savola 2017B. 
203 Born 2014A, p. 458-459; Paulsson 2014, p. 66-67.  
204 “The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence 
or validity of the arbitration agreement”, UNCITRAL Model Law, article 16(1). 
205 “For that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract”, UNCITRAL Model Law, article 16(1). 
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article shall be interpreted so that the doctrine shall be applied to allegedly non-existent 
agreements.206 In addition, the ICC Rules, article 6(9) accepts the applicability of the doc-
trine of separability to the alleged non-existence of the main agreement.207 
From a Nordic perspective, it seems that the doctrine of separability also applies to non-
existent main agreements. In Norway and Denmark, this stems from their respective arbitra-
tion acts.208 The Swedish Arbitration Act does not directly support the viewpoint, but the 
Government Proposal broadens the applicability of the doctrine of separability to also cover 
agreements never entered into.209 Internationally, the legal state is somewhat unclear.210 Pou-
dret and Besson have comprehensively compared the different international views and came 
to the conclusion that the opinion accepting the applicability of the doctrine to agreements 
never entered into can be considered as the leading one.211  
However, as the aim of the doctrine of separability is to avoid abuse, a mere allegation that 
the agreement does not exist should at least not eliminate the competence of the tribunal 
even if the applicability of the doctrine would not be accepted in Finland.212 The argument 
has to be at least stronger to move the competence from a tribunal to the general courts. The 
applicability of the doctrine of separability would however better protect the arbitral pro-
ceeding from these attempts of abuse. Another argument supporting the applicability of the 
doctrine of separability to non-existent main agreements is that the distinction between a 
void and non-existent agreement is difficult to draw, which can lead to procedural conflicts 
and forum shopping which consequently make the procedure ineffective.213 Also, if it is 
accepted that the intent of the parties is to solve all their contractual disputes by arbitration, 
                                                          
206 Also Koulu seems to support the interpretation, Koulu 2008, p. 79. 
207 “Unless otherwise agreed, the arbitral tribunal shall not cease to have jurisdiction by reason of any allega-
tion that the contract is non-existent or null and void, provided that the arbitral tribunal upholds the validity 
of the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal shall continue to have jurisdiction to determine the parties’ 
respective rights and to decide their claims and pleas even though the contract itself may be non-existent or 
null and void”, ICC Rules, article 6(9); The applicability of the doctrine of separability to non-existent main 
agreements is also for instance included in the British Arbitration Act, section 7. 
208 See Norwegian Arbitration Act, section 18 and Danish Arbitration Act, chapter 4, section 16. 
209 Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 75; Before the enactment of the Swedish Arbitration Act in 1999, it has been argued 
that the doctrine did not reach to contracts never entered into, The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1984, 
p. 28. 
210 Academics accepting the applicability of the doctrine of separability to non-existent agreements are for 
instance, Born 2014A, p. 351; Moses 2008, p. 18; Grant 2007, p. 873; Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133; Lew et 
al. 2003, p. 103; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 210; Against the applicability are for instance, Svernlöv & Carroll 
1991, p. 38; van den Berg 1981, p. 145; As a national example, in for instance the US, if the main agreement 
is non-existent the arbitration clause cannot be valid, Leboulanger 2007, p. 25. 
211 Poudret & Besson 2007, p. 133-136. 
212 Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 211; Svernlöv & Carroll 1991, p. 49. 
213 Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 211. 
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why would then the disputes regarding the invalidity of the main agreement be arbitrated, 
but regarding the existence of the main agreement be solved by general courts?214  
Concludently, as can be seen from the arbitral award regarding draft agreements, the doctrine 
of separability has an important task to fill regarding agreements never entered into. Since 
also all the other Nordic countries, the Model Law and the ICC Rules apply the doctrine of 
separability to non-existent main agreements, it is well-grounded to claim that the doctrine 
of separability also in Finland should be applied to agreements alleged to never have been 
entered into. 
2.7 Burden of Proof 
The allocation of the burden of proof affects the possibilities to successfully refer to the 
doctrine of separability. Therefore, the burden of proof also affects the strength of the doc-
trine.  
Generally in contract law, there is a presumption that an agreement is binding if the opposite 
is not proved.215 In general courts where the Code of Judicial Procedure applies, the “free 
evaluation of evidence” applies.216 However, according to Chapter 17, section 2, subsection 
1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the party shall prove the circumstances on which his or 
her claim or objection is based. Even if the Code of Judicial Procedure is not applied to 
arbitration, it is well-known that it affects the proceeding in the arbitral tribunal. Since the 
national law is applied as lex arbitri and lex fori, it is usually difficult to justify procedural 
rules that are not in line with the national procedural rules, if the parties have not otherwise 
agreed. In addition, most of the evidential rules included in the Act can be seen as general 
procedural principles.217 As a result, value can be given to the Code of Judicial Procedure 
even when the matter is decided in an arbitral tribunal.  
According to Koulu, in general courts, the Act is interpreted so that the applicant has to prove 
that the arbitration agreement has been terminated, is invalid or unreasonable and the re-
spondent that the arbitration clause is entered into, is fulfilled and covers the dispute at 
                                                          
214 Leboulanger 2007, p. 27. 
215 Annola 2016, p. 41. 
216 In other words, this means that the Court has to determine what has been proven and what has not. 
217 For instance, in Helsinki Court of Appeal S 15/2325, 1551 (HelHO 2016:19, 21.10.2016), the Court ruled 
that the arbitral award was valid and enforceable, since the burden of proof set on the applicant for the casual 
connection between the injury and the act, as also codified in the Code of Judicial Procedure was a general 
procedural principle. Thus, the challenge was rejected. 
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hand.218 Regarding non-existent main agreements, Koulu´s standpoint seems well-grounded. 
At least it is easier for a party alleging that there is an existing arbitration clause to show 
evidence that an arbitration clause has been concluded. The burden of proof shifts to the 
other party, if evidence of the arbitration clause can be shown. When it comes to terminated 
main agreements, it is also easy to agree with Koulu. Since it is presumed that the parties 
have intended to solve all disputes regarding the main agreement by arbitration, it is logical 
that the party alleging that disputes regarding a terminated main agreement shall not be 
solved by arbitration shall have the burden of proof. 
Regarding invalidity, Koulu seems to be of the opinion that the burden of proof is on the 
party claiming that same facts allegedly causing the main agreement to be invalid also causes 
the invalidity of the arbitration clause, even if he admits that the legal state is not yet settled 
in Finland.219 I agree with Koulu. Since the doctrine of separability is a lex specialis provi-
sion aimed to prevent misuse of justice, it could be justifiable to set a heavier burden of proof 
for the respondent who claims that the tribunal has no jurisdiction (and the applicant in a 
general court). Consequently, the presumption would be that the arbitration clause is valid, 
but the presumption could be rebutted by evidence of the opposite. 
2.8 Conclusions 
Even if there are some differences in the scope of the core of the doctrine of separability, 
there is at least an international consensus that the doctrine is defined as separating the main 
agreement and the arbitration clause to two separate agreements. This is also accepted in 
Finland. As regards the differences in the definitions, some of the definitions only include 
                                                          
218 Koulu 2008, p. 229; Even if Koulu´s book is written before the amendment of the rules regarding evidence 
in the Code of Judicial Procedure, the legal state should still be the same since the rules regarding burden of 
proof have not changed. Only the wording of the section has been modernized, since the former rules where 
from 1948. The old rules were included in Chapter 17, section 1, subsection 1 of the Code of Judicial Procedure 
in the following form: “In a civil case the plaintiff shall prove the facts that support the action. If the defendant 
presents a fact in his or her favour, also he or she shall prove it”. 
219 Koulu 2009, p. 78; Koulu 2008, p. 209; In general contract law, the burden of proof regarding that the 
invalidity of one contract clause does not reach to the whole of the agreement is on the party claiming the 
partly invalidity, Koulu 2008, p. 78; In Sweden, it seems that the party alleging the invalidity of the main 
agreement has to show that the alleged invalidity ground also makes the arbitration clause invalid, Heuman 
2011, p. 338; Hobér 2011, p. 108; Interesting is that based on the Nordic doctrine, Koulu states that as regards 
prorogation clauses, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that the alleged invalidity of the main agree-
ment does not affect the prorogation clause. This seems to be opposite to the burden of proof applied to 
arbitration clauses. Nevertheless, Koulu does not give any sources for his standpoint, Koulu 2009, p. 208; 
Internationally, at least Paulsson is of the opinion that the burden of proof is on the party claiming that the 
alleged invalidity of the main agreement also causes the invalidity of the arbitration clause, Paulsson 2014, p. 
61. 
38 
 
the invalidity of the main agreement, some also include terminated and non-existent main 
agreements, and some are open definitions. However, the exact scope of the doctrine of sep-
arability does not necessary depend on the definition since the doctrine has in most jurisdic-
tion been shaped by both case law and legal doctrine. 
The aim of the doctrine of separability is to express the will of the parties, enhance the effi-
ciency of the proceeding and give competence to the tribunal.220 It seems logical that the 
presumed will of the parties is to get all disputes regarding the main agreement solved by 
arbitration. But is it necessary to justify the doctrine of separability with the will of the par-
ties, when the will of the parties can be respected by interpreting the arbitration clause in the 
light of the presumed will of the parties? It seems to me that the doctrine is better justified 
with efficiency arguments than with the will of the parties, which is better aimed for the 
actual separate assessment of the arbitration clause.221  
There is a wide international and Finnish consensus that when deciding on the invalidity of 
the main agreement, the arbitration clause shall be considered as a separate agreement. How-
ever, the question regarding the invalidity of the arbitration clause is more complex. The 
ambiguity regards if the alleged invalidity ground of the main agreement can automatically 
reach to the arbitration clause and if the invalidity grounds in general contract law shall be 
applied to arbitration clauses as such or if the threshold for invalidity shall be higher. 
From a Finnish perspective it seems that the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Constitution forces us to apply an approach demanding that the parties have to freely express 
their will to arbitrate. Applying this approach, it is natural that the invalidity grounds in 
general contract law have to be applied as such to arbitration clauses to keep the doctrine in 
accordance with the Convention. To avoid exceeding its competence, the tribunal primarily 
has to decide if the arbitration clause is valid before assessing the substantial matter and the 
validity of the main agreement.  
Consequently, the doctrine gets a bit toothless, since most of the invalidity grounds allegedly 
making the main agreement invalid probably also encumber the arbitration clause even if a 
separate assessment of the arbitration clause is done.222 If the arbitration clause is invalid 
                                                          
220 Without the doctrine of separability, the tribunal would still have competence-competence to rule on its 
own jurisdiction but by ruling the main agreement invalid or terminated it would remove its own competence. 
221 I will assess this matter further in chapter 5.4. 
222 If the alleged invalidity ground of the main agreement is based on a deficient formation of intent, it is 
nevertheless unlikely that the arbitration clause is valid. However, as long as the deficient formation of intent 
is only intended towards a part of the main agreement, it is still possible that the arbitration clause is not 
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because of an error in the formation of the will, also the main agreement is most likely invalid 
since the will is usually formed simultaneously. The Tribunal could not decide on the mate-
rial question even if it solves it simultaneously with the procedural matter since this would 
lead to a breach of the right to a fair trial. From a procedural economic perspective this leads 
to an unwanted situation. 
When it comes to the expiration of the main agreement, it seems to be well established that 
the doctrine of separability applies as long as the will of the parties is not to also terminate 
the arbitration clause. The alleged non-existence of the main agreement is a more complex 
question, even if the leading standpoint in the Finnish doctrine seems to be that the doctrine 
of separability cannot be applied to allegedly non-existent main agreements. However, there 
is also an arbitral award applying Finnish law accepting the applicability of the doctrine to 
non-existent main agreements. Nonetheless, it seems that there is a need for applying the 
doctrine of separability also to non-existent agreements. For instance, an arbitration clause 
included in a draft agreement could be valid even if the draft agreement is not entered into. 
In such a situation and without the doctrine of separability, a valid arbitration clause would 
also be non-existent as a part of the draft agreement never concluded. 
Concludently, the legal state in Finland is clear regarding the applicability of the doctrine of 
separability to invalid and terminated main agreements but uncertain regarding non-existent 
main agreements. Since the legal state is uncertain and there is a need for applying the doc-
trine to non-existent main agreements, an inclusion of the definition of the doctrine of sepa-
rability would be needed when amending the Arbitration Act. The definition of the doctrine 
should as in the UNCITRAL Model Law include the invalidity, expiration and non-existence 
of the main agreement.223  
                                                          
defected; In for example the US, the problem does not occur since it seems that many of the contract law 
invalidity grounds affecting the main agreement does not affect the arbitration clause, Ware 2007, p. 120-
121. 
223 Also the other Nordic countries can be used as models for the amendment of the Finnish Arbitration Act. 
In Norway and Denmark, the definition included in the legislation covers the invalidity and non-existence of 
the main agreement. In Sweden, the definition in the Arbitration Act only includes the invalidity of the main 
agreement, but in the Government Proposal it is clarified that the doctrine also applies to non-existent and 
terminated main agreements; In Denmark, it has been alleged that the inclusion of the doctrine of separability 
in the legislation was necessary from an international perspective. Even if the doctrine was already accepted 
in Danish arbitration practice, the inclusion was seen as important so that also people not familiar with Danish 
arbitration practice, especially international parties could verify the applicability of the doctrine of separabil-
ity in Denmark, Lookofsky & Kristoffersen 2006, p. 55. 
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3. Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Separability 
In this chapter, I will assess if the doctrine of separability can affect the choice of law of the 
arbitration clause. Firstly, I will assess if the doctrine of separability is applicable to the 
choice of law of the arbitration clause. Secondly, if applicable, which effect the doctrine of 
separability has on the choice of law of the arbitration clause. The questions are interesting 
since a strict application of the doctrine of separability would prohibit the application of the 
choice of law of the main agreement to the arbitration clause. On the other hand, the aim of 
the doctrine does not require the applicability of the doctrine of separability to the choice of 
law. Without the doctrine of separability, there has to be an explicit choice of law in the 
arbitration clause or otherwise lex contractus will be applied to the arbitration clause as the 
law of the only agreement. The stronger the effect of the doctrine of separability is, the more 
likely it is that lex arbitri will be applied instead. 
The importance of the matter cannot be overestimated since the rules regarding the validity 
and interpretation of dispute resolution agreements differs considerably from one country to 
another. The choice of law matter could be subject to an entire pro gradu, but I will only 
assess the overall choice of law matter as broadly as necessary to solve the question regard-
ing the applicability of the separability doctrine to the choice of law.224 Without understand-
ing the process of choosing the law for the arbitration clause, one cannot correctly apply the 
doctrine of separability in the context of choice of law. 
Firstly, I will assess how the choice of law is made in general contract law. Secondly, I will 
assess the division between material and procedural questions and how the division affects 
the choice of law and the doctrine of separability. Thirdly, I will assess how it is determined 
if lex arbitri or lex contractus should be applied to the arbitration clause. Fourthly, I will 
assess the different methods of choosing the law applicable and finally, how the doctrine of 
separability affects the choice of law. 
3.1 General Contract Law Rules 
Generally, the choice of law of international contracts is governed by the principle of free-
dom of contract.225 Consequently, in the simplest of situations the parties have agreed on a 
choice of law clause in their agreement. Unfortunately, the law governing the arbitration 
                                                          
224 As has been stated by Born, there are several different scholars preferring different approaches to the 
choice of law question and consequently there is no consensus regarding the question, Born 2014B, p. 821. 
225 Liukkunen 2012, p. 81. 
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clause is rarely specified. If no intention of the parties can be found, the law with the closest 
connection to the agreement will usually be applied.226 Since there is more often a law cho-
sen for the main agreement, the question regarding the applicability of the doctrine of sepa-
rability to protect the arbitration clause from the choice of law clause in the main agreement 
actualizes. 
The choice of law is regulated both in international conventions and in the European Union, 
but the problem from an arbitration point of view is that arbitration agreements are excluded 
from the scope of these instruments.227 In Finland, the main rule is that lex fori will be applied 
to questions regarding the procedural part of a matter.228 According to Koulu this would 
include also dispute resolution agreements and consequently as a main rule, lex fori is ap-
plied to dispute resolution clauses.229 However regarding prorogation clauses, the rule can 
only be seen as a weak main rule.230 Interesting from a separability point of view is which 
role the doctrine of separability has in the choice of lex fori as the main rule in the choice of 
law for dispute resolution clauses. 
3.2 Is the Question regarding the Choice of Law a Material or Procedural Question?  
3.2.1 The Arbitration Clause 
It is a natural starting point that lex fori or lex arbitri is applied to the procedural matters and 
lex contractus or the law chosen by the parties is applied to the substantial matters of a con-
flict.231 The starting point is logical, since lex fori and lex arbitri are vital for the competence 
of the tribunal and the enforcement of the award in the country of the arbitral seat or the 
                                                          
226 Born 2014B, p. 816-817. 
227 For instance, article 1(2)(d) of the Rome Convention and article 1(2)(e) of the Rome I Regulation states 
that arbitration agreements are not included in the scope of the Convention nor the Regulation. Nevertheless, 
there could be a possible analogy between the choice of law of arbitration clauses and the Convention and 
Regulation, since general rules of Finnish civil law are to be applied also to arbitration clauses, Kurkela 1996B, 
p. 10; However one has to be careful since the exclusion of the arbitration agreements from the scope of the 
Convention and Regulation is an explicit choice by the legislator. 
228 Koulu 2009, p. 74. 
229 Koulu 2009, p. 74; Internationally there is no consensus on the applicability of lex fori or lex contractus to 
competence clauses, Koulu 2009, p. 74; As will be shown in chapter 3.3, lex arbitri is usually applied instead 
of lex fori to arbitration clauses. This is probably because lex fori is difficult to predict since it depends on the 
country where the party wants to execute the award. 
230 According to Koulu, the type of the dispute resolution clause determines how strong the lex fori principle 
is, Koulu 2009, p. 74. 
231 With lex fori is meant the law of the country of the proceedings, with lex arbitri the law of the country of 
the arbitral seat and with lex contractus the law of the main agreement. In practice, usually at least both lex 
fori and lex arbitri leads to the same law applicable, but also lex contractus can often lead to the same appli-
cable law. 
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country of the enforcing court.232 Thus it is usually possible for the parties to choose the law 
for the substantial matter without any intervention by the national court, but possibly the 
court could apply lex fori or lex arbitri to the procedural questions to protect its own proce-
dure, regardless of the intent of the parties. This division is sometimes also used as a starting 
point when choosing the law of the arbitration clause. It has been alleged that the procedural 
validity of the arbitration clause always should be governed by lex arbitri but that the law 
applied to the substantive validity of the clause could be chosen by the parties.233  
From a Finnish perspective, jurisdictional agreements are often classified as procedural mat-
ters.234 Nevertheless according to Koulu, an arbitration clause includes both procedural and 
material elements which can lead to a possible problem with different laws applicable to 
different parts of the arbitration clause.235 In accordance with this view, lex arbitri should be 
applied to matters regarding arbitration law which could include the arbitrability of the dis-
pute, the form of the agreement, criteria for the content of the agreement and the supple-
menting of the clause.236 It is however not certain which law should be applied to the general 
conditions for contractual commitment, for instance the conclusion and termination of an 
agreement. 237 It could either be lex contractus or lex arbitri. In Sweden, at least Madsen 
suggests that no division is needed since the law chosen by the parties or the law with the 
closest connection should be applied to all parts of the arbitration clause.238  
Even if the division is correct from a theoretical viewpoint and the aim with the theory is to 
protect the arbitration clause from invalidity by applying lex arbitri or lex fori to the proce-
dural part of the matter, it seems that the disadvantages of the theory are significant. There 
are some problems connected to the drawing of a border between the material and procedural 
matters which can lead to costly conflicts, for instance conflicts within the dispute regarding 
                                                          
232 Otherwise it would be difficult to carry out the arbitral proceeding or enforce the award, Koulu 2008, p. 
64.  
233 Moses 2008, p. 65. 
234 Koulu 2009, p. 76. 
235 Koulu 2008, p. 63-64; Generally about this problem when it comes to all dispute resolution agreements, 
see Koulu 2009, p. 75. 
236 Koulu 2008, p. 64; Regarding prorogation clauses, see Taivalkoski 2001, p. 703-704. 
237 Koulu 2008, p. 64; Because of the division, it would be most logical to apply lex contractus to the contrac-
tual commitment, but on the other hand to avoid fragmentation of the choice of law, lex arbitri would be a 
more suitable choice. In the end and based on the freedom of contract, the law applicable would most ap-
propriately be decided based on the will of the parties; According to Taivalkoski there is no clear answer to 
the question when it comes to prorogation clauses, Taivalkoski 2001, p. 703-704. 
238 Madsen 2016A, p. 437; However, see also Zettermarck, who is of the opinion that lex arbitri always shall 
be applied to the question regarding the arbitrability of the conflict even if another law would be applied to 
other issues concerning the arbitration clause, Zettermarck 2006, p. 115-116. 
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the law applicable to different parts of the arbitration clause.239 There are also more dimen-
sions to consider when choosing the applicable law than only the procedural/substantial mat-
ter division, for instance the intention of the parties, the recognition and enforcement of the 
award and other the benefits and disadvantages with different applicable laws.  
From the point of view of the doctrine of separability, a division between procedural and 
substantial questions is interesting. Without the doctrine of separability, the law of the main 
agreement would also be applied to the arbitration clause. When applying the doctrine of 
separability there could possibly be a similar division as shown in this chapter. There could 
be two separate agreements, the substantial main agreement to which lex contractus would 
be applied and the procedural arbitration clause to which lex arbitri would be applied. 
3.2.2 The Doctrine of Separability  
The division between procedural and substantial matters can also affect the law applicable 
to the doctrine of separability.240 The real nature of the doctrine of separability is still not 
decided in Finland nor internationally.241 If the doctrine of separability is recognized as a 
prerequisite for the tribunal to effectively exercise its competence-competence, the doctrine 
could be regarded as procedural.242 On the other hand, if the doctrine is regarded as a special 
feature of the arbitration clause, it could be deemed as a substantial matter.243 There are 
scholars supporting both lex fori, lex arbitri and the law of the arbitration clause (this would 
be lex contractus or lex arbitri) as the law applicable to the doctrine of separability.244 This 
question is important since even if the doctrine of separability is accepted worldwide, there 
are significant differences in the strength and scope of the doctrine. In Finland, the question 
                                                          
239 Also Koulu accepts the problems with the division, Koulu 2008, p. 64. 
240 Even if Koulu prefers the application of lex arbitri to the doctrine of separability, he admits that the leading 
Nordic standpoint is that the law applicable to the arbitration clause should be applied. However, Koulu does 
not validate the Nordic standpoint with any Nordic sources, Koulu 2008, p. 65; The Nordic standpoint (if ac-
cepted) again leads us back to the main question of this chapter, which is the law applicable to the arbitration 
clause? It could be argued that Koulu´s choice would be a simpler and more unambiguous rule. 
241 This systematization problem is common for all dispute resolution agreements and thus analogy can also 
be taken from the general principles or from prorogation clauses; About the Finnish legal state, see Koulu 
2008, p. 64; For an international perspective, see Siig 2003, p. 253. 
242 Siig 2003, p. 253. 
243 Siig 2003, p. 253; At least if the main agreement is allegedly invalid, it can be argued that the question 
regarding the validity of the arbitration clause is a material question, since the question is not anymore about 
competence but about the special features of the arbitration agreement, Siig 2003, p. 245. 
244 For instance, van den Berg supports the applicability of lex fori to the doctrine, Van den Berg 1981, p. 146; 
Koulu supports the applicability of lex arbitri, Koulu 2008, p. 65; Siig is one of the academics supporting the 
applicability of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement, Siig 2003, p. 254. 
44 
 
has not been assessed and internationally there is not much research concluded about the 
problem. 
The application of lex arbitri would be suitable from the point of view of the actual arbitral 
proceeding, which is also governed by lex arbitri. The application of lex fori to the scope of 
the doctrine of separability would be the most suitable choice from an enforcement point of 
view. The underlying principle of freedom of contract supports the applicability of the law 
of the arbitration clause. From a theoretical point of view it seems to be more justifiable to 
apply the law of the arbitration clause also to the doctrine of separability, to protect the free-
dom of contract of the parties. It is on the parties’ responsibility and for the choice of law 
rules to decide, the most suitable law for both the arbitration clause and the doctrine of sep-
arability. 
3.3 Lex Arbitri and Lex Contractus 
This chapter aims to assess how the choice of law between lex arbitri and lex contractus is 
generally made.245 Chapter 3.5 will then discuss whether the doctrine of separability affects 
the assessment between the two competing laws. It is good to keep in mind that usually both 
lex arbitri and lex contractus leads to the same law and that the problem only actualises 
when they lead to different laws.246  
At least in Finland, the situation is ambiguous since arguments for both the applicability of 
lex contractus and lex arbitri have been raised.247 According to Koulu, lex fori (lex arbitri 
when it comes to arbitration) is better understood by the Court and therefore the applicability 
of lex fori would lead to a better quality of the decisions and less costs.248 Koulu recognizes 
that a choice of law clause in the main agreement could express the intent of the parties to 
                                                          
245 As regards arbitration clauses, the choice of law debate is usually between the choice of lex contractus or 
lex arbitri, Landolt 2013, p. 518; Savola 2008, p. 24-25; It has been alleged that lex arbitri is applied to the 
applicability of competence-competence, Várady 2015, p. 179. 
246 The question gets important when the different laws lead to different results. When it comes to the arbi-
tration clause, the worst scenario is that one of the laws leads to the invalidity of the arbitration clause. 
247 For the scholar supporting lex contractus, see Kurkela & Uoti 1995, p. 72; For the scholar supporting lex 
arbitri, see Koulu 2008, p. 63; Koulu would apply lex fori to the other types of dispute resolution clauses, 
Koulu 2009, p. 201. 
248 Koulu 2009, p. 201; If the arbitration has an international aspect, lex arbitri seems to get an even higher 
value since it is important to get the award executed and that the arbitration clause is valid in the country of 
the arbitral tribunal, Savola 2008, p. 27; Not all countries accept the validity of the arbitration clause under 
another law chosen by the parties than the law of the court/tribunal as the basis for the competence of the 
tribunal. If lex fori and lex arbitri differs, lex fori is a safer choice since the award is not always enforced in the 
country of the seat. However, at the time of the drafting of the arbitration clause and at the time of the 
arbitral proceeding it is often difficult to predict in which country or countries the award will later be exe-
cuted. 
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also apply lex contractus to the arbitration clause, but claims that it is not alone enough to 
supersede lex arbitri.249 
In Sweden, the Government Proposal of the Arbitration Act stipulates that the choice of law 
for the arbitration clause has to be made explicitly.250 Section 48 of the Swedish Arbitration 
Act, which regards arbitration clauses with international connection, only states that lex ar-
bitri is applied to the proceeding if the parties have not otherwise agreed.251 The wording 
used in the Government Proposal was upheld by the Swedish Supreme Court decision Bul-
garian Foreign Trade Bank, Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin.,Inc (2001),252 where the Court ruled that 
a choice of law clause in the main agreement does not affect the choice of law of the arbi-
tration clause. The agreement between the parties included a choice of law clause stating 
that Austrian law would apply to the agreement. The Supreme Court briefly stated that since 
there was no choice of law clause explicitly governing the arbitration clause, lex arbitri (in 
this case the Swedish Law) applies.253 The Court did not give any further reasons for the 
standpoint, but since it was undisputed that there was a choice of law clause in the main 
agreement, the decision is in line with the Government Proposal.  
Therefore, the term “kommit överens” means that the parties have to agree about the choice 
of law explicitly in the arbitration clause. The choice is not considered as explicitly agreed, 
if there is only a general choice of law clause in the main agreement.254 Even if the Swedish 
                                                          
249 However, it is unsure what else is needed to supersede lex arbitri since Koulu does not continue the argu-
ment further, Koulu 2009, p. 78. 
250 Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 191; It could be claimed that the doctrine of separability has influenced section 48 of 
the Swedish Arbitration Act. Since the doctrine states that there are two separate agreements, it can be al-
leged that the demand for an explicit choice of law for the arbitration clause strengthens the doctrine when 
ruling out the possibility to extend the applicability of a choice of law clause in the main agreement to the 
arbitration clause; However, According to the Government Proposal it seems that the main reason for the 
need for an explicit choice of law for the arbitration clause was that the Government interpreted article 
V(1)(a) of the New York Convention as to demand the choice of law to be explicit, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 190-
191. 
251 Lindskog´s opinion is in line with the Government Proposal. The parties have to agree explicitly in the 
arbitration clause about the choice of law, otherwise lex arbitri will be applied. Lindskog does not justify the 
use of lex arbitri instead of lex contractus with the doctrine of separability, Lindskog 2012, p. 1105. 
252 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin.,Inc (2001), Högsta Domstolen 27.10.2000, T 1881-99. 
253 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank, Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin.,Inc (2001), Högsta Domstolen 27.10.2000, T 1881-99, 
p. 4. The parties had not referred to the choice of law question so the Court determined the law applicable 
ex officio. 
254 This rule makes the choice of law easy if there only is a choice of law clause in the main agreement, but 
problems can occur when defining what “explicitly agreed” means. In Sweden, the problem was avoided by 
defining the threshold for “explicitly agreed” in the Government Proposal. 
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solution seems to be an easy and working solution, it seems that the Swedish law is one of 
the few laws including provisions regarding the choice of law of the arbitration clause.255  
There is not a similar section included in the Finnish Arbitration Act. An important question 
in Finnish arbitration law is therefore, if there is any principle requiring clarity of the choice 
of law made for the arbitration clause?256 If there is, it would make it more difficult to con-
clude that a choice of law clause in the main agreement also covers the arbitration clause, 
even if it still could be possible by interpreting the arbitration clause in accordance with the 
intention of the parties.257 Otherwise if no such rule exists in Finnish arbitration law, it could 
be argued that a choice of law clause in the main agreement is intended to also reach to the 
arbitration clause as an implicit choice of law. This would lower the bar to apply the choice 
of law of the main agreement to the arbitration clause in Finland. However, also the choice 
of an arbitral seat could be considered as an implicit choice of law, since the procedural 
questions are generally solved in accordance with the law of the seat.258 According to Koulu, 
traditionally in Finnish contract law it has been regarded that a choice of law shall be unam-
biguous and precise.259 Consequently, it seems that a requirement of an explicit choice of 
law of the arbitration clause could be justified also in Finland. 
Internationally, the New York Convention which is ratified by a huge number of countries, 
has a significant impact on the choice of law applicable to the arbitration clause. Especially 
as an argument favouring the applicability of lex arbitri.260 According to article V(1)(a) of 
the Convention, the enforcement and recognition of an award can be refused if the agreement 
is not valid under the law the parties have subjected to the agreement or otherwise under the 
law of the country where the award was made.261 The article has often been interpreted in a 
                                                          
255 Savola 2008, p. 24-25. 
256 Koulu 2008, p. 67. 
257 Koulu 2008, p. 68. 
258 In Sweden, it has been alleged as an alternative explanation of the connection between section 48 of the 
Arbitration Act and the New York Convention that also a choice of an arbitral seat can be regarded as an 
implicit choice of law for the arbitration clause, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 191. 
259 Koulu 2009, p. 78. 
260 However, internationally there are scholars supporting both the applicability of lex arbitri and lex contrac-
tus to the arbitration clause, which makes the legal state unclear in international arbitration, Poudret & Bes-
son 2007, p. 142; Redfern & Hunter 2004, p. 129-130; There also seems to be a difference between common 
law and civil law countries. In common law countries, lex contractus has a stronger support and in civil law 
countries, lex arbitri is usually preferred, Savola 2009, p. 56. 
261 “The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to them, under some 
incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing 
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made”, The New York Convention, 
article V(1)(a).  
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way favouring the arbitration clause being valid under the law of the country of the tribunal, 
in other words under lex arbitri. It seems that the common interpretation only accepts the 
parties to explicitly subject the arbitration clause to a specific law.  
For instance, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has ruled that according to the New York Conven-
tion, the scope of the arbitration clause shall be decided in accordance with lex arbitri.262 
The practice regarding the ICC Rules seems to support the applicability of lex arbitri for 
practical reasons. The ICC Rules, article 42 states that the tribunal “shall make every effort 
to make sure that the award is enforceable at law”. In ICC Case 4472 (1984), the Tribunal 
interpreted the article as that the tribunal has to make sure that the arbitration clause is valid 
under lex arbitri before deciding on their competence.263 Also as earlier mentioned, the Gov-
ernment Proposal for the Swedish Arbitration Act states that the Convention should be in-
terpreted as demanding an explicit choice of law in the arbitration clause.264 
Nevertheless, the standpoint taken by the Swedish legislator and in case law can also be 
criticized. Even if article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention has been interpreted as pro-
moting the use of lex arbitri, the wording of the article does not directly support this view. 
The article states that the agreement has to be “valid under the law the parties have subjected 
it” to. In its ordinary meaning, “subjected” does not necessary mean that the law has to be 
chosen explicitly as alleged in the proposal for the Swedish Arbitration Act. Apparently, 
either a choice of law clause in the main agreement or a choice of an arbitral seat could be 
interpreted as indications of which law the parties have subjected the agreement to. In legal 
doctrine, there is support for both the view that the choice shall be explicit and that the choice 
can be implicit.265 Nonetheless, the legal state is still unclear both in Finland and interna-
tionally. 
                                                          
262 Swiss Federal Tribunal, judgement of 21.3.1995 (referred to in Craig et al. 2000, p. 54). 
263 ICC case No. 4472 (1984) (referred to in Craig et al. 2000, p. 54). 
264 Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 190-191; The proposals to the Finnish, Norwegian and Danish Arbitration Acts do not 
clarify if the choice of law shall be explicit or if it could be implicit. 
265 For instance, van den Berg does not accept implicit choices of law, van den Berg 1981, p. 292-293; On the 
contrary, Born does interpret the Convention as to allow both explicit and implicit choices of law, Born 2014A, 
p. 499.  
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Finally, the applicability of lex contractus or lex arbitri depends on the national court apply-
ing the law since there is no international consensus regarding the question.266 From a prac-
tical point of view, it is in the parties’ interest to choose the law of the seat to govern the 
main agreement so that both lex arbitri and lex contractus leads to the same applicable law. 
3.4 The Aim of the Parties and the Closest Connection 
When deciding the applicable law between lex arbitri and lex contractus, another division 
also has to be done. As mentioned before in chapter 3.1, the freedom of contract is the fore-
most principle of contract law and thus also has to be the base for the choice of law. How-
ever, if no explicit or implicit (if implicit choices are accepted) choice of law can be found, 
the law with the closest connection will be applied to the arbitration clause.267 Therefore, the 
intent of the parties is the primary way to choose the law applicable, but secondly if no choice 
can be found, the law with the closest connection will be applied.268 
If the principle of closest connection is applied, both the law of the arbitral seat and the 
choice of law of the main agreement will affect the outcome. There seems to be no consensus 
                                                          
266 For instance in United Kingdom, lex contractus is also applied to the arbitration clause based on the Court 
of Appeal decision SulAmérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and others v Enesa Engenharia S.A., 1 W.L.R. 102 
(2012). According to the Court of Appeal, if there is a choice of law clause in the main agreement, lex con-
tractus should also govern the arbitration clause. The standpoint was justified by the Court of Appeal because 
it strongly indicates “the parties' intention in relation to the agreement to arbitrate”. Interesting with the case 
is that one of the parties claimed the opposite, based on the doctrine of separability. The Court however 
discarded the argument by claiming that the aim of the doctrine of separability is only to reflect the parties´ 
presumed intention to keep the arbitration clause effective even if the main agreement is null or void. Thus 
the doctrine could not be applied to the choice of law, SulAmérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and others v 
Enesa Engenharia S.A., 1 W.L.R. 102 (2012), pp 26; Opposite the British approach, the Singaporean Supreme 
Court has applied lex arbitri to arbitration clauses despite a choice of law clause in the main agreement. In its 
decision FirstLink Investments Corp Ltd v. GT Payment Pte Ltd and others (2014) SGHCR 12, the Supreme 
Court separated the substantive dispute and the dispute resolution mechanism as two distinct relationships. 
The Court stated that the presumption should be that the parties intended that their dispute (including the 
arbitration clause) should be governed by lex arbitri, as the neutral law governing the proceeding. The parties´ 
intention is according to the Court based on the fact that the parties intend their award to be enforceable 
and recognized. The Court interpreted the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law so that an 
award can be set aside if the arbitration clause is invalid under the law of the arbitral seat. However, the 
Supreme Court did not use the doctrine of separability in its argumentation and instead used the parties´ 
intention as justification for setting aside the substantive law, FirstLink Investments Corp Ltd v. GT Payment 
Pte Ltd and others (2014) SGHCR 12, pp 13-14. 
267 Koulu 2008, p. 68-69; In Sweden, the situation is different. The Swedish Arbitration Act, section 48 states 
that if no explicit choice of law is made, lex arbitri will be applied to the arbitration clause. Therefore, there 
is no space and need for the closest connection principle in Swedish arbitration law. 
268 Koulu 2008, p. 68-69. 
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in Finland which law is preferred even if it is alleged by Koulu that for prorogation clauses, 
lex fori (for arbitration clauses lex arbitri) could be a weak main rule.269  
Also internationally the law with the closest connection to the arbitration has been accepted 
as a base for the choice of law, if no common intent of the parties can be found.270 Similarly 
as in Finland, the main rule is that the law chosen by the parties applies (again the situation 
regarding implicit choices is unsure) but otherwise the law with the closest connection will 
be applied.271  
These two methods are of interest also when deciding the scope of the doctrine of separabil-
ity. Firstly, it is possible that the parties´ intention is to apply the doctrine of separability to 
the choice of law. Secondly, the doctrine could be taken into consideration when deciding 
which law has the closest connection to the arbitration. The doctrine of separability could be 
used to argue that since there are two separable agreements, lex arbitri has a closer connec-
tion to the procedural agreement than lex contractus as the law of the substantive contract.272 
3.5 The Doctrine of Separability 
3.5.1 The Doctrine of Separability as a prerequisite for the Choice of Lex Arbitri 
The applicability of the doctrine of separability to the choice of law seems to be settled even 
if there are some differing opinions. Also the extent to which the doctrine of separability 
applies to the choice of law appears to be settled. 
                                                          
269 Koulu 2008, p. 69; Regarding the closest connection, Koulu also mentions that the evaluation differs de-
pending on if there is only a single arbitration clause in the agreement or also other dispute resolution clauses. 
It is natural that the law of the main agreement should be applied to all clauses to avoid different laws applied 
to the different dispute resolution clauses, but if there is only a single clause it is easier to justify the applica-
bility of lex arbitri, Koulu 2008, p. 69-70. 
270 Born 2014B, p. 816-817; Also called the method of ”most significant relation”, Born 2014A, p. 506. 
271 Born 2014A, p. 506; However, Born is personally of the opinion that instead of the principle of ”closest 
connection”, the validation rule should be applied. The validation rule states that the arbitration clause is 
valid if it is valid under any of the laws that could be applied to the clause. According to Born, the rule is based 
on the objective of the parties to solve all conflicts regarding the agreement by arbitration, Born 2014B, p. 
834; In Finland, Kurkela also supports the principle he calls favorem validiatis, which means that the arbitra-
tion clause shall be interpreted in a way upholding its validity and in accordance with the intention of the 
parties, which is to have their dispute resolved by arbitration. This forces the tribunal to make sure that the 
clause is valid in accordance with the law applicable before making the decision on the applicable law, Kurkela 
1996A, p. 352. 
272 Born 2015, chapter 2, pp. 32. 
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The aim of the doctrine of separability is to protect the arbitration clause from invalidity and 
inefficiency and the aim of dispute resolution clauses is to get a satisfactory and final judg-
ment.273 However, even if the original aim of the doctrine of separability has only been to 
protect the arbitration clause from invalidity, it has in Finland been alleged that the doctrine 
also could protect the arbitration clause from choice of law clauses in the main agreement.274 
Internationally, it has been alleged that a separate choice of law assessment for the arbitration 
clause and the main agreement was already in the beginning accepted as a consequence of 
the doctrine of separability.275 This interpretation does not seem to have been objected 
later.276 
In Finland, there is not much case law regarding the matter. The only Supreme Court deci-
sion assessing the matter is KKO 2007:39. In the decision, there was no explicit choice of 
law made in the arbitration clause. Unfortunately, both the law of the main agreement and 
lex arbitri were Norwegian law, which meant that the court did not have to make a choice 
of law decision between the both possibilities.277 The Supreme Court only stated that the law 
applicable to the main agreement is not necessary applicable to the arbitration clause.278 This 
can possibly be considered as a reference to the doctrine of separability and interpreted so 
that the doctrine of separability enables other laws than lex contractus to be applied to the 
arbitration clause.279  
It seems that the Court did not want to take a stand in the question and thus reasoned its 
decision with the fact that both lex arbitri and lex contractus lead to the applicability of 
Norwegian law. Regardless of the wording of the case, Koulu is of the opinion that case shall 
be read so that the applicable law should be determined by the law applicable to the main 
agreement.280 I do not agree with Koulu´s interpretation of the case, since it seems clear that 
KKO did not take a standpoint on which law is more suitable to apply to the arbitration 
                                                          
273 See chapter 2.2. 
274 Koulu 2008, p. 74-75; In general, Koulu is sceptic about the applicability of the doctrine of separability to 
the choice of law of the arbitration clause, Koulu 2008, p. 65-66. 
275 Dimolitsa 1999, p. 219. 
276 Dimolitsa 1999, p. 219; But see e.g. Landolt for criticism on the applicability of the doctrine of separability 
to the choice of law, Landolt 2013, p. 518.  
277 The Court only stated that since both lex contractus and lex arbitri were Norwegian law, it was apparent 
that Norwegian law should be applied to the arbitration clause, KKO 2007:39, pp. 3.  
278 KKO 2007:39, pp. 3. 
279 The same wording has also been used in the legal doctrine to explain the effects of the doctrine of sepa-
rability on the choice of law, see e.g. Saarikivi 2008, p. 34. 
280 Koulu 2008, p. 66, 69; Koulu does not give any reasons for his interpretation but he states that there are 
many problems with applying the doctrine of separability in the context of choice of law, Koulu 2008, p. 66. 
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clause, lex arbitri or lex contractus.281 However, the leading opinion in Finnish doctrine 
seems to be that as a consequence of the applicability of the doctrine of separability to choice 
of law matters, the law applied to the arbitration clause shall be assessed separately from the 
choice of law of the main agreement.282 This viewpoint seems to be in accordance with the 
decision KKO 2007:39.  
The doctrine of separability does however not have any other effects on the choice of law of 
the arbitration clause. Firstly, it seems that there is no reason to apply the doctrine further to 
prohibit a choice of law clause in the main agreement to also reach to the arbitration clause. 
The freedom of contract does not support such an extension. The foremost principle in in-
terpreting agreements is the intent of the parties and it is fully possible that the parties aim 
could be to apply lex contractus to the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court decision KKO 
2007:39 also only states that lex contractus is not necessarily applied to the arbitration 
clause. Neither does the doctrine of separability support such a standpoint since the doctrine 
is only interpreted as to allow the arbitration clause to be governed by another law than the 
main agreement.283 The doctrine only forces the courts to make a separate assessment of the 
law applicable to the main agreement and to the arbitration clause. 
Secondly, regarding the actual choice of law, one has to ask if the doctrine of separability is 
a factor favouring the applicability of lex arbitri. As shown in chapter 3.4, in determining 
the applicable law primarily the aim of the parties and secondly the closest connection have 
to been assessed. When it comes to the aim of the parties, it seems that there is no space for 
the doctrine of separability to be applied in favour of lex arbitri. It is not well-grounded to 
allege that the aim of the parties would be to apply lex arbitri instead of lex contractus based 
on the doctrine of separability. However, when assessing the closest connection there could 
                                                          
281 ”Korkein oikeus toteaa, että välityssopimukseen sovellettava laki ei määräydy välttämättä pääsopimuk-
seen sovellettavan lain mukaisesti vaan siihen saattaa soveltua jonkun muun valtion laki. Tässä tapauksessa 
välityssopimukseen sovellettavasta laista ei ole sovittu. Kun kuitenkin välimiesmenettelyn paikaksi on sovittu 
Norja ja kun lisäksi siihen vakuutussopimukseen, johon A perustaa oikeutensa, on sovittu sovellettavaksi Nor-
jan lakia, myös välityslausekkeen sitovuutta A:han nähden on perusteltua arvioida Norjan lain mukaisesti.”, 
KKO 2007:39, pp. 3. 
282 Saarikivi 2008, p. 34; Savola 2008, p. 14; Kurkela 1996A, p. 352; Kurkela 1996B, p. 10; However according 
to Kurkela and Uoti, a choice of law clause in the main agreement also covers the arbitration clause and thus 
the doctrine of separability cannot be applied. However, if there is no choice of law clause in the main agree-
ment, lex arbitri will apply, Kurkela & Uoti 1995, p. 72: According to Koulu, it is still unclear if the choice of 
law of the main agreement does not extend to the arbitration clause because of the doctrine of separability. 
It has also been argued by Koulu that the doctrine of separability is not as strong in Finland regarding choice 
of law as in the other Nordic countries, Koulu 2008, p. 65-66; In Sweden, it is codified in section 48 of the 
Arbitration Act that a choice of law clause in the main agreement does not reach to the arbitration clause. 
283 Saarikivi 2008, p. 34; Kurkela 1996A, p. 352. 
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possibly be some space for arguments based on the doctrine of separability. The doctrine 
reduces the connection between the main agreement and the arbitration clause which could 
be a factor favouring lex arbitri when putting a greater weight on the connection between 
the arbitral seat and the arbitration clause. One has still to keep in mind that there is no 
support for such an interpretation in case law or legal doctrine and that such an interpretation 
is not in line with the aim of the doctrine of separability. 
In Sweden, section 48 of the Arbitration Act could be understood as expressing a strong 
doctrine of separability applicable to the choice of law since as a consequence of the section, 
the law applicable to the main agreement does not reach to the arbitration clause.284 In the 
Swedish doctrine, even before the present Arbitration Act was enacted, it was alleged that 
the doctrine of separability enabled that the arbitration clause “might” be governed by an-
other law than the main agreement because there are two separate agreements.285 Therefore, 
the starting point in the evaluation is similar in both Finland and Sweden, even if the Swedish 
Arbitration Act now has codified that lex arbitri will be applied to the arbitration clause if 
no explicit choice of law is made. 
Opposite to the Finnish standpoint, it has in Norwegian doctrine been alleged that the doc-
trine of separability could prevent a tribunal from applying lex contractus to the arbitration 
clause. According to Sørensen, lex arbitri applies to the arbitration clause and the view is 
justified with the doctrine of separability, which seems to prohibit the law applicable to the 
main agreement to reach to the arbitration clause.286 In international arbitration, the legal 
state seems settled. It appears that because of the doctrine of separability, the law applicable 
to the main agreement and the arbitration clause have to be assessed separately and thus may 
be governed by different laws.287 Some legal academics also seems to keep the doctrine as a 
                                                          
284 See for instance, Mannheimer Swartling 2014, p. 25; However, the official reason for the wording of the 
section seems to be that the Government interpreted the New York Convention as to not accept implicit 
choices of law in the main agreement to also cover the arbitration clause, see chapter 3.3. 
285 The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1984, p. 21; Even today, because there are two separate agree-
ments, Hobér states that they “may” be governed by different laws, Hobér 2011; See also Madsen 2016A, p. 
96. 
286 Sørensen 2018, p. 401. 
287 Born 2014A, p. 351, 476-477; Redfern et al. 2015, p. 159; Leboulanger 2007, p. 16; Poudret & Besson 2007, 
p. 141-142; Redfern & Hunter 2004, p. 125-126; Lew et al. 2003, p. 107; Craig et al. 2000, p. 107-108; Fouchard 
et al. 1999, p. 209-210, 212; As the definition of the doctrine states, the evaluation of the law applicable has 
to be done separately for the main agreement and for the arbitration clause, Born 2014A, p. 464; Some aca-
demics have used the term “may” be applied to illustrate that the doctrine only enables the applicability of 
different laws to the separate agreements, see e.g. Ferrari & Kröll 2011, p. 28. 
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prerequisite for applying a different law to the arbitration clause than to the main agreement 
or the aforementioned as a direct consequence of the doctrine.288  
3.5.2 Criticism 
There is also some international criticism targeting the applicability of the doctrine of sepa-
rability to the choice of law. According to Landolt, the usage of the doctrine of separability 
to the choice of law is problematic. In his opinion, the usage of the doctrine infringes the 
will of the parties, and offers a third choice of law option besides lex contractus and lex 
arbitri.289 He also states that it is not an easy task to find a connecting factor between the 
arbitration clause and the applicable law.290 The problem with Landolt´s criticism is that the 
doctrine of separability does not offer a third option to the choice of law, it only offers a way 
to justify the possibility to apply lex arbitri in the form it is applied in accordance with the 
aforementioned international consensus. The doctrine does neither infringe the will of the 
parties since it does not prohibit the evaluation of the choice of law in accordance with the 
will of the parties. In addition, the same problem to find a connecting factor between the 
arbitration clause and the law applicable also occurs in other situations. An exception could 
be situations where the choice of law is based on an exact legislative rule, as for instance in 
Sweden.291 
Even if Landolt´s criticism is not well-grounded there is still space for some criticism of the 
applicability of the doctrine of separability to the choice of law. Problematic is still the jus-
tification of the usage of the doctrine to choice of law clauses, since the aims of the doctrine 
to protect the arbitration clause and to make arbitration more efficient does not support the 
applicability. The arbitration clause can fulfil its aim and work properly even if lex contrac-
tus is automatically applied to the arbitration clause.292 As a reason for the applicability of 
the doctrine of separability has been suggested the need for applying lex arbitri to the arbi-
tration clause.293 However, the doctrine is not a guarantee for the application of lex arbitri 
                                                          
288 Born 2014A, p. 475; Born 2014B, p. 819; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 209-210; There are however no indications 
that the doctrine could have any other further going effects on the choice of law question. 
289 Landolt 2013, p. 518. 
290 Landolt 2013, p. 518. 
291 The Swedish approach found in the Arbitration Act, section 48 is based on that lex arbitri will be applied if 
an explicit choice of law is not made in the arbitration clause. Another possibility could be the application of 
the law of the main agreement, if no explicit choice of law is made in the arbitration clause. 
292 Koulu 2008, p. 75. 
293 Koulu 2008, p. 75. 
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to the arbitration clause since it only enables an equal assessment of the applicable law be-
tween lex arbitri and lex contractus.294 
As shown earlier, Born is of the opinion that the doctrine of separability is a prerequisite for 
the applicability of different laws to the main agreement and the arbitration clause. In Finland 
however, it seems that it is fully possible to choose different laws to be applied to different 
parts of a single contract.295 Thus, the effect of the doctrine in Finland only appears to be 
that a separate evaluation has to be done to decide the law applicable to the arbitration clause 
but the doctrine is not a prerequisite for choosing different laws for the separate agreements. 
Without the doctrine, it seems that lex contractus automatically would be applied to the ar-
bitration clause if there is no separate choice of law made in the arbitration clause. Therefore, 
when applying the doctrine of separability, lex arbitri and lex contractus are theoretically on 
the same line when assessing the choice of law matter. 
Similarly in Finland, Sweden, Norway and international arbitration, the applicability of the 
doctrine of separability to the choice of law has been accepted without any critical evalua-
tion. However, the applicability of the doctrine to the choice of law is in line with the word-
ing of the doctrine and useful in at least jurisdictions where different parts of agreements 
cannot be governed by different laws. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The question regarding which law shall be applied to the arbitration clause appears to be 
unsettled in both Finland and internationally.296 However, the applicability of the doctrine 
of separability to the choice of law and the extent to which the doctrine is applied to the 
choice of law seems to be settled even if there are some differing opinions. Because of the 
doctrine of separability, the choice of law of the main agreement and the arbitration clause 
shall be made separately.  
The leading opinion seems to be that the applicability of the doctrine of separability to the 
choice of law enables the parties to choose different laws applicable to the arbitration clause 
                                                          
294 The applicability of the doctrine of separability only leads to the result that a choice of law clause included 
in the main agreement does not cover the arbitration clause, Koulu 2008, p. 65; It does not in any other way 
affect the choice of law of the arbitration clause. 
295 Koulu 2008, p. 65; Nevertheless, Savola seems to be of the opinion that the doctrine of separability enables 
the parties to choose different laws to be applied to the main agreement and the arbitration clause, Savola 
2008, p. 14. 
296 However, without a choice of law clause in the main agreement it seems quite settled that lex arbitri shall 
be applied to the arbitration clause at least in Finland, see e.g. Kurkela & Uoti 1995, p. 72. 
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and the main agreement. Another question is, if the doctrine is necessary to apply in Finland, 
since it seems that general contract law accepts the choice of different laws to different parts 
of a single contract. The definition of the doctrine of separability enables such an interpreta-
tion of the doctrine, but criticism can be given to the way of adapting such an interpretation 
of the doctrine. The adaption has been made without any critical review of the applicability 
of the doctrine, based on the aim of the doctrine as a factor restricting the applicability.  
However, the doctrine of separability does not favour the applicability of lex arbitri nor 
prohibit the law applied to the main agreement from reaching to the arbitration clause. The 
doctrine of separability only enables an equal assessment of lex arbitri and lex contractus as 
possible applicable laws and consequently respects the intent of the parties as the foremost 
principle in the process of deciding the applicable law. 
For the future, it seems that since the scope of the doctrine of separability regarding the 
choice of law is settled, the actual ambiguity regards the actual choice of law between lex 
arbitri and lex contractus. When amending the Arbitration Act, there is a possibility to clar-
ify the legal state. A good example of a successful clarification of the legal state is the Swe-
dish Arbitration Act which demands for an explicit choice of law in the arbitration clause or 
otherwise lex arbitri will apply. Since lex arbitri seems to have strong support among the 
legal academics in Finland, a similar section in the Finnish Arbitration Act would not be a 
drastic change to the Finnish legal state but more of a clarification of the legal state.  
Even if the amendment would be done for practical reasons, the amendment would probably 
also symbolize a strong doctrine of separability since the law of the main agreement would 
not anymore affect the choice of law of the arbitration clause. Nevertheless, the amendment 
would lead to a situation where the intent of the parties has to be expressed explicitly or 
otherwise the law of the seat will be applied regardless of the intent of the parties.  
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4. Interpretation and Adjustment of Arbitration Clauses 
In this chapter, I will assess how the doctrine of separability affects the interpretation and 
adjustment of the arbitration clause. Since the doctrine of separability separates the main 
agreement and the arbitration clause to two separate agreements, a strict application of the 
doctrine would lead to an interpretation and adjustment of the arbitration clause without any 
influences from the main agreement. First, I will assess how the doctrine of separability 
affects the interpretation and then, the adjustment of the arbitration clause. 
4.1 Interpretation of Arbitration Clauses and the Doctrine of Separability 
Arbitration clauses are often formulated as short standard clauses as a part of the main agree-
ment. Therefore, a textual interpretation of the arbitration clause is often difficult since the 
wording of the clause does not always give an answer to the problem occurred. A contextual 
interpretation of the arbitration clause in the light of the main agreement seems to be a better 
solution since the clause is drafted as a part of that agreement. Problems may arise if the 
doctrine of separability is applied to the interpretation of arbitration clauses. If there were 
two different agreements, it could be argued that the doctrine could prevent the main agree-
ment from being taken into consideration in the interpretation.  
Under Finnish law, the objective of the interpretation of contract clauses is to find the com-
mon intention of the parties.297 The starting point in contractual interpretation and in finding 
the common intent of the parties is the wording of the contract clause.298 However according 
to general contract law, when interpreting a contract clause attention shall also be given to 
the whole agreement.299 The importance of contextual interpretation depends on how pre-
cisely formulated the interpreted contract clause is.300 Even other agreements closely con-
nected to the interpreted agreement can be considered as permissible sources for contextual 
interpretation.301 Since the wording of arbitration clauses is often not that informative, it 
                                                          
297 Tamminen 2017, p. 36; Annola 2016, p. 24; The objective is similar in Sweden, see e.g. NJA 2016:58, pp. 
10 (p. 698); The same objective is applied in Norway also, Woxholth 2013, p. 299; According to Lando, the 
objective is similar in all Nordic countries and the whole continental Europe, Lando 2016, p. 28. 
298 Tamminen 2017, p. 36; Annola 2016, p. 26; The starting point is similar in Sweden, Ramberg & Ramberg 
2016, p. 161; This also applies for Norway, Woxholth 2013, p. 303. 
299 Therefore, the entire agreement can affect how a single clause will be interpreted, Hemmo 2003A, p. 586. 
300 Annola 2016, p. 27; The importance of the main agreement as a source is based on the fact that in situa-
tions where there are disagreements regarding the content of the agreement, the most valuable source ma-
terial is the material showing the parties´ consensus in the strongest possible way. In other words, a written 
agreement, Annola 2016, p. 168. 
301 Annola 2015, p. 135; These connected agreements can be regarded as a strong indication of the parties´ 
consensus. 
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leads to a greater need for a contextual interpretation and especially gap filling, to cover 
issues left open by the shortly formulated clause.302 
4.1.1 The Impact of the Contract Type 
Are there general principles for the interpretation of arbitration clauses and if there are, does 
the doctrine of separability form a part of these principles? The question is important, be-
cause otherwise the interpretation would only depend on general contract law principles. At 
least as a main rule in contract law, the interpretative rules are dependent on the type of 
agreement interpreted.303 Arbitration agreements are not always classified as an own agree-
ment type but the arbitration agreement has so many special characteristics that Koulu is of 
the opinion that there is a need for own interpretative rules for arbitration agreements.304 
Consequently, there could be some specific interpretational rules applicable to arbitration 
clauses in addition to the general interpretational rules. 
It has been argued that the leading interpretational method for arbitration clauses could be 
either a narrow or wide interpretational method.305 When applying a narrow interpretational 
method, the attention is focused on the wording of the clause and an ambiguous arbitration 
clause is interpreted narrowly and to the detriment of the drafter of the clause.306 The method 
has been justified with the better procedural safety given by the general courts.307 A broad 
interpretational method refers to an interpretation in accordance with the presumed aim of 
the parties to have all parts of their dispute and all related disputes solved by arbitration.308 
The method has been justified with the avoidance of fragmentation of the conflict,309 and the 
                                                          
302 It does not seem to be meaningful to make a distinction between regular interpretation and gap filling, 
Ramberg & Ramberg 2016, p. 160.  
303 Häyhä 1991, p. 21. 
304 Koulu 2008, p. 188; The approach with specific interpretational principles applied to arbitration clauses is 
also common in many other developed jurisdictions, Born 2014A, p. 1317; Nevertheless, in Norway only gen-
eral contract law principles seems to apply to the interpretation of arbitration clauses, Woxholth 2013, p. 
299; Also in Sweden, it seems that only general contract law principles are applied to the interpretation of 
arbitration clauses, Mannheimer Swartling 2014, p. 29. 
305 Tamminen 2017, p. 35. 
306 Frände et al. 2017, p. 1305; Koulu 2008, p. 189. 
307 Tirkkonen 1943, p. 102. 
308 Frände et al. 2017, p. 1305; Möller 1997, p. 30. 
309 Heuman 2003, p. 53. 
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intent of the parties to solve all their disputes by arbitration.310 It seems that the narrow in-
terpretational method which earlier was the leading way of interpreting arbitration clauses 
has declined and the broad interpretational method seems to be the leading method today. 311 
According to Koulu, when interpreting arbitration clauses there are three dimensions of the 
interpretation; 1. The type of the clause; 2. The scope of the clause; and 3. The content of 
the clause.312 With the type of the clause is meant what kind of dispute resolution clause the 
parties have concluded. The doctrine of separability is not a problem when deciding the type 
of the clause. The type of the clause is not dependent on the content of the main agreement, 
but rather on how the clause is formulated and thus does not raise any problems regarding 
the connection with the main agreement.   
The doctrine does not seem to be applicable when deciding the scope of the arbitration 
clause, since the scope of the clause is primarily decided by the scope of the main agree-
ment.313 Primarily, importance has to be given to the material scope of the main agreement 
which offers the borders for the applicability of the clause.314 Of course, the wording of the 
clause is the paramount source of the intent of the parties and can thus either broaden the 
scope of the clause to also include matters outside the main agreement or limit the scope 
(sometimes intentionally) to only cover some aspects of the main agreement. It is apparent 
that the doctrine of separability cannot be given any value when deciding the scope of the 
arbitration clause. Applying the doctrine strictly to prohibit taking into consideration the 
main agreement would lead to a situation where it would be impossible to determine the 
scope of the clause. 
Regarding the content of the arbitration clause, which includes for instance the determining 
of the rules and the type of arbitration the parties have decided on, Koulu is of the opinion 
that general principles of contract law will apply.315 Problematic in this regard is that the 
                                                          
310 Heuman 1997, p. 535. 
311 Frände et al. 2017, p. 1305; The same can also be said in Sweden, Hobér 2011, p. 102-103; The legal state 
is similar in Norway, Woxholth 2013, p. 299; Internationally the legal state also seems to be similar, Redfern 
et al. 2015, p. 93-94; For the traditional school, see e.g. Tirkkonen 1943, p. 102.  
312 Koulu 2008, p. 185. 
313 Koulu goes a step further and is of the opinion that the wording of the clause has almost no value in 
deciding the scope of the arbitration clause, Koulu 2008, p. 185-186; Such an interpretation is in line with the 
broad interpretational method, since the clause is interpreted as to include all disputes regarding the main 
agreement instead for strictly interpreting the arbitration clause in accordance with its wording. 
314 Koulu 2008, p. 185. 
315 Koulu 2008, p. 187; This was already claimed by Tirkkonen regarding the interpretation of arbitration 
clauses in general, Tirkkonen 1943, p. 102; In Sweden, the legal state is similar. The approach has been justi-
fied with the aim of the parties, Lindskog 2012, p. 115; Hobér 2011, p. 102.  
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clause is usually a standard clause and not thoroughly negotiated, which means that neither 
the wording nor the intention of the parties give much interpretative guidance. However, it 
seems that the factors to be taken into consideration include at least a procedural economic 
aspect, the Arbitration Act and the wording of the clause.316 
4.1.2 The Doctrine of Separability 
Even if there are some special features regarding the interpretation of arbitration clauses, the 
main rule is that the clause has to be interpreted in the light of the main agreement.317 Ac-
cording to Koulu, the doctrine of separability cannot prohibit the considering of the environ-
ment and surroundings of the clause as an important part of the interpretation of the arbitra-
tion clause.318 With the environment and the surroundings is meant the environment where 
the parties are operating.319 According to Annola, a separate agreement which is relevant for 
the interpretation of an agreement can be used as a source for the interpretation as a part of 
the contextual material permissible for the interpretation.320 Arbitration clauses are often 
included in agreements in the last minute, in standard form and without any negotiations. 
How would one interpret the clause, without any supporting materials? Therefore, it seems 
logical that the doctrine of separability cannot reach to the interpretation of arbitration 
clauses. 
In Sweden, it is also clear that the doctrine of separability does not reach to the interpretation 
of arbitration clauses.321 The standpoint has been justified with the intention of the parties.322 
The aim of the parties is in Sweden both considered as the basis for the interpretation of 
arbitration clauses and as the basis for the justification of the entire doctrine. Since the main 
                                                          
316 Koulu is of the opinion that a context-based interpretation cannot be used since there have usually been 
no negotiations regarding the clause and therefore there are not any additional materials available for the 
interpretation. Consequently, the wording of the clause gets an important role in the interpretation, Koulu 
2008, p. 187; Of major importance are also the rules of arbitration and the legal doctrine and practice inter-
preting the rules, if specific rules have been chosen. 
317 Koulu 2008, p. 75; These special features are not based on the doctrine of separability but on the charac-
teristics of dispute resolution clauses, Koulu 2009, p. 207; However, Koulu states that the legal state is not 
totally clear, Koulu 2009, p. 236. 
318 Koulu 2009, p. 207. 
319 Annola 2015, p. 105. 
320 Annola 2015, p. 135; The contextual material is not as strong as a source as the material that is part of the 
interpreted agreement but because the actual agreement does not always solve the interpretable problem, 
the contextual material has to be considered, Annola 2015, p. 157; The threshold for being relevant for the 
interpretation of the arbitration clause should easily be exceeded by the main agreement. 
321 Heuman 2003, p. 63-64; Heuman 1999, p. 82; The legal state is similar in Norway, Woxholth 2013, p. 486-
487. 
322 Heuman 2003, p. 63-64; Heuman 1999, p. 82. 
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agreement assists the court/tribunal to discover the intention of the parties, the Swedish 
standpoint seems logical.323 Internationally, based on case law it also seems like the doctrine 
of separability does not reach to the interpretation of arbitration clauses.324 
The aforementioned standpoints seems to be well-grounded. Even a strict interpretation of 
the wording of the doctrine of separability should not lead to a result preventing the usage 
of the main agreement in the interpretation of arbitration clauses. Even then, general contract 
law rules accept the consideration and effects of a connected agreement in the interpretation 
of another agreement. Regardless if the doctrine of separability is justified with the intention 
of the parties or effectivity arguments, the applicability of the doctrine to the interpretation 
of arbitration clauses is not necessary for the fulfilment of the aim of the doctrine. 
4.2 Adjustment of Arbitration Clauses and the Doctrine of Separability 
According to section 36 of the Contracts Act, a clause which is unfair or its application 
would lead to an unfair result may be adjusted or set aside.325 Section 36 of the Contracts 
Act states that the “entire contents of the contract, the positions of the parties, the circum-
stances prevailing at and after the conclusion of the contract” shall be taken into consider-
ation when determining if a clause is unfair.326 Among the most common reasons for adjust-
ment can be found an unequal amount of expertise or financial assets between the parties.327 
The aforementioned unequal positions are usually only relevant for the adjustment, if one of 
the parties is a consumer or a small company.328 These inequalities could possibly be prob-
                                                          
323 Heuman 2003, p. 63-64; Heuman 1999, p. 82. 
324 “The clause must always be interpreted as part of, and in the light of, the particular contract in which it 
appears”, ICC case No. 5754 (1988) (referred to in Craig et al. 2000, p. 90). 
325 Unclear is what happens if the law applicable to the arbitration clause does not accept adjustment. How-
ever, Koulu keeps the adjustment section in the Contracts Act as an ordre public provision, which means that 
a Finnish court could refuse to enforce an award based on an unfair arbitration clause, Koulu 2005, p. 39; The 
ordre public principle is codified in section 40, subsection 1, paragraph 2 of the Arbitration Act. The scope and 
meaning of the principle is not further clarified in the Government Proposal, HE 202/1991, p. 25; Even if Koulu 
seems to be quite sure about his standpoint, it has to be kept in mind that there are not much case law and 
doctrine about ordre public and that the threshold to apply the principle is high.  
326 The English translation of section 36 of the Finnish Contracts Act; Section 36 of the Finnish Contracts Act 
is similar to the provisions regarding adjustment in the other Nordic countries, see section 36 of the Swedish 
Contracts Act, section 36 of the Norwegian Contracts Act and section 36 of the Danish Contracts Act. 
327 Hemmo 2003B, p. 65, 69-70; Nevertheless even if rare, adjustment is possible even if the parties are in an 
equal position, since an equal position cannot always guarantee equal contractual terms, Telaranta 1990, p. 
381.  
328 Usually, adjustment is only possible if one party is in an unequal position towards the other party, Hemmo 
2003B, p. 64; In international arbitration, both parties are usually equally positioned companies, which makes 
the scope for adjustment in international arbitration narrow.  
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lematic when it comes to arbitration since the proceedings can be more expensive than gen-
eral court proceedings and the need for legal expertise is significant. Regarding arbitration 
clauses, adjustment is however quite uncommon since consumers cannot accept to take an 
upcoming dispute to arbitration in advance.329  
It is accepted that arbitration clauses can be adjusted based on the Contracts Act, section 
36.330 In accordance with section 36 of the Contracts Act, the whole agreement has to be 
considered when adjusting a contract clause. One of the special feature for arbitration clauses 
is that the adjustment of an arbitration clause usually leads to the invalidity of the whole 
clause, instead of only a partly adjustment of the clause.331 Nevertheless, the adjustment of 
arbitration clauses is generally more common than the adjustment of arbitration agree-
ments.332  
4.2.1 The Doctrine of Separability 
The doctrine of separability could possibly restrain the main agreement from being consid-
ered as a factor in the adjustment of the arbitration clause.333 Nevertheless according to 
Koulu, the lack of importance of the main agreement in the adjustment of arbitration clauses 
is not necessarily because of the doctrine.334 There is simply no connection between the main 
agreement and the lack of access to justice which could follow from the arbitration clause.335 
When assessing if a party has access to justice and if the proceeding therefore should be 
                                                          
329 See Consumer Protection Act, chapter 12, section 1d; However as can be seen from the decision KKO 
2003:60, there is still space and need for the adjustment of arbitration clauses. 
330 This has been accepted in the decisions KKO 1996:27 and KKO 2003:60; As in Finland, the Swedish legisla-
tion enabling adjustment of contract clauses also applies to arbitration clauses, Prop. 1976/77:81, p. 147; 
Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 47; Lindskog 2012, p. 124; The same applies for Norway also, NOU 2001:33, p. 64; The 
adjustment of arbitration clauses is however rare in at least both Finland and Sweden, Frände et al. 2017, p. 
1306; Hobér 2011, p. 104-105. 
331 Koulu 2008, p. 211; A partly adjustment of the clause seems to be possible, if only a single condition in the 
arbitration clause is unfair and the condition could either be amended or left without notice, Lindskog 2012, 
p. 124; This reluctance to partly adjust the arbitration clause seems to be mainly because the financial ine-
quality between the parties makes the arbitral proceeding as such unfair. The best way to secure a fair trial 
in such a situation would then be to move the trial to the general state courts. Another possibility would be 
to order the costs to be shared differently. 
332 Koulu 2008, p. 211; Arbitration agreements are usually not concluded until the conflict is already at hand, 
compared to the arbitration clauses which are concluded at the same time as the main agreement. At the 
time the main agreement is entered into, the effects of the arbitration clause cannot always be predicted. 
When the conflict is already at hand, it is easier for a party to assess the benefits and disadvantages with 
arbitration, Möller 1996, p. 449. 
333 Koulu 2008, p. 75. 
334 Koulu 2008, p. 75. 
335 Koulu 2008, p. 75; Usually the only reason for adjustment is that arbitration would lead to a lack of access 
to justice for the weaker party, which is only caused by the arbitration clause and not connected with the 
main agreement. 
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moved to the state courts to make the proceeding fair, it is natural that the main agreement 
gives no additional value to the evaluation.  
In Finnish doctrine, the leading opinion is that the adjustment of the arbitration clause shall 
be made in accordance with the wording of section 36 of the Contracts Act, which means 
taking into consideration the main agreement as a part of the overall assessment when deter-
mining if the arbitration clause is unfair.336 Also in Sweden, it is clear that in accordance 
with ordinary contract law rules an overall assessment shall be made and therefore the doc-
trine of separability cannot be applied to the adjustment of the arbitration clause.337 In Nor-
way, it also appears that the doctrine of separability does not reach to the adjustment of 
arbitration clauses. In the Norwegian report evaluating the need for amending the Arbitration 
Act, it was clearly stated that the adjustment provision in the Contracts Act is applied to 
arbitration clauses.338 The procedural nature of the arbitration clause does not prevent ad-
justment since the arbitration clause is a part of the overall contractual relationship between 
the parties.339 
There is not much case law regarding the matter in Finland. One of the few cases dealing 
with the matter is KKO 1996:27.340 As earlier mentioned, it is unusual that arbitration clauses 
are adjusted, since they are often concluded between equally positioned companies. In this 
case however, the parties were unequally positioned. One of the parties was a big company 
and the other a rather small one with not much resources compared to the bigger company. 
Most importantly, it was alleged by the claimant that the reason for the unfairness of the 
                                                          
336 Turunen 2005, p. 158; Even if Möller also favours the overall assessment, he however accepts that there 
can also be arguments supporting the adjustment of arbitration clauses without taking into account the main 
agreement even if it would contradict the common interpretation of section 36 of the Contracts Act, Möller 
1996, p. 444; Even if he thinks that the legal state still is a bit ambiguous, Koulu also accepts that by applying 
section 36 of the Contracts Act, the adjustment of an arbitration clause should be based on an overall assess-
ment of the fairness of the clause, in which also the main agreement is considered. Since section 36 ndemands 
for an overall assessment, it would anyway be difficult to give reason for an adjustment of the clause where 
the main contract would not be taken into account at all, Koulu 2008, p. 211. 
337 Grönfors & Dotevall 2016, p. 294.  
338 NOU 2001:33, p. 64. 
339 ”Skulle det oppstå et tilfelle hvor det på grunn av omkostningene i uventet og i helt særegen grad viser seg 
å bli urimelig om voldgift skal anvendes, må for øvrig en avtale om voldgift kunne tenkes satt til side etter 
avtaleloven § 36. Det kan ikke være til hinder for dette at avtalen om voldgift gjelder et prosessuelt forhold. 
Også voldgiftsavtalen er en del av det totale avtaleforholdet mellom partene.”, NOU 2001:33, p. 64; Even if 
the report clearly states that the agreements are separate, the arbitration clause is still a part of the overall 
contractual relationship between the parties. This indicates that when it comes to adjustment, the main 
agreement would be taken into consideration; It seems that also Woxholth is of the same opinion, since he 
states that an overall assessment has to be done and that the adjustment can lead to changes in both the 
arbitration clause and the main agreement, Woxholth 2013, p. 346. 
340 See also the later decision KKO 2003:60, also dealing with the adjustment of arbitration clauses. 
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arbitration clause in this case was that the party did not have financial means for financing 
the arbitral proceeding. In a scenario like this, there is not much need for using the main 
agreement in the assessment. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court did not adjust the arbitration clause, the case contains some 
important obiter dicta. Even if the clause was not adjusted, it is interesting that the Court 
considered that an arbitration clause can be adjusted, for instance if the legal question is clear 
and the economic interest is small which can make the contractual relationship as a whole 
unreasonable.341 It could be alleged, that these aforementioned factors are connected to the 
main agreement and not to the arbitration clause. In addition, the Court stated that the arbi-
tration agreement is only a clause included in the main agreement.342 From the Supreme 
Court´s statement of reason can be interpreted that KKO meant that the arbitration clause 
shall be adjusted in the light of the main agreement and that KKO considered that the doc-
trine of separability cannot be applied to the adjustment of arbitration clauses. 
Hemmo interprets the case as stating that the contract type and the type of business can be 
taken into consideration when adjusting arbitration clauses.343 Möller goes a step further and 
interprets the case as stating that the arbitration clause shall only be considered as a part of 
the overall contractual relationship between the parties when adjusting the arbitration 
clause.344 Nevertheless, it seems that the doctrine of separability is not applied to the adjust-
ment of arbitration clauses. 
Another example of the consideration of the main agreement in the adjustment of dispute 
resolution clauses is the Supreme Court decision KKO 1986 II 50, which regarded the ad-
justment of a prorogation clause. A Finnish employee had worked for a Swiss company in 
Finland and the parties had made a prorogation clause stating that conflicts between the par-
ties should be solved in Basel. The employee claimed in a Finnish court that the prorogation 
clause should be adjusted and that the court therefore had jurisdiction to decide the substan-
tial dispute. The Court found that the need to protect the employee, the financial circum-
stances and the connection of the case to Finland favoured the jurisdiction of the Court and 
                                                          
341 ”Lisäksi välityslauseketta voidaan pitää kohtuuttomana muun muassa silloin, kun riitakysymys on selvä ja 
yksinkertainen ja sen taloudellinen arvo on vähäinen, jolloin välimiesmenettelystä sopijapuolelle aiheutuvat 
kustannukset olisivat sopimussuhde kokonaisuudessaan huomioon ottaen kohtuuttomat.”, KKO 1996:27. 
342 ”Kaupalliseen yhteistoimintasopimukseen otettuna välityslauseke ei ole kuitenkaan epätavallinen tai yllä-
tyksellinen sopimusehto.”, KKO 1996:27. 
343 Hemmo 2003B, p. 84. 
344 Möller 1996, p. 456. 
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therefore the prorogation clause was adjusted.345 According to Koulu, the assessment made 
by the Court can be considered as a substantial overall assessment.346 At least the connection 
of the case to the Finnish jurisdiction is a factor connected to the substantive part of the 
contractual relationship. Therefore, it seems that the Court examined the substantial agree-
ment as a part of the evaluation of the fairness of the arbitration clause.347 
In Sweden, even a step further has been taken since it is alleged that the whole agreement, 
including the arbitration clause shall be assessed at once in a substantial adjustment assess-
ment.348 Consequently, the court/tribunal could exceed its competence if setting aside the 
arbitration clause as a consequence of the adjustment. In addition, the court/tribunal assesses 
the main agreement without having yet decided on its competence, which could be regarded 
as inefficient since at the time of the adjustment assessment, it is still unsure if the court/tri-
bunal has competence to investigate the main agreement. This interpretation has also in the 
legal doctrine been criticised for making the proceeding inefficient.349  
Does then the adjustment of the main agreement also reach to the arbitration clause? Theo-
retically and strictly applied in accordance with its wording, the doctrine of separability 
could restrict the adjustment of the main agreement from also covering at least prorogation 
clauses.350 It seems logical that the adjustment of the main agreement does not cover the 
prorogation clause (and by analogy also the arbitration clause), since the adjustment can lead 
to the main agreement being set aside which consequently also would lead to the dispute 
resolution clause being set aside.351 If the adjustment leads to the whole agreement being set 
aside and the doctrine of separability would not be applied, this would lead to a situation 
where the tribunal would lose its competence by adjusting the main agreement. The applica-
bility of the doctrine seems self-evident also since the court/tribunal primarily has to assess 
                                                          
345 ”Työntekijän suojelu ja taloudelliset seikat edellyttävät, että A voi ajaa kannettaan Suomessa. Jutussa on 
myös liittymäkohtia Suomen oikeuteen. Edellä olevan perusteella Kuopion raastuvanoikeus on toimivaltainen 
käsittelemään jutun.”, KKO 1986 II 50. 
346 Koulu 2009, p. 222. 
347 The decision has been criticized for being economically inefficient, since the Court had to make a material 
examination before even deciding if it has jurisdiction. In addition, the decision has also been criticized for 
making the competence question unpredictable since the examination was made in casu, based on the ma-
terial agreement instead of being based on clear rules governing the choice of forum, Koulu 2009, p. 222. 
348 Grönfors & Dotevall 2016, p. 294. 
349 Grönfors & Dotevall 2016, p. 294. 
350 Koulu 2009, p. 209, 221; The doctrine of separability has been given the same strength in both arbitration 
law and regarding prorogation clauses, Koulu 2009, p. 235; In Norway, the adjustment of the main agreement 
does not necessary cover the arbitration clause, Woxholth 2013, p. 489. 
351 Koulu 2009, p. 209. 
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if it has competence based on the alleged unfairness, expiration, non-existence or invalidity 
of the arbitration clause before adjusting the substantial agreement. 
In Sweden, at least a separate assessment of the arbitration clause has to be done before 
setting aside the arbitration clause in connection to the setting aside of the main agreement 
based on section 36 of the Contracts Act.352 This has been justified with the doctrine of 
separability which prohibits setting aside the arbitration clause because of the setting aside 
of the main agreement without a separate assessment of the fairness of the clause.353 Also 
internationally it seems that since the aim of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the 
proceeding, the unfairness of the main agreement or the arbitration clause does not automat-
ically make the other agreement unconscionable without a separate assessment of the other 
agreement.354 
4.2.2 Criticism  
The standpoint taken in case law and legal doctrine can be criticised from an efficiency per-
spective as have been done in Sweden and by Koulu, or from a jurisdictional perspective. 
The competence to assess the substantial part of a conflict depends on the result of the pro-
cedural assessment. If the result of the procedural assessment is that the tribunal has no ju-
risdiction, the assessment of the main agreement has been unnecessary. Also, by taking into 
consideration the main agreement in the adjustment of the arbitration clause, the court/tribu-
nal could exceed its competence by assessing the substantial matter before yet having de-
cided on its competence.355 In addition, one of the objectives of the doctrine of separability 
is to enhance arbitration and with giving the state courts the right to also assess the substan-
tial side of the dispute, it can be argued that arbitration is not enhanced. 
4.3 Conclusions 
The legal state regarding the interpretation of arbitration clauses seems to be clear both in 
Finland and internationally. When interpreting an arbitration clause, the main agreement has 
                                                          
352 Heuman 2003, p. 105-106; Heuman 1999, p. 123. 
353 Heuman 2003, p. 105-106; Heuman 1999, p. 123. 
354 Born 2015, chapter 3, pp. 23. 
355 The importance of the division between the procedural and material side can be illustrated by the fact 
that an arbitral award can only be set aside on procedural grounds. It can however be argued that setting 
aside an award based on section 40, subsection 1, paragraph 2 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the 
award is against Finnish ordre public could be a material ground, and thus an exception to the rule. 
66 
 
to be taken into account as a part of the contextual interpretation and consequently the doc-
trine of separability cannot be applied.  
Also, the question regarding the adjustment of arbitration clauses seems to be settled. Based 
on Supreme Court praxis and legal doctrine it seems well established that the main agree-
ment can be taken into account when adjusting the arbitration clause. The adjustment is 
based on Contracts Act, section 36, which states that when adjusting a contract clause, the 
whole content of the contract has to be taken into account in an overall assessment of the 
fairness of the contract clause. However from an opposite point of view, the adjustment of 
the main agreement cannot affect the arbitration clause. The setting aside of an arbitration 
clause can only be made based on a separate assessment because of the doctrine of separa-
bility and since the arbitration clause already has to be adjusted before assessing the main 
agreement. 
The assessing of the main agreement as a part of the adjustment of the arbitration clause has 
been criticized on efficiency grounds and from a competence perspective. By assessing the 
substantial main agreement when adjusting the arbitration clause, a general court could ex-
ceed its competence at least if ruling the arbitration clause valid and the tribunal exceed its 
competence at least if ruling the clause invalid.356 In addition, the substantial assessment is 
unnecessary, if the court/tribunal after the assessment decides that it does not have jurisdic-
tion to assess the main agreement.  
                                                          
356 If the court/tribunal gives itself competence, the failure would only be the mixing up of the procedural and 
substantive parts of the proceeding. 
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5. General Rules for the Applicability of the Doctrine of Separability 
This chapter will assess if any general rules for the scope and applicability of the doctrine of 
separability can be found or constructed. Firstly, I will discuss the friction between the def-
inition of the separability doctrine, which possibly broadens the scope of the doctrine and 
the aim of the doctrine, which possibly narrows the scope of the doctrine. Secondly, I will 
assess the practical situation of assigning the arbitration clause in connection to the assign-
ment of the main agreement since the scope of the doctrine has been debated in connection 
to the assignment of agreements. Thirdly, I will assess if any general rules for the applica-
bility of the doctrine of separability can be found. Finally, I will conclude the findings, and 
based on them, suggest my own construction of general rules for the scope and applicability 
of the doctrine of separability. 
5.1 Is the Scope of the Doctrine broader than the Original Aim of the Doctrine? 
There is a conflict between the aim and the definition of the doctrine of separability. As the 
doctrine is defined, there are two independent agreements, the main agreement and the arbi-
tration clause. This literally means that these shall be totally separate, including interpreted 
and adjusted separately. As a consequence, clauses in the main agreement, for instance the 
choice of law clause cannot affect the arbitration clause. However, the arbitration clause 
would without the main agreement have no use, task and meaning. 
The aims of the doctrine of separability are to protect the arbitration clause from invalidity, 
to protect the efficiency of the proceeding and express the intention of the parties. These 
aims demand a weaker separability doctrine. For instance, it does not seem necessary for the 
effectiveness of the proceeding to apply the doctrine of separability to the choice of law. If 
the doctrine would be interpreted in accordance with its aims, it would be quite narrow and 
would not prevent other influences of the main agreement apart from those contradicting the 
aims of the doctrine.  
In the following subchapters, I will assess if there can be found general rules for the applica-
bility of the doctrine of separability that could also be applied to other situations than those 
presented in chapters 2-4. As an example of such a situation, I will use the assignment of the 
main agreement to which the doctrine of separability could be applied in accordance with 
the definition of the doctrine, but to which the applicability could be in conflict with the aim 
of the doctrine. Even if the aim of this chapter is to find general rules for the applicability of 
the doctrine of separability, it is necessary to also thoroughly study specific situations where 
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the applicability of the doctrine is ambiguous. Since there is no comprehensive research re-
garding the matter and no generally accepted rules governing the applicability, the problems 
have occurred in certain isolated situations and therefore it is necessary to study these situa-
tions comprehensively.  
It is still not certain how broad the scope of the doctrine of separability is in Finland.357 There 
are different scholars supporting different strengths of the doctrine of separability. The most 
extreme scholars either deny the doctrine totally,358 or state that the doctrine has an almost 
endless scope and no exceptions.359 It is at least accepted that the doctrine has in some situ-
ations been used to develop the arbitration law by applying the doctrine of separability fur-
ther than the original aim of the doctrine.360 An extensive interpretation of the doctrine ap-
parently broadens the jurisdiction of the tribunal and a narrow interpretation favours the 
general courts, which is good to keep in mind when critically evaluating the question.  
5.2 Transfer of the Main Agreement 
One of the typical situations where problems with a strong doctrine of separability can occur 
is the transfer of the main agreement. Certainly, the will of the parties usually is to also 
transfer the arbitration clause in connection with the transfer of the main agreement. How-
ever, if strictly adapting the doctrine of separability, it should explicitly be mentioned that 
also the arbitration clause is transferred since there are two separate agreements. Since the 
scope of the doctrine of separability is ambiguous, the scope of the doctrine has been debated 
in connection to the transfer of the main agreement. The automatic transferability of the 
arbitration clause has been considered as a good test for the strength and scope of the doctrine 
of separability.361 
In Finland, the decision KKO 2007:39 states that the transferee is bound by the arbitration 
clause even after the main agreement has been transferred.362 The case regards an insured 
company that went bankrupt and the injured party´s rights and obligations under the insur-
                                                          
357 Neither is there internationally any consensus about how far the doctrine reaches in practice, Siig 2003, p. 
253. 
358 Ware 2007, p. 119. 
359 Koulu 2008, p. 77. 
360 Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 213; One of these situations seems to be the choice of law, since the original aim 
of the doctrine of separability does not seem to support the applicability of the doctrine to the choice of law. 
361 Leboulanger 2007, p. 30. 
362 A comprehensive analysis of the choice of law question risen in the decision can be found in chapter 3.5.  
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ance agreement concluded between the insurer and the company. The Court applied Norwe-
gian law to both the insurance agreement and the arbitration clause. The Court stated that 
since both Norwegian and international doctrine supports the view that also the arbitration 
clause is transferred with the main agreement, there was no reason to make an exemption 
from the principle formulated in the legal doctrine.363 Based on the wording of the case, it 
remains unclear if the Court made a separate assessment of the arbitration clause or if it was 
assigned automatically as a part of the main agreement.364 
In addition, since the Court applied Norwegian law it is not sure if the same principles would 
be applied in a purely Finnish case. In Norway, it is accepted that even if the arbitration 
clause is a separate agreement it is not totally unconnected with the main agreement.365 As 
the aim of the doctrine is to enhance the efficiency of arbitration, the doctrine of separability 
cannot be used to prevent the transferability of the clause in connection with the transfer of 
the main agreement, since it would be against the aim of the doctrine.366 However, as the 
Court stated that also in accordance with international doctrine the transferee is bound by 
the arbitration clause, there are strong arguments for adopting the principle also in Finland.367 
Today, the Norwegian Arbitration Act, section 10, subsection 2 clarifies that it is presumed 
that the parties intend to also assign the arbitration agreement in connection to the transfer 
of the main agreement.368 The use of the word “voldgiftsavtal” indicates that the arbitration 
clause is a separate agreement and consequently that the doctrine of separability today could 
be applied to the assignment. As a consequence, it could be alleged that even if it is presumed 
that the parties intend to transfer the arbitration clause in connection to the transfer of the 
main agreement, a separate assessment of the transfer of the arbitration clause has to be done. 
                                                          
363 KKO 2007:39, pp 7-8. 
364 By invoking the agreement, it can be alleged that the injured party implicitly also accepted the arbitration 
clause included in the agreement. Problematic in this situation is that the injured party had no other choice 
than accepting the agreement to get the possibility to claim damages. Another problematic aspect of the case 
is that the Court did not use the terminology coherently. The Court used both terms “arbitration clause” and 
“arbitration agreement” interchangeably. 
365 Sørensen 2018, p. 404. 
366 NOU 2001:33, p. 72; The standpoint taken in the report was adapted in the present Norwegian Arbitration 
Act enacted in 2004 (came into force in 2005), section 10, subsection 2.  
367 KKO 2007:39, pp 7; This principle also applies in Denmark, Woxholth 2013, p. 338. 
368 According to section 10, subsection 2 of the Norwegian Arbitration Act; ”Hvis ikke annet er avtalt mellom 
partene i voldgiftsavtalen, følger voldiftsavtalen med ved overføring av det rettsforhold den omfatter”. Con-
sequently, it is presumed that the parties also intend to assign the arbitration agreement. 
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The present Norwegian Arbitration Act enacted in 2004 was not applicable to the Supreme 
Court case.369 
According to Norros, the legal state was already settled in Finland before the decision, but 
he gives the case value as it strengthens the prevailing legal state.370 Also Möller accepts the 
standpoint.371 However, Möller sets as a prerequisite for the transfer that the transferee 
should have known about the arbitration clause.372 Kurkela is of the opinion that even if the 
doctrine of separability makes the arbitration clause independent, it is still ancillary to the 
main agreement which means that assigning an arbitration clause without the main agree-
ment would not be possible since the arbitration clause would lose its “substance or mean-
ing”.373 Consequently, it seems that the main rule is that an arbitration clause binds the trans-
feree also according to Finnish law, but the role of the doctrine of separability in the assess-
ment is still unsure.374 
In Sweden, similarly as the justification of the doctrine of separability in general, also the 
justification of the transfer of the arbitration clause in connection to the transfer of the main 
agreement could be justified with the will of the parties. The Supreme Court decision NJA 
1997:147 accepts the transfer of the arbitration clause in connection to the transfer of the 
main agreement.375 It is however unclear from the reasoning of the decision if the transfer 
                                                          
369 KKO 2007:39, pp. 7. 
370 Norros 2007, p. 260. 
371 According to Möller, this is based on general contract law rules, Möller 2004, p. 13; Is then the original 
party of the agreement bound by the arbitration clause towards the transferee? According to Möller, the 
answer is positive, the original party is bound by the arbitration clause. Möller also gives weight to the parties’ 
intention and thus the arbitration clause is not binding if the intention has been that it could only be invoked 
by the original parties. It seems that Möller suggests that this intention only prevents the transferee from 
invoking the clause against an original party, Möller 1997, p. 22-23; The standpoint seems strange since the 
transfer of the clause would then put the original party in a better position than the transferee. 
372 Möller 1997, p. 22-23. When the arbitration clause is a part of the main agreement, there only seems to 
be a theoretical possibility to wave that the party did not know about the clause, since the transferee has a 
strict duty to investigate the agreement before accepting the transaction. By accepting the transfer, the party 
should be aware of that there is an arbitration clause included in the agreement and it can thus also be argued 
that the party concludently accepts the assignment of the arbitration clause. 
373 Kurkela calls the result of a strict application of the doctrine of separability to the assignment of agree-
ments absurd and nonsense. In his opinion, the question is more about interpretation of the agreement and 
that the presumption should be that also the arbitration clause is transferred, if an intention of the contrary 
is not shown, Kurkela 2005, p. 72. 
374 The same can also be said regarding prorogation clauses, Oikeusministeriö: Työryhmämietintö 2007:15, 
Riita-asioiden oikeuspaikkasäännösten uudistaminen, p. 50; Since arbitration clauses are seen as more fateful 
than prorogation clauses, the transferability of a prorogation clause to a third party should happen even eas-
ier than the transfer of an arbitration clause, Koulu 2009, p. 155; In Norway, prorogation clauses have been 
regarded as binding on the transferee if the main agreement gives the transferee rights, Schei et al. 2013, p. 
173. 
375 NJA 1997:147 (p. 866); The question concerning codification of the ambiguous rules regarding the trans-
ferability of the arbitration clause in connection with the transfer of the main agreement was discussed in 
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was automatic or based on a separate assessment of the transfer of the arbitration clause. The 
Supreme Court justified its decision with the presumed aim of the parties to include the 
arbitration clause in the transfer.376 If the party would not have wanted to be bound by the 
arbitration clause, the party was free not to acquire the main agreement.377 Hobér and Mag-
nusson have interpreted the case so that the Court did not contradict the doctrine of separa-
bility in its reasoning.378 
According to Lüning, the automatic transfer of the arbitration clause to the transferee of the 
main agreement is a natural effect of the presumed will of the parties.379 According to him, 
this would not violate the doctrine of separability since the will of the parties is only a pre-
sumption that can be disproved in favour of the applicability of the doctrine of separabil-
ity.380  
Hobér and Magnusson suggests another explanation for the transferability of the arbitration 
clause in connection with the transfer of rights. They suggest that the transfer of the clause 
is not automatic since the doctrine of separability also applies to the assignment of the main 
agreement.381 Consequently, the arbitration clause is transferred separately as a separate 
agreement and the transfer shall be assessed separately even if it should be presumed that 
the parties intend to also transfer the arbitration clause when they assign the main agree-
ment.382 
Nevertheless, it seems that the doctrine of separability should at least be applied to evaluate 
the validity of the transfer since the validity requirements for the assignment could differ for 
                                                          
the Government Proposal of the present Arbitration Act. Even if it was admitted that the legal state was 
unclear, it was decided to leave the question to be solved by the administration of justice, Prop. 1998/99:35, 
p. 63-66; The Government Proposal is based on a report from the Ministry of Justice (SOU 1994:81). According 
to the report, the applicability of the doctrine of separability to the assignment of the main agreement was 
unsure. The report suggested that for the arbitration clause to be transferred, it has to be implicitly or explic-
itly agreed on the transfer. Otherwise the clause would not to be transferred in connection to the transfer of 
the main agreement, SOU 1994:81, p. 91-94; As shown above, the Government Proposal rejected the pro-
posal made in the report. 
376 NJA 1997, p. 872. 
377 NJA 1997, p. 872; The Supreme Court accepted that in certain circumstances the arbitration clause cannot 
bind the transferee even if the main agreement is transferred, NJA 1997, p. 873.  
378 Hobér & Magnusson 2008, p. 73. 
379 Lüning 2016, p. 637. 
380 Lüning 2016, p. 637; See also Hobér, who comes to the same conclusion, Hobér 2011, p. 129. 
381 Hobér & Magnusson 2008, p. 72. 
382 Hobér & Magnusson 2008, p. 72; Consequently, the presumed will of the parties is according to Hobér and 
Magnusson important when making the separate assessment of the transfer. Regarding the evaluation of the 
applicability of the doctrine of separability to the assignment of agreements, they do not seem to give the 
presumed will of the parties any value.  
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the arbitration clause and the main agreement.383 Otherwise, the validity of the transfer of 
the arbitration clause would always depend on the validity of the transfer of the main agree-
ment. Consequently, the doctrine of separability should at least give the tribunal competence 
to separately evaluate the validity of the transfer of the main agreement and the arbitration 
clause, even if it would be presumed that also the arbitration clause is automatically trans-
ferred. 
Contrary to the transfer of rights, where the legal state regarding the applicability of the 
doctrine of separability seems to be unclear, at least in Sweden the doctrine appears to apply 
to boilerplate clauses included in the main agreement.384 However, the presumption in favour 
of the applicability of the doctrine can be rebutted, if it can be shown that the parties other-
wise intended.385 Therefore, boilerplate clauses included in the main agreement only reaches 
to the arbitration clause if it can be shown that the parties intended so.  
Even if the result is different when it comes to boilerplate clauses compared to the transfer 
of arbitration clauses, the justification is similar to that suggested by Heuman regarding the 
transfer of arbitration clauses. The only difference is that the presumption of the applicability 
of the doctrine of separability is opposite. If the intention of the parties is shown to oppose 
the applicability of the doctrine, it cannot be applied. However, it is not reasoned why the 
presumption should be different in different situations when determining if the doctrine shall 
be applied. From a theoretical perspective, the applicability of the doctrine has been regarded 
as the presumed aim of the parties. Therefore, the construction used by Madsen regarding 
boilerplate clauses seems stronger and more logical from the theoretical perspective. On the 
other hand, in practice it appears odd to presume that the parties do not intend to also transfer 
the arbitration clause when transferring the main agreement. 
Internationally, the transfer of the main agreement has often been argued to represent a de-
limitation of the scope of the doctrine of separability.386 The leading international standpoint 
seems to accept the automatic assignment of the arbitration clause in connection with the 
                                                          
383 Heuman 1997, p. 554. 
384 Madsen 2016, p. 96. 
385 Madsen 2016, p. 96. 
386 Leboulanger 2007, p. 5; However, Leboulanger is of the opinion that the transfer of the arbitration clause 
could be regarded as independent in accordance with the doctrine of separability even if it is transferred in 
connection with the main agreement, Leboulanger 2007, p. 30-31. 
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assignment of the main agreement even if there are some differing opinions.387 At least it is 
presumed that the parties intend to also transfer the arbitration clause but as in Sweden, this 
presumption can be rebutted by the actual aim of the parties.388 According to Born, since the 
aim of the arbitration clause is to provide a dispute resolution remedy for solving conflicts 
regarding the main agreement, it would be against the aim of the arbitration clause to apply 
the doctrine of separability to the assignment of the main agreement.389 However, the sepa-
rability doctrine has to be applied when determining the validity of the transfer, since other-
wise the validity of the transfer of the arbitration clause would automatically be determined 
by the validity of the transfer of the main agreement.390  
The presumed transfer of the arbitration clause in connection to the transfer of the main 
agreement has also been argued to be a consequence of the nature of the arbitration clause. 
The arbitration clause is considered by Mayer as auxiliary to the main agreement.391 The 
auxiliary nature of the arbitration clause means that its only function is to assist in the fulfil-
ment of the main agreement.392 When it comes to arbitration clauses, the function is to solve 
conflicts and determine the future of the main agreement.393 The function of the arbitration 
clause can be explained with the presumed will of the parties.394 When transferring the main 
agreement, the clause should consequently follow with the main agreement or otherwise the 
clause could not fulfil its auxiliary function to solve conflicts and determine the future of the 
                                                          
387 Born 2014A, p. 1466-1469; As Fouchard has explained it, if the arbitration clause would not be transferred 
with the main agreement, it would have no objective. Fouchard is of the opinion, that regardless of the doc-
trine of separability, it should be presumed that the parties intend to also transfer the arbitration clause if 
the opposite is not shown. It is unsure from his reasoning if the transfer is automatic or if a separate assess-
ment of the transfer of the arbitration clause has to be done, Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 427-428; At least most 
civil law countries seems to accept that the arbitration clause is also transferred to the transferee when the 
main contract is transferred. Contrary to the civil law countries, the legal state in the common law countries 
is still not clear. Leboulanger is of the opinion that regardless of if it is presumed that the parties intend to 
also transfer the arbitration clause, the transfer of the arbitration clause is independent, and thus in accord-
ance with the doctrine of separability, Leboulanger 2007, p. 29-31; However, there are still opinions that 
suggests that even if the main agreement is transferred it does not even trigger a presumption that also the 
arbitration clause is transferred, even if most legal systems accept the automatic transferability, Born 2014A, 
p. 1468-1469; Landolt 2013, p. 516, 518; Landolt is also of the opinion that the legal state should be similar, 
regardless of the type of dispute resolution clause transferred, Landolt 2013, p. 518. 
388 Born 2014A, p. 1468; Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 427-428. 
389 Born 2014A, p. 1469. 
390 Born 2014A, p. 1470. 
391 Mayer 1999, p. 262-264. 
392 Mayer 1999, p. 262-264. 
393 As one of its auxiliary functions is to assist in determining the future of the main agreement, it is clear that 
the arbitration clause should survive the invalidity, termination and non-existence of the main agreement, 
Mayer 1999, p. 262-264.  
394 Mayer 1999, p. 263. 
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main agreement.395 Therefore, based on the auxiliary nature of the arbitration clause, it 
should be presumed that also the arbitration clause is transferred.396 
However, Mayer does not see a conflict between the nature of the arbitration clause and the 
doctrine of separability. He even states that because of the nature of the arbitration clause, 
the doctrine of separability is vital for the fulfilment of the function of the clause to determine 
the future of the agreement as both severable and auxiliary to the substantive part of the 
agreement.397 Consequently, the arbitration clause has to be separable in at least some situ-
ations to fulfil its auxiliary function.398  
5.3 Possible Constructions for General Rules on the Applicability of the Doctrine of Sepa-
rability 
Based on the thesis and the aforementioned examples, it is time to conclude if there are any 
general rules that can be applied to decide the scope of the doctrine of separability. There 
are some different options which I will assess. Firstly, I will assess Koulu´s theory focusing 
on variations in the strength of the doctrine of separability, which is the only Finnish theory 
considering the scope and applicability of the doctrine. Secondly, I will analyse different 
theories restricting the applicability of the doctrine of separability based on the intention of 
the parties and the aim of the doctrine. Thirdly and lastly, I will assess if the scope and 
applicability of the doctrine of separability can be determined by the definition of the doc-
trine, especially by definitions enacted by the legislator. 
5.3.1 Differences in the Strength of the Doctrine of Separability399 
Even if the matter has not been thoroughly studied in Finland, some necessary advice for the 
construction of general rules can however be taken from Koulu´s research. Koulu suggests 
that depending on the situation to which the doctrine of separability is applied, the strength 
of the doctrine varies.400 This theory would suggest that the doctrine is at its strongest when 
the main agreement is allegedly invalid since both the presumed aim of the parties and the 
                                                          
395 Mayer 1999, p. 263; It has also been argued that the application of the doctrine of separability would be 
against the purpose of the transfer, Brekoulakis 2010, p. 32; This argument is quite close to the argument 
regarding the auxiliary function of the clause, since it could be argued that the auxiliary function of the clause 
is the reason for also transferring the arbitration clause in connection to the transfer of the main agreement. 
396 Fouchard et al. 1999, p. 427-428. 
397 Mayer 1999, p. 263. 
398 In some situations, for instance when the main agreement is assigned, the arbitration clause has to be 
non-separable to fulfil its auxiliary function, Mayer 1999, p. 263-264. 
399 Koulu calls it “Erillisyysopin vahvuusvaihtelu”, Koulu 2008. p. 76-79. 
400 Koulu 2008, p. 78. 
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function of the arbitration clause supports the applicability of the doctrine.401 The doctrine 
is weak when it comes to the alleged non-existence of the main agreement. Even if the ap-
plicability is formally accepted in for instance the UNCITRAL Model Law and the function 
of the arbitration clause supports the applicability, there could according to Koulu be no 
intention of the parties to apply the doctrine since there is not even an agreement concluded 
between them.402 Between these examples of a strong and a weak doctrine are the expired 
main agreements.403 The doctrine of separability could be applied to expired main agree-
ments since it could be argued that there is an operative necessity for applying the doctrine 
and the presumed party will supports the applicability.404 However according to Koulu, from 
a legal standpoint it could be difficult to separate the situation from that of the non-existence 
of the main agreement.405 
As I interpret Koulu´s thoughts, it would be necessary to compare different factors, for in-
stance the intent of the parties and the function of the arbitration clause. Based on the com-
parison, a case by case analysis should be made on what strength the doctrine shall be given. 
As with many of the other theories, the aim of the parties and the function of the dispute 
resolution clause seems to be in the centre of Koulu´s theory. The value of this theory is that 
it takes into consideration the aims of the arbitration clause and the intent of the parties and 
so prevents the doctrine of separability from being applied to situations counteracting the 
aims of the clause and the intention of the parties.  
5.3.2 Constructions Focusing on the Intention of the Parties and the Aim of the Doctrine 
As Koulu´s research also suggests, the intention of the parties, the aim of the doctrine and 
the aim of the arbitration clause have been regarded as the most important factors to consider 
when assessing the scope of the doctrine of separability.406 
                                                          
401 Koulu 2008, p. 78. 
402 Koulu 2008, p. 78-79. 
403 Koulu calls it “keskivahva erillisyysoppi”, Koulu 2008, p. 79.  
404 Koulu 2008, p. 79. 
405 This could enable forum shopping, since a party could allege that the agreement was never entered into 
instead of alleging that it has expired, Koulu 2008, p. 79. 
406 As will be shown in this chapter, many academics have put more focus on the aim of the doctrine of 
separability than on the aim of the arbitration clause, see e.g. Heuman 2003, p. 47; Heuman 1999, p. 66; The 
aim of the arbitration clause is to get all disputes regarding the main agreement solved by arbitration. The 
aim of the doctrine of separability is to enhance efficiency and to give the tribunal competence. This division 
seems to be more of a theoretical one since both usually lead to the same results. Apparently, one of the 
most important things aimed with the doctrine of separability is to protect the arbitration clause so that it 
could fulfil its own aim. 
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According to Heuman, the doctrine of separability can only be applied if the application is 
in accordance with the intention of the parties.407 The intention is considered as a hypothet-
ical intention of a typical party.408 It has been stated that normally the intention of the parties 
is to get all their contractual disputes solved by arbitration and that this presumption prevails 
if it is not overturned by the actual will of the parties.409 Consequently, the doctrine of sep-
arability cannot be applied if the actual will of the parties or the hypothetical will of the 
average party can be shown to oppose the applicability of the doctrine.410 This kind of con-
struction of the will of the parties cannot necessarily be found in general contract law but 
can be regarded as a political striving to give competence to the arbitral tribunal.411 The 
strength of the theory is that without the will of the parties, there is no meeting of minds and 
thus the doctrine of separability cannot be a part of the agreement concluded.412 
Lindskog criticizes the theory regarding the hypothetical or average aim of the parties as 
unmotivated to apply to a party with no intent to even conclude the main agreement and 
since the parties do not usually consider the possibility that their agreement is invalid when 
concluding the agreement.413 Even if Lindskog´s criticism is well-grounded as the construc-
tion appears artificial, the theory can be defended by a party´s possibility to prove that the 
intent has not been to apply the doctrine. The threshold for proving this should be quite low 
or the presumption even opposite in some situations. For instance when transferring the main 
agreement, it could be presumed that the parties are aware of the arbitration clause included 
in the main agreement before accepting the assignment.414 
                                                          
407 Heuman 1997, p. 536. 
408 Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; This presumption has also been described as a rule of contractual construction 
rather than the actual intention of the parties, Schöldström 1998, p. 265. 
409 The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1984, p. 27. 
410 Heuman 1997, p. 536; For instance, the hypothetical will of the parties regarding the assignment of the 
main agreement seems to be to also assign the arbitration clause in connection with the main agreement and 
therefore the doctrine of separability cannot be applied if the opposite is not shown. 
411 It is also possible that the will of the parties can be expressed by interpreting the agreement in the way 
respecting the average will of the parties, Heuman 1997, p. 547. 
412However, if the doctrine of separability is only seen as a tool for contractual interpretation and the inten-
tion of the parties is only taken into consideration in the actual separate interpretation of the arbitration 
clause, the problem with justifying the doctrine would also be solved, see chapter 5.4. 
413 Lindskog 2012, p. 290, 294. 
414 For more about the doctrine of separability and the transfer of the main agreement, see chapter 5.2. 
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In Finland, there seems to be no such thing as the hypothetical or average aim of the parties 
in contractual interpretation. However, in the objective interpretation of agreements the per-
spective of a reasonable man has to be taken into consideration.415 With this is meant to 
interpret the agreement so as to find the intent of the parties from a neutral viewpoint and 
with a normal, reasonable understanding.416 All in all, even if there is no such interpretational 
standard as the average or hypothetical aim of the parties, the construction is however quite 
close to the ordinary Finnish interpretative standards.  
Later, Heuman has focused on the underlying aims of the doctrine of separability to give the 
tribunal competence and make the proceeding more efficient.417 In his later writings, he has 
come to the conclusion that the doctrine of separability cannot be applied in contradiction 
with its aims.418 Even if the definition and wording of the doctrine opens for a wide applica-
tion of the doctrine, the aim narrows the scope of the doctrine.419 As an example of such a 
situation can be mentioned the application of the doctrine of separability to transfer of rights, 
since if the arbitration clause would not be transferred and not bind the transferee, the tribu-
nal would not anymore have competence.420  
                                                          
415 Annola 2016, p. 117; The starting point for the interpretation of agreements in Finland is an intersubjective 
interpretation, which aims to find the common intent of the parties. This cannot often be found and thus the 
next step is to find the common intent of the parties with an objective interpretation, based on the viewpoint 
of a reasonable man, Annola 2016, p. 88-89; However, if the common intent of the parties cannot be found 
from an intersubjective, objective or subjective interpretation, one has to resort to a risk-sharing interpreta-
tion. The risk-sharing interpretation is not anymore based on the aim of the parties but on a group of objective 
norms used for deciding the content of the agreement, Annola 2016, p. 257-258; One of the objective norms 
possibly applied is the normality rule (tavallisuussääntö), which stipulates that if the intention of the parties 
cannot be found, the interpretation has to be done in accordance with common practice, Annola 2016, p. 
283-284; When drawing a border between the normality rule and the objective interpretation, the interpre-
tation has been considered as objective if the source for the interpretation demonstrates the intent of the 
parties and as risk-sharing if the used source for the interpretation does not demonstrate the intent of the 
parties, Annola 2016, p. 260; There seems to be some elements of common intent regarding the implications 
of agreeing on an arbitration clause, for instance it could be alleged that there is a common intent to solve 
all disputes regarding the main agreement by arbitration. Consequently, it appears that the average or hypo-
thetical aim of the parties is better positioned as a part of the objective interpretation even if it fairly could 
be argued that it also could be considered as a part of the normality rule. 
416 Annola 2016, p. 79; This way of interpreting agreements when the intersubjective intentions of the parties 
cannot be found is similar in all Nordic countries and the continental Europe, Lando 2016, p. 28. 
417 Heuman 2003, p. 44; Heuman 1999, p. 62-63; Heuman was earlier in his article from 1997 sceptical about 
which weight could be given to the fact that the applicability of the doctrine of separability can counteract 
the aims of the doctrine, especially the aim of giving competence to the tribunal, Heuman 1997, p. 546-547; 
However, already then he mentioned that it is possible that the Supreme Court in NJA 1997:147 did not apply 
the doctrine of separability, since it did possibly counteract the aim of the doctrine to give competence to 
the tribunal, Heuman 1997, p. 557. 
418 Heuman 2003, p. 47; Heuman 1999, p. 66. 
419 Heuman 2003, p. 47; Heuman 1999, p. 66. 
420 Heuman 1997, p. 546. 
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Also, internationally there are scholars suggesting that the doctrine of separability cannot be 
applied further than the original aim of the doctrine.421  However, Lindskog stresses that one 
has to be careful when restricting the applicability of the doctrine of separability based on 
the aim of the doctrine, since the prohibition of the applicability of the doctrine to other 
situations than those regarding the competence of the tribunal cannot in his opinion be 
drawn.422  
As a conclusion of Heuman´s theories, it seems that the starting point is that the doctrine of 
separability can be applied to all interactions between the main agreement and the arbitration 
clause. The scope of the doctrine is however narrowed by the aim of the doctrine and the 
intention of the parties. As factors narrowing the doctrine Heuman considers; 1. The parties’ 
intention not to apply the doctrine; 2. The applicability of the doctrine does not make the 
proceeding more efficient; and 3. The applicability of the doctrine does counteract the aim 
of giving competence to the tribunal. Heuman´s argumentation is important in Sweden, 
where the doctrine of separability is strong and there seems to be a need for restricting the 
applicability of the doctrine from situations where the applicability of the doctrine in accord-
ance with its wording would lead to unwanted results. 
As shown in the examples regarding boilerplate clauses and transfer of the main agreement, 
the leading basis for the applicability of the doctrine of separability seems at least in Sweden 
to be the aim of the parties. The interpretation of the scope of the doctrine of separability in 
the case law regarding the transferability of the arbitration clause has lots of similarities with 
Heuman´s theory and a stronger institutional support. It is however not sure if the transfer 
of the arbitration clause in the case law was based on the automatic assignment of the arbi-
tration clause or a separate assessment of the transfer of the arbitration clause. Nevertheless, 
the will of the parties seems to be the basis for the transfer of the arbitration clause in the 
Supreme Court decision NJA 1997:147 regardless of if the aim of the parties affected the 
applicability of the doctrine of separability or the separate assessment of the arbitration 
clause. In Norway, the matter regarding the transfer of the arbitration clause when transfer-
ring the main agreement has been solved by referring to the efficiency aim of the doctrine of 
separability instead of the aim of the parties. If the arbitration clause is not transferred, the 
                                                          
421 See e.g. Veeder who is of the opinion that the doctrine of separability can only be used for the “creation 
and validity” of the arbitration clause, Veeder 1996, p. 292. 
422 Lindskog 2012, p. 291. 
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conflict would have to be solved in a general court which is against the efficiency objective 
of the doctrine.423 
It can be argued that the intention of the parties, the aims of the arbitration clause and the 
aims of the doctrine of separability are closely connected. It could be alleged that the pre-
sumed intention of the parties is to solve all conflicts regarding the contract by arbitration. 
This also seems to be the aim of the arbitration clause. The aim of the doctrine of separability 
seems to be to fulfil these aims by make the proceeding more efficient and give competence 
to the tribunal. 
The strength of the intention of the parties is its close connection to general contract law and 
especially interpretation and construction of agreements. It is indisputable that the objective 
when interpreting Finnish contracts is to find the common intent of the parties.424 The prin-
ciple is strong in Finland and can only be set aside by mandatory law. The strong force 
behind the principle is the freedom of contract.425 Therefore, it seems legitimate to justify 
the borders of the doctrine of separability with the aim of the parties and in the separate 
assessment of the arbitration clause interpret the clause in accordance with the intent of the 
parties. 
As Mayer has stated, the arbitration clause has an auxiliary function to the main agreement, 
which is to solve disputes and determine the future of the main agreement. This construction 
seems to be used in a similar way in general contract law when deciding which clauses of an 
agreement stay valid even if the agreement is terminated. Mayer uses the doctrine of sepa-
rability to justify the separate assessment of the arbitration clause in situations where it is 
needed for the fulfilment of the auxiliary function of the arbitration clause.426 Consequently, 
the scope of the doctrine of separability could also be determined by asking if the applica-
bility of the doctrine is necessary for the protection of the use of arbitration as the way of 
solving the contractual conflicts between the parties and the future of the main agreement. 
                                                          
423 NOU 2001:33, p. 72; To resolve the ambiguous legal state, the Norwegian Government added a provision 
clarifying the legal state regarding the transfer of arbitration clauses in connection with transfers of main 
agreements in section 10, subsection 2 of the Arbitration Act. 
424 Annola 2015, p. 24. 
425 Annola 2015, p. 59; The freedom of contract is the basis of all Nordic contract laws, Lando 2016, p. 26. 
426 Also Hobér and Magnusson accepts the auxiliary nature of the arbitration clause. According to them, the 
auxiliary nature of the arbitration clause and the doctrine of separability are not in conflict with each other, 
Hobér & Magnusson 2008, p. 72. 
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5.3.3 The Definition of the Doctrine of Separability as a Factor Affecting the Scope of 
the Doctrine 
Both in the legislation and legal doctrine there can be found both exhaustive and inclusive 
definitions of the doctrine of separability. This subchapter aims to assess if the definition of 
the doctrine can assist in determining the scope of the doctrine of separability. Because of 
its value as a source of law, definitions enacted by the legislator are of particular interest. 
This kind of determination of the scope of the doctrine based on the wording of the definition 
can however be criticized for being jurisprudence of concepts.  
The legislator´s choices regarding the scope of the doctrine of separability have to be evalu-
ated, and if explicit enough, they have to be respected. In the Nordic countries, it seems that 
the legislator has tried to restrict the applicability of the doctrine of separability to only the 
invalidity and non-existence of the main agreement.427 The legislative technique is similar 
in all Nordic countries, except Finland where the doctrine is not codified in the Arbitration 
Act. First, the Nordic arbitration acts define the situations where the Court has competence-
competence, and in the following sentence, subsection or section that the doctrine of sepa-
rability is applied to the aforementioned situations.428 It appears that this could be an explicit 
choice made by the legislator to restrict the applicability of the doctrine. Otherwise the leg-
islator would only have stated that “the arbitration clause shall be regarded as a separate 
agreement”, without explicitly mentioning that the applicability is restricted to the situations 
mentioned in connection with the competence-competence of the court. However, in at least 
Sweden and Norway, the doctrine has been given a broader scope in legal doctrine than 
could be read from the wording of their respective arbitration acts.429  
                                                          
427 In Sweden, the Government Proposal also mentions that the doctrine of separability should be applied to 
expired main agreements, Prop. 1998/99:35, p. 75. 
428 Swedish Arbitration Act, sections 2-3, Norwegian Arbitration Act, section 18 and Danish Arbitration Act, 
chapter 4, section 16. 
429 For instance in Sweden and Norway, the doctrine of separability seems to be applied to the choice of law, 
see chapter 3.5; On the contrary, in some jurisdictions the scope of the doctrine of separability could be 
narrow, caused by a narrow definition of the doctrine. For instance, in United Kingdom the definition included 
in the Arbitration Act seems to restrict the scope of the doctrine. The last phrase of section 7 of the British 
Arbitration Act could be said to cut the grounds for using the doctrine in other situations than the invalidity, 
non-existence and ineffectiveness of the main agreement, as it states that: “Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, an arbitration agreement which forms or was intended to form part of another agreement (whether 
or not in writing) shall not be regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective because that other agreement is 
invalid, or did not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that purpose be treated as a 
distinct agreement”; Regarding the choice of law of the arbitration clause, it also seems that the doctrine is 
not applied in United Kingdom, see SulAmérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and others v Enesa Engenharia 
S.A., 1 W.L.R. 102 (2012) in chapter 3.5; There was no mentioning of section 7 of the Arbitration Act in the 
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In Finland, the situation is different since the doctrine is not defined in the Arbitration Act. 
Neither is there case law explicitly determining the borders of the doctrine of separability. 
From the case law can only be determined that the doctrine reaches to terminated and invalid 
main agreements and that it enables the separate assessment of the applicable laws to the 
main agreement and the arbitration clause.430 Neither does Finnish legal doctrine give any 
further assistance. Some of the academics have defined the scope of the doctrine of separa-
bility to only include the invalidity of the main agreement and some have given the doctrine 
an open scope.431 In addition, there are also legal academics explicitly accepting the applica-
bility of the doctrine to the choice of law of the arbitration clause.432 
An exhaustive definition of the doctrine could also possibly be modelled from Born´s list of 
situations where the doctrine of separability is applied. Born lists the matters to which the 
doctrine is applicable as; 1. The validity of the arbitration clause when the main agreement 
is allegedly invalid (including non-existence and termination of the main agreement); 2. 
Choice of law; 3. The possibility to apply different legal rules within the same legal system 
to the arbitration clause and the main agreement; and 4. The validity of the main agreement 
when the arbitration clause is invalid.433 Even if Born does not mention if his list is exhaus-
tive or inclusive, in his later book from 2015 which is not as comprehensive as the 2014 
book, Born uses the same list but mentions that it is only an example list.434  
In addition, Born has also stressed that the separability doctrine forces the courts/tribunals 
to make a separate assessment of the binding effect of the arbitration clause, also in other 
situations than the situations included in the aforementioned list.435 This is interesting since 
it enables a wide application of the doctrine, with focus on the separate assessment of the 
arbitration clause instead of the restriction of the applicability of the doctrine of separability. 
                                                          
Court of Appeal decision, but the narrow scope of the doctrine applied in the case was justified with the 
intent of the parties to only apply the doctrine in situations where the applicability prevents the ineffective-
ness of the main agreement, SulAmérica Cia Nacional De Seguros S.A. and others v Enesa Engenharia S.A., 1 
W.L.R. 102 (2012), pp. 26; Consequently, it seems that the definition could be a reason for the narrow inter-
pretation of the doctrine of separability in the United Kingdom. It also has to be kept in mind that the doctrine 
of separability has historically been weak in the United Kingdom which can be a reason for the narrow defi-
nition of the term codified in the Arbitration Act in 1996 and for the restrictive use of the doctrine in the case 
law. 
430 KKO 1954 II 11 and KKO 1980 II 103 (termination); KKO 1988:55 and KKO 1996:61 (invalidity); KKO 2007:39 
(choice of law).  
431 See chapter 2.1. 
432 See chapter 3.5.1. 
433 Born 2014A, p. 401. 
434 Born 2015, chapter 2, pp 23. 
435 Born 2014A, p. 1413 (regarding non-signatory parties), 1458 (regarding third party beneficiaries). 
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Consequently, it seems that the scope of the doctrine of separability cannot easily be ex-
haustively determined. The scope of the doctrine of separability is ambiguous and the doc-
trine can be applied to a wide variety of situations not easily listed. 
Finally, as regards the scope of the doctrine of separability, there seems to be at least two 
different scholars. The first one stresses that the aim of the doctrine and intention of the 
parties are important to take into account when applying the doctrine. If the application of 
the doctrine of separability contravenes the aim of the doctrine or the aim of the parties, it 
cannot be applied. The other scholar strongly supports an approach where the doctrine has 
to be interpreted in accordance with its definition. According to this scholar, the doctrine 
keeps the evaluation of the main agreement and the arbitration clause separate in all situa-
tions. Based on the legal doctrine, it seems that the scholar keeping the doctrine narrow by 
not applying the doctrine to situations where the application would be against the aim of the 
parties or the aim of the doctrine, is the leading one.  
5.4 Can any General Rules for Assessing the Applicability of the Doctrine be made? 
In the following, I will argue that in accordance with the doctrine of separability, the assess-
ment of the arbitration clause shall always be made separately. This does not however pre-
vent the usage of the main agreement to find out the intention of the parties when separately 
assessing the arbitration clause. 
5.4.1 The Scope of the Doctrine of Separability 
When determining the scope of the doctrine of separability, there are two different options; 
1. It is possible that the doctrine of separability can be set aside when the applicability of the 
doctrine is not in accordance with the aim of the parties and/or the aims of the arbitration 
clause and the doctrine itself;436 and 2. It could be alleged that based on the special features 
of the arbitration clause, the assessment of the arbitration clause shall always be made sepa-
rately from the main agreement.437 I suggest that the second option should be applied. This 
approach would be a construction respecting both the special features of the arbitration 
clause and the intention of the parties. The nature of the arbitration clause requires that the 
evaluation of the clause is made separately to avoid the tribunal losing its competence and 
                                                          
436 Heuman is one of the academics strongly supporting this option. 
437 I would suggest that Hobér & Magnusson supports this option based on their opinions regarding the ap-
plicability of the doctrine of separability to the transfer of rights. 
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the arbitration clause losing its efficiency. On the other hand, the result of the separate as-
sessment of the arbitration clause has to be based on the will of the parties since general 
contract law rules and the specific interpretational rules for arbitration clauses are to be ap-
plied to the assessment. 
Consequently, there are two different dimensions of the evaluation of an arbitration clause 
included in a main agreement; 1. Because of the nature and character of the arbitration clause 
as a dispute resolution clause, the main agreement and the arbitration clause shall be assessed 
separately; and 2. The separate assessment of the arbitration clause has to be done in accord-
ance with the general interpretational rules and the specific interpretational rules for arbitra-
tion clauses.  
The applicability of the doctrine of separability to all situations is a tool for contractual con-
struction which is aimed at protecting the specific features and nature of the arbitration 
clause. As the arbitration clause is auxiliary to the main agreement and as it needs to fulfil 
its procedural functions related to the main agreement, it has to be evaluated as a separate 
agreement. These functions cannot be fulfilled, if the arbitral tribunal loses its competence 
or the arbitration clause becomes ineffective because of the clause being a part of the main 
agreement. The separate assessment can best be explained and justified with the doctrine of 
separability.  
There is no reason for restricting the applicability of the doctrine of separability to only 
certain situations since it is only the tool for the contractual construction which does not 
affect the actual evaluation of the arbitration clause nor infringe the will of the parties. The 
doctrine of separability does not prevent other interactions between the main agreement and 
the arbitration clause. 
The first and foremost function and aim of the doctrine of separability is to protect the com-
petence and efficiency of the tribunal. Therefore, it could be alleged that the doctrine should 
only be applied to situations where the competence and efficiency of the tribunal is at risk. 
However, since the applicability of the doctrine of separability to the choice of law has been 
accepted already from the beginning both in Finland and internationally, it seems that the 
doctrine cannot be restricted to only the aforementioned situations. The application of the 
doctrine of separability to the choice of law only enables an equal assessment of whether lex 
contractus or lex arbitri will be applied to the arbitration clause and does not protect the 
efficiency and competence of the tribunal. Only in concrete situations, the choice of either 
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lex arbitri or lex contractus can lead to the tribunal losing its competence, but the doctrine 
of separability cannot protect the arbitration clause in these in casu evaluations where the 
applicable law is decided by the parties or by the closest connection. Consequently, the doc-
trine of separability cannot in the context of choice of law be explained with efficiency ar-
guments.  
One could ask if the problem could be solved without the doctrine of separability, by re-
specting the intention of the parties and the function of the arbitration clause, for instance by 
contractual interpretation. In general contract law, arbitration clauses are interpreted in ac-
cordance with their function of solving disputes regarding the main agreement.438 Even if 
the main agreement has expired, the arbitration clause stays valid to solve the conflicts re-
garding the main agreement and to determine the future of the agreement.439 However, this 
construction does not work for instance if the main agreement is invalid or non-existent. If 
there is no validly concluded main agreement or the agreement was never entered into, there 
is no base for the arbitrators´ competence since there is neither a valid or existent arbitration 
clause to interpret. By applying the doctrine of separability, there is a separate arbitration 
clause and the arbitrators can have competence even if the main agreement is invalid or non-
existent.  
The above mentioned functions and aims of the arbitration clause also seem to be presumed 
by the parties when deciding to opt for arbitration. However, the will of the parties is not 
optimal as a source for the justification of the doctrine of separability and is better suited for 
the actual interpretation of the arbitration clause. As shown in chapter 2.2, the aim of the 
parties is to effectively solve all the disputes regarding the main agreement by arbitration 
and not to explicitly apply the doctrine of separability. As a consequence, it is difficult to 
justify the applicability of the doctrine of separability with the aim of the parties as has been 
done in Sweden. The presumed aim to solve all the disputes efficiently by arbitration is 
instead better taken into consideration in the actual separate assessment and interpretation of 
the arbitration clause which is enabled by the doctrine of separability.  
                                                          
438 The aim of the parties is regarded as an intent to solve all disputes concerning the agreement by arbitration 
if the opposite is not shown. 
439 Lindfelt 2011, p. 208. 
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5.4.2 The Actual Assessment of the Arbitration Clause 
In the actual evaluation of the arbitration clause, the aim of the parties is the leading principle 
of interpretation. The doctrine of separability only enables the interpretation of the arbitra-
tion clause in accordance with the intent of the parties. Consequently, the intent of the parties 
and not the doctrine of separability determines the fate of the arbitration clause.  
Since it is not always possible to find the common intent of the parties, certain presumptions 
should be made regarding the will of the parties. These presumptions are closely linked to 
the aim of the arbitration clause, which is to give the parties an effective method of solving 
all their disputes related to the main agreement. For instance, it can be presumed that the 
parties intend to solve also disputes regarding the termination and invalidity of the main 
agreement by arbitration and that they intend to transfer the arbitration clause in connection 
with the transfer of the main agreement since otherwise the arbitration clause would lose its 
function. In addition, general contract law rules are applied to the assessment of the arbitra-
tion clause.  
5.4.3 A Practical Approach to the General Rules 
The theory explains well the classic situations of invalidity, expiration and non-existence of 
the main agreement. If the arbitration clause would not be evaluated separately, the tribunal 
would lose its competence when ruling the main agreement invalid, non-existent or expired. 
In these situations, it is accepted that the arbitration clause shall be assessed separately but 
in accordance with general contract law rules. These rules enable both the invalidity of the 
arbitration clause and the main agreement on the same invalidity ground after separate as-
sessments, and the validity of one of the agreements regardless of the validity of the other 
agreement.  
When it comes to the choice of law, the doctrine of separability enables the respecting of the 
intent of the parties by an equal assessment of lex arbitri and lex contractus as possible 
applicable laws. Without the doctrine of separability, lex contractus would be applied if no 
explicit choice of law for the arbitration clause is concluded by the parties. With the doctrine 
of separability, the law applicable to the arbitration clause is assessed separately and in the 
actual assessment of the applicable law, the intention of the parties is the leading interpretive 
principle followed by the principle of the closest connection. 
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Also the interpretation and adjustment of the arbitration clause and the main agreement has 
to be made separately. Otherwise the court or the tribunal mixes the material and procedural 
parts of the proceeding. In addition, an adjustment of the main agreement leading to the 
agreement being declared terminated would eliminate the competence of the tribunal if the 
arbitration clause would not be considered as a separate agreement. However, in the actual 
interpretation of the arbitration clause, the main agreement shall be considered as a source 
for the interpretation as expressing the intention of the parties. Also, when adjusting the 
arbitration clause, the main agreement can be considered in accordance with the Contracts 
Act, section 36.440  
When it comes to the assignment of the main agreement, a separate assessment of the as-
signment of the arbitration clause has to be made since there could be different formal re-
quirements for the transfer of the main agreement and the arbitration clause. When assessing 
the transfer separately, it should be presumed that the intention of the parties is to also trans-
fer the arbitration clause, because the parties should have been aware of the arbitration clause 
included in the main agreement and its implications.  
Lastly, the doctrine can also be used to explain if a boilerplate clause included in the main 
agreement also reaches to the arbitration clause. Even if boilerplate clauses are a part of the 
main agreement, a separate assessment has to be done to consider if they are also a part of 
the arbitration clause. In the separate assessment, it has to be evaluated if the parties have 
intended the clauses to be a part of the arbitration clause. 
5.5 Conclusions 
There seems to be no general rules applicable to the doctrine of separability in Finland. The 
most probable reason for this is that no comprehensive research regarding the doctrine has 
been made in Finland. In Sweden, where the doctrine of separability is stronger, there are at 
least some academic opinions that could be used to assess the scope of the doctrine. Also, 
Born´s and Mayer´s thoughts regarding the scope of the doctrine are of value. 
In Finland, there is a need for more research regarding the subject. Koulu has completed 
some research about the strength of the doctrine, but there is a need for more comprehensive 
                                                          
440 Another question is if it is justified to use the main agreement as a tool for adjusting the arbitration clause 
or if the court/tribunal exceeds its competence as a consequence of the adjustment. 
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research since Koulu has only briefly assessed the scope of the doctrine. However, Koulu´s 
theory is a good starting point for further research.  
In Sweden, where the doctrine of separability has been studied more thoroughly, the starting 
point is that the doctrine is applied to all interaction between the main agreement and the 
arbitration clause. The scope of the doctrine seems to be narrowed by the aim of the doctrine 
and the intention of the parties since the doctrine cannot be applied in a way opposing these 
foundations of the doctrine. This kind of construction has also been used in international 
arbitration. However, Hobér and Magnusson have in their article applied a broad doctrine of 
separability and only assessed the presumed aim of the parties in the separate assessment 
and interpretation of the arbitration clause. The possibility to apply these theories in Finland 
is unsure. The doctrine seems to be stronger in Sweden, which also seems to be a reason for 
adapting theories assessing the scope and applicability of the doctrine.441 On the other hand, 
the theories are logical and the Finnish and Swedish contract laws are closely connected.  
I suggest that because of the doctrine of separability, the arbitration clause shall be assessed 
separately from the main agreement in all situations. The arbitration clause is a procedural 
agreement auxiliary to the subjective main agreement and thus has certain tasks and features 
that have to be protected by evaluating the arbitration clause as a separate agreement. The 
doctrine of separability is only a tool for contractual construction, which enables the courts 
and tribunals to give proper effect to the arbitration clause and the intent of the parties. The 
doctrine does in no other way prevent the interaction between the main agreement and the 
arbitration clause. When separately assessing and interpreting the arbitration clause, the gen-
eral contract law rules determine the outcome of the assessment without any impact of the 
doctrine of separability. 
  
                                                          
441 See however Lindskog, who is of the opinion that the legal state regarding the doctrine of separability is 
similar in Finland and Sweden, Lindskog 2012, p. 289. 
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6. Conclusions 
6.1 The Core of the Doctrine of Separability 
The first research question concerned the core of the doctrine of separability. How is the 
core of the doctrine of separability defined in Finland and how broad is the scope of the 
core? Regarding the strength of the core of the doctrine of separability, the effects of the 
doctrine has to be assessed in four different scenarios; an allegedly invalid main agreement, 
an allegedly invalid arbitration clause, a terminated main agreement and an allegedly non-
existent main agreement. When it comes to the alleged invalidity of the main agreement, it 
is clear that the doctrine of separability applies both in Finland and internationally. The in-
teresting question regards on which basis the arbitration clause can be considered invalid. 
Based on Finnish doctrine, it seems that the invalidity grounds applied to the determination 
of the validity of the arbitration clause are similar to those used in general contract law, 
regardless of the doctrine of separability. In addition, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights forces the member states 
of the Convention to make sure that arbitration clauses are only valid if the formation of the 
intent to arbitrate is made by free will. 
There seems to be a broad acceptance regarding the applicability of the doctrine of separa-
bility to conflicts concerning expired main agreements. The question is more complex when 
it comes to agreements alleged to be non-existent. There are situations where a valid arbitra-
tion clause could have been concluded even if the main agreement has not been signed. The 
case law regarding draft agreements shows that there is a need for the doctrine of separability 
to be applied to such situations. Otherwise, the court would not have competence to rule the 
arbitration clause of a draft agreement valid and the main agreement non-existent. In Finland, 
there is no consensus regarding the applicability of the doctrine to allegedly non-existent 
main agreements, but it is based on the aforementioned example and Nordic and interna-
tional doctrine justifiable, to claim that the doctrine should be applied. 
When it comes to measures for solving the occurred problems, the coming amendment of 
the Arbitration Act seems to be a good opportunity to clarify the legal state. I am only con-
cerned about the applicability of the doctrine of separability to allegedly non-existent main 
agreements. When it comes to the invalidity and expiration of the main agreement and the 
invalidity of the arbitration clause, the legal state seems to be settled. The coming amend-
ment of the Arbitration Act could include a new section defining the doctrine and stating 
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that the invalidity, expiration or non-existence of the main agreement does not ipso jure 
make the arbitration clause invalid.442 Thus, a separate assessment of the validity of the ar-
bitration clause would also be done when it is alleged that the main agreement is non-exist-
ent.  
6.2 Choice of Law and the Doctrine of Separability 
The second research question regarded choice of law clauses in the main agreement. Does 
the doctrine of separability prevent choice of law clauses in the main agreement from being 
applied to the arbitration clause? The applicability of the doctrine of separability to the 
choice of law seems to be quite settled in Finland. Today, it seems that there is a general 
consensus both internationally and in Finland that because of the doctrine of separability, 
the choice of law of the arbitration clause shall be assessed separately from the choice of law 
of the main agreement. The doctrine enables the applicability of different laws to the main 
agreement and the arbitration clause, but the doctrine does not restrain from the possibility 
to apply lex contractus to the arbitration clause nor favour the applicability of lex arbitri. 
Without the doctrine, the choice of law made for the main agreement would automatically 
be applied to the arbitration clause, if it is not explicitly agreed on the applicable law in the 
arbitration clause.  
The application of the doctrine of separability to the choice of law could be criticized even 
if the legal state is settled. The aim of the doctrine and the intention of the parties do not 
support the applicability of the doctrine to the choice of law and the applicability has not 
been comprehensively explained in Finland, Sweden or internationally. However, as shown 
in chapter 5.4, by applying the doctrine of separability to the choice of law in order to enable 
the respecting of the actual intent of the parties and an equal assessment of lex arbitri and 
lex contractus, the doctrine should be justified. The application of the doctrine of separability 
enables a separate assessment of the laws applicable to the main agreement and the arbitra-
tion clause. The separate assessment enables an evaluation of the choice of law in a way 
respecting the benefits of both lex contractus and lex arbitri, the intention of the parties and 
the closest connection between the law and the arbitration clause.  
                                                          
442 The doctrine of separability is already defined in the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish arbitration acts. 
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6.3 Interpretation and Adjustment of Arbitration Clauses 
The third research question regarded the interpretation and adjustment of arbitration 
clauses. How does the main agreement affect the interpretation and adjustment of the arbi-
tration clause? General contract law rules are applied to the interpretation of the arbitration 
clause and to the adjustment of the arbitration clause under section 36 of the Contracts Act. 
It seems quite clear that the doctrine of separability does not extend to the interpretation and 
adjustment of the arbitration clause. However, when adjusting the main agreement, the doc-
trine of separability should at least be applied to avoid the losing of competence of the tri-
bunal. Without the doctrine, the arbitration clause would automatically be terminated if the 
main agreement is terminated as unfair. The standpoint regarding adjustment can also in 
general be criticized. As the adjustment of an arbitration clause can be considered as a pro-
cedural matter, the taking into consideration of the main agreement is not appropriate. This 
can lead to a court/tribunal exceeding its competence or increasing costs when unnecessarily 
evaluating the substantial matter. 
As I have argued in chapter 5.4, the doctrine of separability should in theory reach to both 
the adjustment and interpretation of the arbitration clause, at least so that the tribunal/court 
does not exceed its competence. In practice, this means that the interpretation and adjustment 
of the arbitration clause shall be made separately from the interpretation and adjustment of 
the main agreement, as the situation in Finland seems to be.443 In the actual interpretation 
and adjustment of the arbitration clause, it is possible and justifiable to consider the main 
agreement as a source, in accordance with the case law and legal doctrine. This is necessary 
for finding the intent of the parties and factors affecting the fairness of the arbitration clause.  
6.4 General Rules on the Applicability of the Doctrine of Separability 
Finally, the fourth research question aimed to find general rules for assessing the scope and 
applicability of the doctrine of separability. When it comes to general rules regarding the 
doctrine, there are some different possibilities offered in legal doctrine. Firstly, in the only 
research made in Finland, Koulu suggests that the doctrine has different strengths in different 
usage situations. The strength of the theory is that it is flexible and takes into consideration 
                                                          
443 In Sweden, contrary to the Finnish approach, the adjustment is made as a single overall evaluation of the 
main agreement and the arbitration clause. This could be regarded as a consequence of the non-applicability 
of the doctrine of separability. 
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both the intention of the parties and the aim of the doctrine. Koulu only presents his ideas 
without extensive reasoning which makes the evaluation of the theory difficult.  
Secondly, in Sweden it has been suggested that the doctrine of separability cannot be applied 
in contradiction to its aims of giving competence to the tribunal and of making the proceed-
ing more efficient or against the intention of the parties. The strength of the theory is that it 
is anchored in the aims behind the doctrine and the applicability test is easy to complete by 
using the different interests behind the doctrine of separability. However, there is also sup-
port for an application of a broad doctrine, only taking into consideration the intent of the 
parties in the separate assessment of the arbitration clause.  
Thirdly, because of specific situations where the application of the doctrine of separability 
would lead to unwanted results, for instance regarding the transferability of the arbitration 
clause in connection to the transfer of the main agreement, the applicability has been denied 
by claiming that the intent of the parties has not been to apply the doctrine in the specific 
situation.444 The situation has alternatively been solved by applying the doctrine of separa-
bility, but by a separate assessment of the arbitration clause conclude that the presumed in-
tent of the parties has been to also assign the arbitration clause. The latter solution is close 
to general contract law rules of contractual interpretation. 
I suggest that the doctrine of separability should be applied to all situations where the main 
agreement and the arbitration clause interconnects. The arbitration clause is a procedural 
agreement that is auxiliary to the substantive main agreement and thus has certain tasks and 
features that have to be protected by evaluating the arbitration clause separately. The doc-
trine of separability is a tool for contractual construction, which enables the courts and tri-
bunals to give proper effect to the arbitration clause and the will of the parties. It does in no 
other way prevent the interaction between the agreements. When separately assessing and 
interpreting the arbitration clause, the general contract law rules determine the outcome of 
the assessment without any impact of the doctrine of separability.  
Concludently, there is no consensus on how broad the doctrine of separability is and how 
the general rules of the doctrine shall be formed and applied. There is a need for more re-
search regarding the subject to clarify the legal state. The doctrine needs a clear general 
basis, since it is not sustainable to evaluate secluded situations of applicability without any 
                                                          
444 Alternatively, that the applicability would be in contradiction with the aim of the doctrine. 
92 
 
general rules. With general rules, the scope, applicability and strength of the doctrine of 
separability could better be concluded and procedural conflicts could be avoided.  
